Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

45. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, undated

AFGHANISTAN

INTRODUCTION

On 5 March 1979 we forwarded for SCC consideration a paper on covert action options for Afghanistan.² This paper outlines specific proposals for support of Afghan dissidents and insurgents.

BACKGROUND

In recent weeks Afghan dissidents have stepped up their insurgency against the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and have achieved surprising successes, despite having few weapons and almost no outside support. The rebellion which heretofore has been centered mainly in Afghanistan’s eastern provinces, broke out in Herat, a major city near the western border. Although our information is incomplete, it appears there were large scale defections from Army units in Herat. The Soviets clearly are concerned about setbacks to the Afghan communist regime, and have airlifted military equipment to help shore it up. Soviet media also has accused Pakistan, Egypt and the U.S. of supporting the insurgency.

The attitude of the Government of Pakistan (GOP) is crucial in considering most CA options. Recently, the GOP has signaled to us that it may be much more forthcoming than we previously believed. President Zia, in an 11 March interview in the Saudi magazine Ukaz, implied that Islamabad would like to support the anti-communist, pro-Islamic dissidents, but has not because of Soviet support for Kabul, which might “burn Islamabad’s fingers,” and doubts as to the real strength of the Afghan dissidents. Zia also said Pakistan cannot act in isolation; it must be backed by other countries in any such move. The Director of the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISID) requested a meeting on 28 March 1979 with the Chief of Station, Islamabad to discuss possible assistance to the Afghan insurgents. He said that the Afghans badly need small arms and ammunition and that the U.S. “surely could find a way to provide some assistance.” He added that he would guarantee that anything provided the Peshawar-based rebels would be put to good use. He said it is current GOP policy not to support the rebels “without a firm commitment from the U.S., Pakistan could not risk Soviet wrath.”

In a separate development, the head of the Saudi Arabian Intelligence Service raised the Afghan question [less than 1 line not declassified] and noted that there was a real possibility that the Soviets would suffer a setback in Afghanistan. He said the Saudi Government was considering officially proposing that the U.S. aid the rebels. This approach indicates the possibility of trilateral U.S.-Pakistan-Saudi cooperation in this area. At a minimum, the Saudis could be expected to provide funds and also use their influence with the GOP to encourage Pakistan assistance to the dissidents. Other countries, probably including China, could be expected to provide at least tacit support for our programs.

Soviet response to various options should be carefully gauged. We already have been falsely accused of aiding the rebels in Soviet media, and such accusations could be expected to intensify as we move forward with various programs. The Soviets easily can resupply the Afghan armed forces and they undoubtedly will step up their military aid to counter guerrilla successes. While the Soviets could provide additional “advisors,” pilots, etc., we believe they are unlikely to introduce regular troops. Should they elect to occupy the country militarily, there would be no practical way to stop them. Such a move, however, would cause serious damage to the Soviet image in the region and should serve to undermine Soviet influence and prestige throughout much of the world.

Consideration must also be given to South Asian regional relationships before deciding how closely we wish to involve ourselves with the GOP. Although the question of supporting the Afghan insurgents was originally raised by the Pakistan side, the GOP might later demand a high price in return for its cooperation in terms of security guarantees and economic assistance. Increased cooperation with the GOP must also be considered in light of our relations with India, although there is intelligence which indicates India shares our and Pakistan’s concern over developments in Afghanistan.

COVERT ACTION OPTIONS

CIA representatives have been instructed not to delve too deeply with Afghan sources into the theoretical possibility of clandestine support for the rebels, for fear of giving them false signals regarding U.S. intentions. Much specific information is therefore not now available. Listed below are a number of options, rough cost estimates and a summary of pros and cons for each.

1. Radio Broadcasts from Pakistan

Radio Pakistan has several stations which broadcast regularly into Afghanistan. Assuming GOP cooperation, these stations could be used for propaganda purposes, with CIA assisting in the programming.

Costs: [1 line not declassified]

Pros: Communications are very poorly developed in Afghanistan, and radio is the best means quickly to reach a large Afghan audience. Costs would be moderate as we would be using existing broadcasting facilities and existing staff including linguists. The U.S. hand would be hidden.

Cons: GOP cooperation would be required. Pakistan would be openly identified as opposing the Afghan regime; this would provoke Soviet/Afghan wrath and possible retaliation. In extremis, the Afghans might even attempt to bomb or sabotage the radio stations. More subtly, the Afghans could stir up trouble for Pakistan in Baluchistan and Northwest Frontier Provinces.

2. Insurgency Support—Direct Financial Aid

CIA is in contact with a number of Afghan emigres who could serve as conduits for funds to the insurgents. These funds could be used to buy arms, supplies, etc., as the dissidents saw fit. Because a unified military command has not yet emerged, at least initially we would consider providing several groups with relatively small amounts and then evaluate which uses the funds most effectively.

Costs: [1 line not declassified]

Pros: This would be the easiest way to supply badly needed encouragement and support for the anti-communist rebels. Direct funding could be handled unilaterally. Explicit GOP cooperation would not be required, although tacit approval for the movement of arms and material through Pakistan and the continued use of Pakistan territory for training, etc., would be needed. Nevertheless deniability could be maintained by both the U.S. and Pakistan. Although we would attempt to maintain secrecy, word of our assistance would leak (or we could deliberately leak it). This would demonstrate to informed Pakistanis, Saudis and others that we are willing to underwrite the Afghan fight against communism and stand up to the Soviets. Through our funds, we should be able to exercise some influence over the insurgents, encourage them to put aside their parochial differences and improve their efficiency. Assuming they are ultimately successful in overthrowing the DRA, our contribution to this process should give us some influence on the Afghan Government that subsequently emerges.

Cons: Control on how our funds are used would be difficult. Money could be wasted, stolen or used to support intramural battles among the emigres.

3. Insurgency Support—Indirect Financial Aid

Financial aid would be provided as in Option 2, except we would use a third party such as the Saudis or Pakistanis as an intermediary.

Costs: [1 line not declassified]

Pros: This approach should encourage a team effort. For example, if we used the Saudis, they should be encouraged to add their contributions to ours. With this option, the U.S. hand would be better hidden than in the case of direct financial aid.

Cons: We would lose much control over how the funds would be spent, and also much of the influence which would accrue through dealing directly with the Afghan dissidents.

4. Insurgency Support—Non-Lethal Material

CIA could provide a variety of non-lethal material support to the dissidents in Pakistan. Full GOP cooperation would be required, however. Under this option we would propose to equip a 2,000-man force for one year.

Costs: [amount not declassified]

—Communications Equipment

Costs: [amount not declassified]

—Medical Supplies

Costs: [amount not declassified]

—Ancillary Equipment(Pack, web gear, compass, poncho, clothing, entrenching tool and some rations)

Costs: [amount not declassified]

(FY 1979–80)

Pros: Same as financial assistance proposals, although by supplying direct aid of this nature we should become more deeply involved with the Afghans and thus better able to influence events. The medical supplies and some of the other equipment could be handled under the rubric of “humanitarian assistance.” Once a supply channel to the rebels is established, it later could be used, if desired, to provide them with other types of material including lethal equipment.

Cons: Full GOP cooperation would be required. Security would be difficult to maintain.

5. Unconventional Warfare Support—On-Site Survey

As a prerequisite for direct U.S. unconventional warfare assistance to the Afghans, an on-site survey in Pakistan would be required to develop a detailed operational plan. The team would hold discussions with GOP officials and dissident leaders, survey potential training and support facilities in Pakistan, determine support requirements and control procedures, and finally draft a plan of action. The survey team would consist of approximately five specialists and the survey would take three-four weeks.

Costs: [1 line not declassified]

Pros: Survey results should greatly improve our knowledge of Afghan rebel capabilities and provide essential information needed to make informed decisions on whether, and how, to aid them. Security, or at least plausible denial, could be maintained. However, our commitment to the Afghans would deepen as a result of the survey, but not to the extent that we could not pull back before making a final decision to participate directly in supporting Afghan unconventional war resistance from Pakistan.

Cons: Full GOP cooperation would be required. Although the survey team’s visibility would not be high, absolute security could not be guaranteed, and U.S. involvement would become less easily deniable.

6. Unconventional Warfare Support—Phase I

Provide resistance organizational training in Pakistan to 40 Afghan tribesmen from five separate areas. Develop a resistance strategy with clear cut lines of command. Assign autonomous areas. Equip with communications and medical kits. Locate resistance areas and specify potential base and safe areas. Training would include: fundamentals of resistance, mobile guerrilla warfare, psychological ops and propaganda, air reception, intelligence. The training is estimated to take eight-ten weeks [1½ lines not declassified].

Costs: [1 line not declassified]

Pros: Further improve the rebels’ unconventional warfare capabilities, and enhance the possibility of achieving a successful outcome to the conflict.

Cons: Deepens U.S. involvement in the conflict. Possibilities of plausible denial are decreased. May provoke vigorous Soviet countermeasures.

7. Unconventional Warfare Support—Phase II

Train 65 Afghan resistance cadre as guerrilla warfare instructors. Skills taught will include: small arms, mortar and recoilless rifles, demolitions, ambushes, raids, small unit tactics, night operations, land navigation, caching, air reception, psychological operations, mobile warfare, night movement, tactical communications, and intelligence collection. Selected members of the groups will be trained in CW communications and others will be trained in anti-air and anti-armor weapons. The training would take 10–12 weeks [1 line not declassified].

Costs: [amount not declassified] (FY 1979–80)

Pros: Same as Option 6

Cons: Same as Option 6

8. Unconventional Warfare Support—Phase III

Provide resistance groups with supplies of arms and demolitions.³ Build up arms stocks in Afghan resistance base and safe areas. Continue Phase II training, employing 15 Afghan instructors selected from the Phase II training course. Develop underground resistance support within the Afghanistan population through the cadres trained in Phases I and II. Arrange air support for delivery of arms and other supplies. Five thousand men would be supported in this Phase over a 4–6 month period, [1 line not declassified].

Costs: [amount not declassified]

—Ordnance, [1½ lines not declassified]

Costs: [amount not declassified]

—5 STOL aircraft [1½ lines not declassified]

Costs: [amount not declassified]

—Personnel

Costs: [amount not declassified]

—(FY 1980–81)

Pros: Same as Option 6

Cons: Same as Option 6

9. Unconventional Warfare Support—Phase IV

Commence coordinated resistance operations in Afghanistan. Expand areas of population and resistance control. Continue training and logistic support. Provide target data intelligence and photo interpreter support. Strike confidence-building soft targets and coordinate the gradual escalation of Afghan resistance activity. Wage aggressive psychological warfare operations in concert with increased resistance activity. This Phase would last 1–2 years [1 line not declassified].

Costs: [amount not declassified]

—Air Support Activities

Costs:[amount not declassified]

—Logistic support (5,000 man resupply)

Costs: [amount not declassified]⁴

—Personnel

Costs:[amount not declassified]

—(FY 1981–82)

Pros: Same as Option 6

Cons: Same as Option 6

All portions of this document are SECRET.

1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 15 Feb 1979–22 Aug 1979. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. In the top right corner, an unknown hand wrote: “orig to ZB w/Eve Rept. Mini-SCC 3–30–79. SumCon not prepared.” No other record of the mini-SCC meeting was found. A memorandum from Thornton and Henze to Brzezinski, March 22, called for a mini-SCC meeting, tentatively scheduled for March 31. Thornton advocated the necessity of convening such a meeting because the intelligence situation in Afghanistan remained unclear; “the ambassadorial issue is still open” due to Dubs’s murder; the Americans in Afghanistan were at risk; and there was a need for interagency policy coordination with regard to Afghanistan. (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 8 May 1978–7 Dec 1978) Thornton was responding to a March 20 memorandum from Brzezinski that relayed Mondale’s inquiry regarding what the United States could do about the growing rebellion in Afghanistan. (Ibid.)
2. See Document 38.
3. According to an NSA intercept, the first report found to reach U.S. officials on Afghan insurgents’ success in obtaining foreign arms came on November 13, 1978 [text and less than 1 line not declassified]. The intercept relayed that “rebels in Eastern Afghanistan have succeeded in obtaining Chinese weapons, either from Pakistan or the PRC, and communications between the area and Kabul are cut off.” (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 7, USSR in Afghanistan (1978))
4. Cost in 5,000 men increments. [Footnote is in the original.]