331. Article in the National Intelligence Daily1
SPECIAL ANALYSIS
USSR-AFGHANISTAN: Prospects for the Insurgency
Ten months after the Soviet invasion there is insurgent activity in every province of Afghanistan, urban security is worse, and much of the countryside is under insurgent control. The Soviets have been adapting their force structure and tactics to this situation, however, and gradually are becoming more effective. ([classification marking and codeword not declassified])
The Soviets have prevented the insurgents from seizing a provincial capital or any other symbolic target and may believe they are making a start on a long process of establishing a durable Communist Afghan regime. They probably believe that the diplomatic costs will continue [Page 877] to decrease as the world loses interest and comes to accept their occupation of Afghanistan. ([classification marking and codeword not declassified])
[1 line not declassified] estimates that between 20,000 and 50,000 insurgents are in the field at any one time, in groups ranging from 25 to 2,000. This force is drawn from possibly as many as 1 million Afghans involved intermittently in the fighting. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])
[less than 1 line not declassified] the insurgents are in “full control” of about half the districts in the country and control another quarter at night. [less than 1 line not declassified] seem to support this. Until recently, insurgents had been in virtual control of parts of the city of Herat, and assassinations and sabotage occur frequently in Kabul and other cities. ([classification marking and codeword not declassified])
Attacks on roads and government installations are common even in districts supposedly under full government control. Insurgent raids on convoys have almost completely disrupted the country’s transport system; many civilian truck drivers refuse to travel in the countryside even with a military escort. The Soviets recently forbade military convoys to move after dark and adopted new procedures in an attempt to improve their air support for the convoys. ([classification marking, codeword, and handling restriction not declassified])
Mixed Results for Moscow
The Soviet presence and firepower have forced the insurgents to forgo large-scale operations. Before the invasion, the insurgents moved at will in sizable groups, but now they retreat quickly to avoid Soviet forces. ([classification marking and codeword not declassified])
The insurgents, moreover, no longer attempt to sustain siege operations against important government garrisons and towns, to block roads permanently, or to hold any area Soviet troops make a serious effort to clear. As recent operations in the northeast and Konar Valley indicate, however, the Soviets do not have nearly enough troops to garrison the country and still cannot depend on the Afghan Army to do the job for them. ([classification marking and codeword not declassified])
The insurgents are still able to move men and material across the border with Pakistan and Iran despite Soviet efforts to reduce the flow. Soviet patrols, sweep operations, and extensive mining so far have been directed at only part of the border. The Soviets have only succeeded in turning open borders into borders that must be crossed with more caution. ([classification marking and codeword not declassified])
There has been only slight success in winning over insurgents, but there have been some defections to the government; a few important arms caches have been seized, presumably on information from defectors and prisoners. Such inroads are insignificant and seem to have [Page 878] had no impact on the level of resistance in any part of the countryside. ([classification marking and codeword not declassified])
Fear of Soviet reprisals has made some Afghans reluctant to shelter insurgents, but this has been a problem only for the few bands that operate outside their home areas, particularly some based in Pakistan. Most Afghan villagers still support the locally based insurgents who make up the bulk of the resistance. ([classification marking not declassified])
Prospects
The Soviets have helped give the Babrak government time to try to consolidate politically. The insurgents cannot bring down the government by military means, and they recognize that it will be a long war. Although some exile groups seeking outside support have claimed that insurgent morale is declining, there are no signs that this is the case. ([classification marking not declassified])
Over the next year or so, some tribesmen probably will begin to lose confidence that they can overthrow the Babrak government. Although many others will continue fighting, the level of insurgency nevertheless may gradually begin to decrease. ([classification marking not declassified])
The erosion of tribal determination would be abetted if Kabul were to appear to be avoiding radical social changes and were seen as trying to exercise only nominal authority in the countryside, in the manner of traditional Afghan governments. The government’s identification with the Soviets, however, makes its prospects for winning the acceptance of the Afghan peoples extremely remote. ([classification marking not declassified])
If Pakistan continues to provide aid and a safehaven, the insurgency will continue at a level that will require the Soviets to keep a large military force in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future. The survival of the Babrak government could depend on the presence of at least some Soviet combat forces for years. ([classification marking not declassified])
[Omitted here is a map of Afghanistan.]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 7, Afghanistan Crisis—October 1980, NIDs. Top Secret; [codeword and handling restriction not declassified]. Drafted by [text not declassified].↩