330. Memorandum for the Record by Director of Central Intelligence Turner1

SUBJECT

  • Conversation with Dr. Brzezinski, 29 October 1980 ([classification marking not declassified])

1. I showed him the Afghan bi-weekly report.2 He stressed over and over again that he doesn’t think we are providing enough arms to the insurgents and wants us to increase it. As you know, I sympathize with this point of view. I am not sure an increase from [amount not declassified] to 60 million is all that significant. I want to be able to reassure Brzezinski next time that we are pushing everything through [Page 876] the pipeline that Ahktar is willing to receive.3 ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

2. He wanted an assessment of the impact on the Arab countries of the release of hostages and U.S. provision of spare parts to Iran. I told him we had it in the PDB a couple of days ago. He recalled that, though he didn’t think it was incisive enough to make a real impact on him. In short, he felt that it was obvious the Arabs would be upset and he wondered if we had anything more to say. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

[Omitted here is information unrelated to Afghanistan.]

Stansfield Turner4
Director
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00112R: Subject Files, Box 15, DCI/DDCI, Memrecs/Memos/Agendas & Brzezinski/Aaron Meetings, January–December 1980. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].
  2. The report noted malfunction issues with SA–7s in Afghanistan; a Time magazine story that included a photograph of insurgents carrying land mines (that the report noted were supplied through the covert program); and a campaign in which the Agency manufactured and distributed around the world some 5,000 t-shirts bearing messages of support for the Afghan insurgency. The report described this campaign as having a “remarkable impact.” Also included was a list containing the most recent data on weapons delivered or awaiting shipment to the insurgents, totaling over [text not declassified]. The weapons awaiting shipment represented approximately one-third of the total cost. The bi-weekly report is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C–367, 1 Jan–30 Jun 80, Afghanistan.
  3. For the decision to increase funding for the Afghan covert program, see Document 336.
  4. Gates signed for Turner.