Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

292. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Barry) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Newsom) and the Special Adviser to the Secretary of State on Soviet Affairs (Shulman)¹

Washington, June 27, 1980

SUBJECT

• Soviet Maneuvering on Withdrawal and a Political Settlement in Afghanistan

The Soviets are currently engaged in an increasingly active campaign to spread the idea that their withdrawal announcement demonstrates a serious interest in a political settlement.² While the odds are very high that this is simply a new tack in their effort to divide us from the Allies, it is barely conceivable that the Soviets might be beginning to look for a way out.³

The campaign to demonstrate the sincerity of their withdrawal is going on in public and private in a way which is very reminiscent of the anti-TNF campaign and the “unilateral troop withdrawal” from the GDR designed to head off the December 12 NATO decision.

—The withdrawal has become a media event in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

—Authoritative Soviet commentaries underline that the withdrawal demonstrates the sincerity of Soviet interest in a political settlement.⁴

—Soviet Press Counselor Kamenev gave John Wallach of the Hearst chain a background interview stressing Soviet sincerity.

—Soviet and East European diplomats are coming to us to underline that we’re making a mistake by thinking the Soviets don’t really want to talk seriously about a political settlement.

—Embassy Moscow has picked up a story that Brezhnev overruled Gromyko on the withdrawal question.⁵

All of these indications are consistent with the interpretation that the Soviet withdrawal is strictly a propaganda move which Moscow hopes to exploit to further divide the US and the West. This interpretation is strongly buttressed by the nature of the Soviet withdrawal and the way they let the French in on the news first.

At the same time, there are a few straws in the wind which suggest that there may be more to this than a purely propaganda move.

—Brezhnev appears to be preparing the way for declaring a victory in the style suggested by Senator Aiken for Vietnam. Brezhnev’s statement that the situation in Afghanistan is returning to normal came at a time when the Soviet security situation in Afghanistan appears worse than ever.⁶ Whatever his intention, his statement creates the assumption within the USSR that Soviet involvement is winding down.

—Even the kind of phantom withdrawal the Soviets have announced would seem to indicate that they have abandoned one of the options open to them—doubling or tripling of their force in Afghanistan, coupled with a major effort to defeat the Afghan Nationalists throughout the country.

—Insignificant though the withdrawal might be, it does create the presumption of a lower overall ceiling and possible further withdrawals. Thus, their action creates new constraints for the future.

—It is unlike the Soviets to reverse themselves like this on the withdrawal question. Gromyko told us and the Germans privately that we were wasting our time in talking about withdrawals before there had been recognition of the Babrak government and an end to the Nationalist resistence. He made the same point publicly at a lunch for the Indian Foreign Minister earlier this month.

—The fact that the withdrawal announcement was not made a couple of days before the Venice Summit when it might have had more effect on deliberations there would seem to indicate that it was a subject of internal debate and that the opposition was significant. Such a debate would logically occur in any case before a Plenary meeting of the Party which was called upon to set the line for the next Party Congress in foreign policy.

—Embassy Moscow speculates that the uncertainties stemming from US and allied economic countermeasures related to Afghanistan are forcing the delay in producing a new full-year plan as the question on future dependence on technology and food from the West is debated. In the Embassy’s view it is barely conceivable that our actions are having more policy bite than is apparent, and that Brezhnev may therefore take his withdrawal initiatives more seriously than is apparent.⁷

Of course, the Soviets can justify their stated interest in a political settlement by clinging to the May 14 Afghan proposals as they have done so far. But they could have had more success in pursuing this line without any withdrawal announcement, following Gromyko’s time-tested pattern of complete inflexibility. The kind of iron-pants strategy is at least as effective in stirring up European doubts about the US as Soviet hints of flexibility.

The President’s toast at the Yugoslav State Dinner and subsequent discussion of “transitional” arrangements demonstrate our willingness to discuss a political settlement seriously.⁸ Gromyko’s response to the Muskie letter is a very authoritative indication that the Soviets are not now ready for such a discussion.⁹ If the situation has changed since the “withdrawal” decision, presumably they will find a way of letting us—or more likely Schmidt—know unambiguously.

However, the passage in the Resolution of the Party Plenum which comes out for “a political settlement of the situation that has formed around Afghanistan which is pursuing the policy of nonalignment” seems to suggest some flexibility in considering a broadly based arrangement without preconditions or assurances that the gains of the “socialist” revolution there will not be reversed.

In the meantime, we will presumably be hearing a lot more from the Soviets about the importance of our making a reciprocal gesture such as relaxing some of the post-Afghanistan sanctions. Were we or our Allies to accommodate them on this, it seems safe to predict that we will hear no more from the Soviets about negotiating a political settlement involving complete withdrawal. If the Soviets are serious, a little stalling on our part should produce additional indications that the Soviets are willing to take the steps which will make real negotiations possible. If not then we will have avoided giving ground in response to a Soviet ploy.

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom, Lot 81D154, folder 1. Secret; Nodis.
2. The Soviet statement on a partial withdrawal from Afghanistan, June 22, made through the official news organ, TASS, was first reported in telegram 9988 from Moscow the same day. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900077–1709) An article in the President’s Daily Brief, June 23, asserted that the statement “seems aimed primarily at influencing the Venice Summit and preparing the ground for Schmidt’s visit to Moscow. The announcement implied a reduction in the overall Soviet troop level in Afghanistan, but was not explicit on this point and did not discuss the possibility of further withdrawals.” The article further noted that the withdrawing troops, numbering approximately 5,000, were “largely ineffective against the guerillas.” An article in the July 7 President’s Daily Brief surmised that the announcement of the troop withdrawals possibly suggested Brezhnev’s interest in assuaging domestic critics apprehensive of Soviet Afghan policy. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—June 1980, PDBs; and Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—July 1980, PDBs, respectively)
3. Analysis in the Central Intelligence Agency concurred with this assessment. For example, a memorandum, July 11, forwarded by Turner to Muskie, Brown, Brzezinski, and General Jones, July 14, asserted that the Soviet troop withdrawals “were largely a political ploy; they do not affect Soviet military capabilities in the country.” (National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–031, Apr–Aug 1980) The Bureau of Intelligence and Research came to a similar conclusion. A research paper on Afghanistan, July 18, observed: “Moscow’s June 22 announcement that it was withdrawing some forces from Afghanistan appears to be part of a larger diplomatic strategy aimed at giving the appearance of Soviet flexibility and willingness to talk while extracting recognition of the regime in Kabul as the legitimate government of Afghanistan.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East/West, Brement, Subject File, Box 46, Afghanistan: 7–12/80)
4. In telegram 10223 from Moscow, June 25, the Embassy characterized comments on the Soviet troop withdrawal by USA Institute Director Arbatov as indicative that the Soviet leadership “was anxious to find a way out of Afghanistan which would not appear to be a Soviet capitulation to the U.S., but that they have no idea how to do it.” (National Archives, RG 59, Office Files of Marshall D. Shulman, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs, 1977–1981, Lot 81D109, Afghanistan)
5. The Embassy reported this information in telegram 10147 from Moscow, June 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])
6. Speaking at a June 23 meeting of the Central Committee, Brezhnev declared: “Life in Afghanistan is now gradually coming back to normal.” A resolution passed by the Central Committee approved the December 1979 intervention in Afghanistan. (Craig R. Whitney, “Brezhnev Says His Side Won Afghan War,” New York Times, p. A6)
7. A likely reference to telegram 10353 from Moscow, June 27. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800310–0006)
8. Carter visited Yugoslavia at the conclusion of the Venice Summit. During his dinner toast, Carter deplored Soviet actions in Afghanistan and declared: “We would be prepared to explore a transitional arrangement, to be implemented along with the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan, for the purpose of restoring peace and tranquility in that suffering country.” (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book II, p. 1212)
9. See Document 293.