Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

291. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, June 23, 1980

SUBJECT

• Covert Operations In Afghanistan (S)

I will be doing a full trip report shortly,² but want to fill you in on a few points of particular interest on the covert side. (S)

I got an (apparently) good and candid briefing from the Station Chief in Islamabad. He is very satisfied with the Pak performance now; the earlier bottlenecks have been dissolved and now the Paks are prepared to pass through more equipment than we can get to them. The COS claims that he has several unilateral sources who confirm that the Paks are telling him pretty much the truth. (It is noteworthy, though, that the Paks tell him very little. They hold this entire operation extremely closely and I am impressed by their ability to keep it all secret. Wish we could do as well.) (S)

On the SA–7: There are two launchers and (I believe) 15 missiles in country, headed for the Kabul area. The Paks insisted that they not be used, initially at least, in areas near Pakistan since that would be too obvious and provocative. That is understandable but unfortunate, since the border area is where they are needed most. If things go well, we should soon be hearing of mysterious downing of aircraft. There is no report-back capability from the people who have the SAMs; we will have to read it out of battle reports. (S)

The Paks are extending the arms flow now to groups operating out of Quetta as well as Peshawar. This is another good step, since the operation should not be too dependent on the faction-ridden Peshawar leadership. (S)

Both Afghans and Paks with whom I spoke (and none of the latter at least would have been aware of the operation) commented very favorably on the increased readiness of the GOP over the past two months or so to provide assistance to the mujahidin. I don’t know to what extent this represents our involvement, but it is a good sign. (S)

By chance, I sat on the plane to London next to one of the resistance leaders. He made the usual complaints about the lack of US support (I was noncommittal) but then said that they did expect to get some SA–7s soon. Word must be seeping out. He also went on at length about the stupidity of the VOA in carrying the Inquirer story.³ I know that there has been an exchange between Zbig and Reinhardt on this. I am writing to Mary Bitterman to add my own cry of dismay and point out that this sort of thing is hurting the people we want to help.⁴ (S)

These were the highlights; if you have any other specific questions, I may have the answers to them since I had a long talk with the COS. (U)

You may want to pass this to Zbig on his return.⁵ (U)

1. Source: National Security Council, Carter Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–047, Afghanistan: 11 Sep 1979–22 Jul 1980. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.
2. The full trip report was not found.
3. See Document 289.
4. Mary Bitterman was the Director of Voice of America.
5. Brzezinski was in Italy with Carter and Muskie as a member of the delegation to the Venice Economic Summit. No evidence was found to indicate whether Aaron passed the memorandum to Brzezinski.