Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

286. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Vest) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders) to Secretary of State Muskie ¹

Washington, June 7, 1980

SUBJECT

• A Political Solution for Afghanistan: Next Steps

SUMMARY

There are a number of proposals being floated for a political solution to the Afghan problem. While the Soviets do not seem seriously interested now, we think it worthwhile to keep alive proposals which are broadly consistent with our own views. Tactically, we recommend that in the weeks immediately ahead we focus attention on the Islamic Conference initiative and encourage the Europeans to do likewise. The purpose of this memorandum is to obtain your approval for a positive approach to the Islamic Conference Committee and your guidance on the posture we should take with our allies as we prepare for the Venice Summit.

ISSUES FOR DECISION

1. Your approval of the attached cable informing members of the Islamic Committee other than Ghotbzadeh of the approach contained in your letter to Gromyko, expressing interest in the Islamic Conference initiative, and suggesting that you would be prepared to meet with the Pakistani Foreign Minister if he comes to New York. (The approach would also be conveyed to the Indians and Chinese.)²

2. Your broad agreement that in preparing for Venice, we seek to encourage the Europeans to focus their efforts on the Islamic Conference Committee rather than push competing proposals of their own in their contacts with the Soviets.

3. Your consideration of a recommendation to instruct Swiss Ambassador Lang to convey to Ghotbzadeh in more general terms the thrust of our approach to the Soviets.

BACKGROUND

There are several initiatives, contemplated or underway, designed to advance a political solution for the Afghan problem. Tom Watson will shortly be delivering your letter to Gromyko.³ The Islamic Conference Committee (Pakistan, Iran and Islamic Conference Secretary General Chatti) has been meeting in Tehran to formulate their approach. Schmidt will be going to Moscow and will be discussing Afghanistan. The British are continuing their dialogue in Moscow despite public Soviet rebuffs and could be slightly softening their position.

The Soviets are evidently not prepared at this time seriously to consider a solution which involves their early and total withdrawal from Afghanistan. On the contrary, the Soviets are seeking to turn the notion of a political solution to their own advantage in an effort to gain recognition of the Kabul regime, to divide the allies and soften Third World condemnation. Nevertheless, there is value in keeping alive the idea of an acceptable political solution in order to keep the door open should the Soviets wish to withdraw from Afghanistan and in the meantime keep them on the defensive politically. The allies place particular importance on this tactic.

Your letter to Gromyko clearly keeps the door open and lays out our basic conditions for a solution. At this stage, we think our allies should be encouraged to help to shape and encourage the Islamic initiative rather than proposing their own variants which the Soviets can pick and choose among in an effort to escape pressure for withdrawal. The allies are generally sympathetic to the Islamic Conference Committee’s initiative. We have already encouraged the FRG to discuss the Islamic initiative with Agha Shahi, who will be visiting Bonn next week.

The Committee’s terms of reference are quite close to our own principles, although we cannot be certain how the Committee will proceed in its work and we will certainly have no control over it. There is, however, a good bit of value in having the Soviets confront an Islamic initiative. The Committee may build a record of Soviet intransigence which we could point to later, particularly in the UNGA. However, you should be aware that according to press reports on June 7, the Committee has authorized Chatti to ascertain the views of the Soviets, Afghan authorities and resistance leaders regarding a political solution.

We have not made known our attitude toward the Committee. A public embrace would probably be unwelcome and counterproductive. Unpublicized contact, however, could be useful in indicating our support and perhaps even influencing the process of negotiation.

The President has authorized us to convey to the Islamic Committee members the approach contained in your letter to Gromyko. We propose in addition to express our interest in the work of the Committee and our hope that we could quietly stay in touch at least with Chatti and Pakistan Foreign Minister Agha Shahi. In this connection, we suggest that we tell Shahi that you would welcome an early opportunity to exchange views with him on Afghanistan. (Shahi may be coming to a meeting at the UN in the next few weeks and could come down to Washington for a brief undramatized meeting.) Such a meeting would give you an opportunity to brief Shahi on your conversation with Gromyko, provide an assessment of Soviet intentions and other initiatives for a political solution, and exchange views on the Islamic Committee’s work. The meeting with Shahi could also have a collateral benefit in terms of our bilateral relations with Pakistan.

Finally, we realize that Ghotbzadeh is in a different category from Chatti and Agha Shahi, but we think there is some advantage in giving recognition to the important role Ghotbzadeh has played in this issue and the parallelism of U.S. and Iranian interests on Afghanistan. Since Ghotbzadeh is the Iranian official working most vigorously for release of the hostages, to establish this common interest could have some benefits for us.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve the attached cable informing the two Islamic Conference Committee members of the approach to the Soviets contained in your letter to Gromyko, expressing support for the work of the Committee and suggesting a meeting with Agha Shahi. (The cable also instructs Embassies Delhi and Beijing to convey our approach, as suggested by the President.)⁴

2. That in our preparations for the Venice Summit we develop a line which would encourage the allies to focus on the Islamic initiative rather than putting forward new ideas of their own.⁵

3. That we also convey in more general terms via the Swiss to Foreign Minister Ghotbzadeh the thrust of our approach to the Soviets. If you approve this recommendation, we will provide a separate telegram for Ambassador Lang. (NEA supports this recommendation.)⁶

1. Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs David Newsom, Lot 81D154, folder 2. Secret; Sensitive. Sent through Christopher. Drafted by Coon; concurred in by Shulman, Kreisberg, and Barry. A typed notation in the top right corner of the memorandum reads: “DepSec took action for Secretary. 6/13/80.” Below that, an unknown hand wrote to Newsom: “DDN—Urgent. See Secretary’s decision on p. 4.” An unknown hand circled and crossed out both notations.
2. The Islamic Conference Standing Committee (ICSC) was established by a resolution of the Conference of Islamic Foreign Ministers in May; see footnote 4, Document 270. The cable was not attached, but was found in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870094–0887, as telegram 155761 to Jidda, Islamabad, New Delhi, and Beijing, June 12. The telegram informed the posts that Department officials had notified the Soviet Union of the latest U.S. views on the Afghanistan issue. The Department instructed the Ambassadors to convey the following points: 1) a viable settlement in Afghanistan required the withdrawal of the Soviet military, after which the United States would be prepared to help “establish a truly independent and non-aligned Afghanistan;” 2) the United States “has no interest in interfering with Afghanistan’s internal affairs;” 3) the United States is “prepared to explore some transitional arrangement, to be implemented along with the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan, for the purpose of ensuring that peace and tranquility are restored in Afghanistan;” and 4) a settlement in Afghanistan would “facilitate the restoration of more cooperative relations between the U.S. and USSR.”
3. See Document 284.
4. Muskie approved the recommendation.
5. Muskie approved the recommendation.
6. Muskie disapproved the recommendation.