Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

280. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, May 1980

Afghanistan: Factions in the Ruling Party ([classification marking not declassified])

Summary

The ruling People’s Democratic Party (PDP) of Afghanistan, in which Moscow has a substantial stake, is beset by longstanding divisions. President Babrak Karmal’s regime would have fallen apart by now were it not for constant Soviet pressure on the feuding factions—Babrak’s Parcham (Banner) and the Khalq (People’s) of former Presidents Amin and Taraki—to work together. ([classification marking not declassified])

Still, personal enmity and the settling of old scores between the more numerous Khalqis and their Parchamist adversaries continue in spite of Soviet attempts at mediation. Moreover, as the intraparty struggle erodes the authority and saps the energies of the PDP’s leaders, the Soviets will become even more involved in the regime’s day-to-day decisionmaking process. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

The strains in the regime are the same as those that weakened the governments of Amin and Taraki before the Soviet intervention. Soviet military intervention and political interference, far from bringing the two party factions together, have sharpened the antagonisms dividing them. Moscow could engineer yet another coup, but the Soviets are unlikely to come up with a new leadership that will achieve Moscow’s objective of restoring stability under a Soviet-dominated regime. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

As they try to deal with the infighting, the Soviets are concerned that Babrak’s faction in the military is weaker than its Khalqi rival. If the Soviets are ever to disengage from Afghanistan, they must first rebuild the demoralized Army and ensure its loyalty to the regime. Babrak’s weak position in the military is a serious vulnerability Moscow must confront and probably will be an important factor in any Soviet consideration of an alternative leadership. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

Babrak recognizes that he remains in power only as long as Moscow believes he can serve Soviet interests. As he and the Khalqis vie for Soviet backing, Moscow will face difficult choices in estimating the prospects for each faction in holding the regime together and, over the longer term, governing effectively in the absence of Soviet occupation forces. For the foreseeable future, however, Moscow will not be able to look to its clients in Kabul to shoulder the burden of protecting Soviet interests in Afghanistan. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified]).

[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Directorate of Intelligence, Office of Support Services, Job 81T00208R: Production Case Files, Box 4, Afghanistan: Factions in the Ruling Party, An Intelligence Memorandum. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. A typed note at the bottom of the page reads: “The author of this paper is [name not declassified] of the Near East-South Asia Division, Office of Political Analysis. It was coordinated with the Offices of Strategic Research and Central Reference and the National Intelligence Officers for the Near East and South Asia and the USSR and Eastern Europe. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Southwest Asia Analytic Center, [less than 1 line not declassified]. Research for this paper was completed on 23 May 1980.”