279. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the Chairman of the Special Coordinating Committee on Intelligence (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Possible Increased Aid to Afghanistan Freedom Fighters
1. It may be possible to use Pakistan’s close intelligence connection with Iran to increase the flow of weapons to the Afghanistan fighters. Pakistani Intelligence Chief General Akhtar has made several veiled references to connections with his Iranian counterparts. He has refused to identify this link or provide any elaborating data, but he recently provided one example of its use. We provided intelligence to the Pakistanis on a bloody Soviet offensive in the heavily Shi’ite areas of central Afghanistan. The intent was to place the material in the Islamabad press at the time of the Islamic Conference. Time factors made this impossible, but General Akhtar, acting on his own, used the material to prepare a report for his Iranian contacts on the suffering of Shi’ites in Afghanistan.2
2. The Pakistanis are presently receiving all the weapons that they can distribute through their mechanisms. It is possible that the Pakistanis, through their Iranian links, could arrange for the delivery of additional weapons to fighters in western Afghanistan. We propose to suggest to General Akhtar that he approach his Iranian contacts and offer to fly Soviet weapons to Iran for onward distribution in Afghanistan. The weapons could be flown directly from Islamabad to airfields in eastern Iran on the C–130’s to be loaned to Pakistan. Neither the origin of the weapons nor our role in their procurement would be [Page 746] mentioned. We believe Pakistan would honor a proviso not to use our aircraft to deliver embargoed items to Iran.
3. Given the political sensitivity of shipping U.S.-procured arms via Iranian authorities and our inability to control the weapons once they reach Iran, we request your prior approval of this proposal.3
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, For President or Brzezinski Only File, Box 88, PA—Very Sensitive: 1–6/80. Secret; Sensitive; [handling restriction not declassified].↩
- An intelligence information cable prepared in the CIA reported on a meeting between Zia and Qotbzadeh at the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers in Islamabad, May 24. Regarding Afghanistan, Qotbzadeh was quoted as saying: “some appeasement time in delaying tactics” would be required in dealing with the Soviet Union, and that the Soviets had intimated to Iran that they could cause trouble in Baluchistan, which, Qotbzadeh told Zia, neither Iran nor Pakistan could afford. In response to Zia’s assertion that the Afghan insurgency was gaining strength, Qotbzadeh said that Iran would increase its support of the insurgents by 30 percent in June. Both Zia and Qotbzadeh agreed that at some point their respective countries would have to talk with the Karmal regime, but doing so should be delayed as long as possible given the possibility that the Afghan Government would collapse within the next two months. (Department of Defense, Afghan War Collection, Box 5, Pak Support for Insurgents)↩
- In his reply to Turner, June 2, Brzezinski approved Turner’s proposal, “provided adequate assurances can be obtained that such weapons will not be diverted by the Iranians to other purposes (including retention by the Iranians themselves).” Noting “the extreme importance of the Afghanistan resistance effort,” Brzezinski requested semi-monthly reports on the status both of U.S. involvement and what was known of U.S. involvement by other parties. (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject Files, Box 12, C–367, 1 Jan–30 Jun 80, Afghanistan)↩
- Turner signed “Stan Turner” above his typed signature.↩