Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

269. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, undated

OVERVIEW

—The Pakistani and US intelligence appraisals of the Afghan war are remarkably similar. Both sides believe the Soviets have encountered unanticipated difficulties, or as General Akhtar said, “the Russians are stuck.” The identity of views is particularly noteworthy because we arrived at our conclusions by different routes. Much of the US judgment is based on sensitive signals intelligence not available to the Pakistanis. The Pakistanis have based their judgment not simply on appraisals we have provided them but on intelligence they received directly from Afghan rebels. The Pakistanis conclude that the Afghan “Freedom Fighters”—as they call them—are doing surprisingly well and will in all likelihood continue to do so.

—Neither side had a good estimate of insurgent strength. The Pakistanis feel the Afghan situation is a classic Mao’s “Peoples’ War.” As a Pakistani colonel observed: if an Afghan has a rifle and a bullet he is a soldier; when he loses one, he becomes a civilian. It is therefore not possible to reach a reliable estimate of insurgent strength. Drawing further on Mao, the Pakistanis say the rebels are the fish in this sea. The rebels are careful not to undertake actions which would damage the people’s interest and risk weakening the insurgents’ link with their mass base. They want to damage a bridge and force the Russians to expose themselves during its repair rather than to destroy the bridge and injure for years the surrounding economy. Thus, explained the Pakistanis, they cannot, and indeed should not, control the insurgency. The Afghans control it and the Pakistanis support it with materiel, which the Afghans accept, and advice, which may or may not be accepted. This fact establishes the parameters within which the covert support must operate.

COVERT ACTION PROGRAM

—Barring a change in the internal or international scene, the Pakistanis are committed to covert support to the Afghans. General Akhtar expressed his concern about lack of US security guarantees but did not pursue the subject and did not make continued support contingent on such aid.

—The Pakistanis are providing unilateral weapons support from their stockpiles to the insurgents, support which predates our involvement. When we offered to provide some of the materiel now being provided by Pakistan (e.g., .303 ammunition), General Akhtar waved aside our offer stating he preferred to use Pakistan money for things available in Pakistan and to use our resources for external procurement.

—The Pakistanis attempt to control any unilateral exile weapons procurement. They do not want weapons entering Pakistan outside their control and have so informed the Peshawar exile leaders. The Pakistanis share our surprise at the vigor of the insurgency in northeastern Afghanistan (Badakshan and Qonduz Provinces). The Pakistanis suggested some aid may be coming over the mountains from China or that Tadzhik ethnic groups resident in the four border area could be providing support.

—General Akhtar described how the support mechanism works. Our weapons arrive at Rawalpindi airport by Saudi C–130 approximately twice a week at dusk. Officers of Akhtar’s organization oversee the unloading. Fortuitously we happened to witness one such unloading while awaiting our aircraft departure. A Pakistani Army tank transporter backed up to the C–130 ramp and the unmarked crates rolled on to the transporter. The whole process took less than an hour. From the aircraft the crates are taken to a warehouse controlled by Akhtar’s organization where they are opened and the weapons inspected and inventoried. The Pakistanis have excellent records which coincide with ours; what we are buying in Egypt is being delivered in Pakistan. The munitions are distributed through eight different exile organizations which are responsible for transporting the materiel in Afghanistan. There is no Pakistani distribution system in Afghanistan. Akhtar unilaterally monitors the distribution of the weapons and is confident that most of the materiel is indeed going to Afghanistan. Akhtar is distributing weapons into all parts of Afghanistan, not just the eastern area bordering Pakistan. We said we had noted the appearance of anti-tank rockets and land mines around Herat and encouraged Akhtar to continue to distribute the weapons in western Afghanistan through any means he deemed appropriate (i.e., via Iran).

—The arms mix has been about right. The Pakistanis had a list of 24 items needed by the insurgents. These items divide basically into four categories: anti-armor, anti-aircraft, AK–47 rifles and ammunition, and miscellaneous equipment such as time detonators, gas masks and wireless equipment.

—Akhtar said the present weapons delivery schedule of two C–130’s per week is about the right pace. We emphasized we stand ready to increase the flow whenever he can handle it and we are prepared to fly C–141’s directly into Pakistan under cover of the regular embassy resupply flight.

—The Pakistanis need two C–130’s. Akhtar explained that overland transport is too slow and unreliable. The Pakistan Air Force has been helping but due to the loss of two C–130’s they can no longer do so and meet their other obligations. The request for a loan of two aircraft is legitimate.

SA–7 MISSILES

—Akhtar said the Pakistani Government had made the political decision to use the SA–7’s, “fully aware of its implications.” The Pakistanis forecast three levels of Soviet reaction. The least serious would be no reaction at all; second would be a ground incursion into border areas of Pakistan; and most severe would be a Soviet air strike at Pakistani airfields. We took no exception to his estimate. Soviet retaliation, to a certain extent, will depend on how and where the missiles are used. Akhtar explained that two Afghan groups had been trained in the use of the weapon. Each of these groups will take three missiles and one launcher. The targets will be Shindand and Bagram airfields. Akhtar refused to reveal any timing. The second group is scheduled to complete its training on 17 May.

—In reply to Akhtar’s request for more SA–7’s we explained the difficulty finding these in the international market. We told Akhtar that we understood the Chinese may have SA–7’s. If the Pakistanis could give the appropriate political signal to the Chinese, we would be prepared to do whatever necessary to purchase and deliver the missiles to Pakistan. Akhtar seemed to like the idea and said he would discuss it with President Zia.

PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

—The US side gave a one hour slide presentation on worldwide Soviet and Free World psychological warfare activities. Akhtar was obviously interested in what was going on outside his borders and confessed Pakistan was probably not doing enough in the psywar field. We agreed that the issue was beginning to fade from international attention and that we should work both jointly and separately to insure that the Afghan story continues to be told.

SECURITY

—The Pakistanis would vigorously oppose any surfacing of the covert action program and would probably consider it reason for termination. The program is highly compartmented within Pakistan—even within the intelligence service.² Akhtar is particularly anxious that there be no publicity if and when the SA–7’s are fired. Akhtar registered the anticipated complaint about Washington leaks.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, For President or Brzezinski Only File, Box 88, PA—Very Sensitive: 1–6/80. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. The author of the memorandum is not identified. In a May 15 covering memorandum to Brzezinski, Turner noted that he was following up on the meetings between a CIA officer and Pakistani ISID Director Akhtar, which he first reported May 13. (See footnote 2, Document 259.) In the upper right corner of the covering memorandum, Carter wrote: “Zbig, p. 3” and initialed “C.”
2. Carter placed a bracket in the left margin beside this sentence and wrote: “Zbig.”