Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

262. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

NIC–M–0001–80

Washington, May 2, 1980

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL MEMORANDUM²

SUBJECT

• Soviet Policy Toward West Europe in the Aftermath of Afghanistan

Summary

Soviet policy toward Europe since the invasion of Afghanistan has been characterized by elements of defensiveness and of opportunism. To a great extent, it is a policy of reactive and ad hoc efforts to exploit what Moscow perceives as significant West European concerns about the wisdom and predictability of US policy toward the USSR. Moscow’s policy, therefore, is less a “peace offensive” than a combination of blandishments and threats intended to undercut West European support for potential economic sanctions or other retaliatory measures against the Soviet Union. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

In seeking to influence West European opinion, Moscow has strongly condemned West European endorsement of US policies. Threats of a harsh Soviet response have been conveyed directly—as in President Brezhnev’s letter of 2 March to Chancellor Schmidt—and have also been evident in the increasingly acerbic tenor of Soviet media commentaries directed at West Europe.³ At the same time, our reporting clearly indicates that in private the Soviets have taken care to differentiate between the harsher aspects of Moscow’s public posture and an underlying flexibility in Soviet policy. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

Overtures to the West Germans appear to be the most frequent and subtle. Brezhnev has sent two letters to Chancellor Schmidt—the last containing an unexpected invitation to visit Moscow this summer. By means of private channels, which the Soviets have long believed useful in communicating with the Chancellery, Soviet representatives have indicated Moscow’s “interest” in the European Community’s neutralization proposal for Afghanistan, and have also conveyed the message to a Chancellery official that West Germany’s expected refusal to impose economic sanctions on the USSR was much more important to the Soviet leadership than Bonn’s likely decision to boycott the summer Olympics. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

Although private Soviet overtures to the West Germans and other West Europeans lack specific substance, it is evident that Soviet tactics are based on the assumption that US-West European differences are significant and create openings for the Soviets to exacerbate them. The Soviets may believe that the worst of the European reaction to the Afghanistan intervention has passed or that more serious moves—such as specific economic sanctions—can be attenuated by skillful diplomacy. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified])

In either case, the Soviets have opted for a combination of harsh public rhetoric with private hints of a more conciliatory Soviet stance on arms control issues in particular should the West Europeans temper their support for US “hard line” policies toward Moscow. Thus far, however, the Soviets have demonstrated little willingness to make tangible concessions to West European concerns. Nevertheless, West European reservations with respect to US actions in Iran, the implementation of NATO’s decision on theater nuclear force modernization, and diplomatic maneuvering leading up to the November 1980 CSCE Review Conference.⁴ All are perceived by Moscow as opportunities to affect adversely US-West European ties. ([classification marking and handling restriction not declassified.])

[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]

1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 7, Afghan Crisis—Pubs Soviet Moves/Options (May 1980). Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].
2. This memorandum was prepared by the Analytical Group of the National Intelligence Council at the request of the National Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union and East Europe. It has been coordinated with the National Foreign Assessment Center and within the Directorate of Operations. [Footnote is in the original.]
3. The letter, a response to a letter Schmidt sent to Brezhnev in late January, was described by Schmidt during a news conference as “moderate in tone but hard in content,” with a “warning undertone” against West Germany following U.S. policy with regard to Afghanistan. Schmidt was quoted in Bradley Graham, “Brezhnev Warns Schmidt Against Bowing to U.S.,” Washington Post, March 13, 1980, p. A26.
4. Documentation on the November 1980 CSCE Review Conference is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XXVII, Western Europe.