Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

240. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 19, 1980, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Discussion with Six Ambassadors on a Neutral Afghanistan and Visit of Chinese Vice Foreign Minister

PARTICIPANTS

• Deputy Secretary Christopher
• Ambassador Hermes, FRG
• Ambassador de Laboulaye, France
• Ambassador Henderson, U.K.
• Ambassador Towe, Canada
• Ambassador Pansa, Italy
• Ambassador Togo, Japan

Neutral and Non-Aligned Afghanistan

Deputy Secretary Christopher gave the Ambassadors a paper on “Elements for a Neutral and Non-Aligned Afghanistan” (attached) as a basis for discussion and then retrieved the paper later in the meeting. He said the “Elements” had not been prepared for use at any specific event but as a contribution to the search for a common position among us which could (1) develop ultimately into a sound basis for a constructive Western approach and (2) help develop a structure which might be useful eventually in resolving the problem in Afghanistan. The Soviets appeared to be uninterested but not closing the door. He noted the importance of avoiding the appearance of pursuing the Soviets and the need to watch for shifts in the Soviet line.² He commented on the range of upcoming diplomatic events—the Tito funeral, the EC Heads of Government meeting on March 31, the Islamic Foreign Ministers meeting in Islamabad in late April, the Venice Summit in June and the preparations for the UNGA.³ We might need a common position at any one of these and hence the value of this exchange. The group then considered the Elements point by point.

Point One was generally acceptable to the group and several called it essential. De Laboulaye described it as “the ultimate aim,” apparently thinking that withdrawal might take place sequentially. Mr. Christopher made it clear that all Soviet troops would have to come out first; otherwise we might expose ourselves to a situation in which the Soviets would control the transport lines and communication points with a reduced military force and claim that they had returned the country to Afghan control.

Point Two drew considerable discussion. Hermes warned that the search for a government acceptable to the Afghan people could go on for years and the Soviets would continue to say that nothing was acceptable. De Laboulaye speculated that there could be a new government in place before the Soviet troops all withdrew and it could serve as a transitional government. Henderson said that Point Two should be the outcome of Points One and Three, i.e., withdrawal of forces and non-interference could create a state of affairs which would permit the evolution of a government which would be acceptable to the Afghan people.

Point Three led to a discussion of the Afghanistan/Pakistan boundary. Hermes asked if we thought the Pakistanis would accept the Durand Line. Mr. Christopher thought they would. Thereafter there was some discussion about whether the right words should be “no interference” or “no intervention” since a range of activities such as radio broadcasts could lead to a situation where it would be hard to differentiate between normal contacts and interference. In the end the group preferred the words “intervention by neighboring other states” rather than “by its neighbors or any other state.”

Point Four was reasonably acceptable to the group and Henderson thought it would be acceptable to his government.

Point Five. Henderson was worried that the proposal for guarantees was too sweeping and implied that the guarantor powers might have to use force; he did not think Britain would be ready to go to war automatically in such a situation. Hermes as well thought that the countries involved could not give substance to guarantees. Henderson continued that any breach of neutrality or interference would call for the parties to re-establish the status quo. The group were inclined to think that Points Five and Three might be brought together with language calling for something along the lines of “respect by neighboring states for the territorial integrity, sovereignty and neutrality and for the principle of non-intervention in Afghanistan’s internal affairs.”

Point Six. There was no quarrel with this formulation. De Laboulaye had some intellectual difficulties, observing that France retained an open mind on neutralization in Southwest Asia.

There was a brief discussion of next steps. Hermes thought that the proposal should be kept in the backyard of the Islamic countries. Pansa reminded that memories are short. De Laboulaye thought we should proceed bilaterally. Hermes stressed that India is the key country in this matter.

China—Vice Foreign Minister’s Visit

Mr. Christopher briefed the Ambassadors on the recent visit.⁴ China had viewed with concern the proposal for neutralization of Afghanistan, fearing it would lead to permanent Soviet domination of the country. He had stressed to the Chinese that complete Soviet withdrawal had to be a pre-condition to any other action and the Chinese gave the impression that they could live with the approach. On the Olympics, China wholeheartedly supported the boycott and the alternative games. On Pakistan the Chinese urged us to be patient as Pakistan decided its strategy towards its neighbors, and they stressed the need for other countries to supplement Chinese efforts to provide military aid to Islamabad. They had expressed a willingness to work toward improved relations with India but were not sanguine about the prospects. The Chinese told us that the Democratic Kampucheans in Kampuchea had done better during the dry season than had been expected, and were pleased with the outcome of the recent EC/ASEAN discussions.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁵

Washington, undated

ELEMENTS

1. Prompt withdrawal of all Soviet military forces from Afghanistan.

2. An Afghan government acceptable to the Afghan people.

3. No interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by its neighbors or any other state.⁶

4. Non-alignment in Afghanistan’s foreign policy and permanent neutrality for Afghanistan, including the obligation to refrain from entering into any military alliance, and to refrain from allowing any state to have military forces or facilities in its territory except by agreement of the guarantors.

5. Guarantees by Afghanistan’s neighbors and other interested states of permanent neutrality for Afghanistan and of non-interference in its internal affairs.

6. Arrangements to apply only to Afghanistan and not to affect the sovereign rights of other countries.

(This is seen as a responsive or counter-punching point).

1. Source: Department of State, Executive Secretariat (ES), Sensitive and Super Sensitive File, 1979–1983, Lot 96D262, Box 3, 1980 Super Sensitive I, Jan, Feb, Mar–1980. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Vest. Attached but not printed is a March 20 memorandum from Lake and Tarnoff to Vance forwarding the memorandum of conversation.
2. An article in the President’s Daily Brief, March 24, reported Karmal’s New Year’s address which characterized Western attempts to neutralize Afghanistan as “reactionary” and reaffirmed that Soviet troops would remain in Afghanistan until “the smallest signs of aggression” had been “completely uprooted.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—March 1980, PDBs) An intelligence memorandum prepared in the Department of Defense, March 25, reporting on a conversation between a Soviet diplomat and a Polish counterpart in Moscow, relayed the former’s assertion that the Soviet Union “rejected totally” the Western European proposal for a neutral Afghanistan. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330–82–0217, Box 2, Afghanistan, Jan–Feb 1980)
3. For the Islamic Foreign Ministers’ meeting, see footnote 4, Document 270. The G–7 Summit was held in Venice June 22–23; see footnote 2, Document 281. The U.N. General Assembly convened in New York September 16.
4. The visit of Zhang Wenjin, who met with Vance and Christopher March 17, was reported in telegram 75394 to Beijing, March 21. Regarding European proposals for the neutralization of Afghanistan, Zhang emphasized that it would not compel the Soviets to withdraw, that they could distort it for their political gain, and ultimately it was a decision for the Afghan people. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 9, China (PRC): 3/80) See also Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. XIII, China, Documents 303 and 304.
5. Secret; Sensitive. Lake and Tarnoff in their March 20 covering memorandum to Vance noted that an earlier version of this paper, which was attached at Tab B to their memorandum and seen by the President, omitted the clause at the end of item 4: “except by agreement of the guarantors.” They explained “this was originally designed to permit foreign advisors and peacekeeping forces, on a case-by-case basis, but only by collective agreement. With the omission of the concept of ‘guarantors,’ L believes this clause serves no purpose and that any deployment of peacekeeping forces could be dealt with through over-riding provisions of the UN Charter.” An amended version of these elements was sent in telegram 88719, April 4, to all NATO capitals and Tokyo. In relaying the elements, the Department wanted to ensure that posts could “respond coherently” in the effort to find an “acceptable political solution in Afghanistan.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D880029–1390)
6. If a question is raised as to the geographical scope of Afghanistan, we would refer to the Durand Line as the international boundary. [Footnote is in the original.]