238. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting1
PARTICIPANTS
- The President
- The Vice President
- Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
- Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
- Deputy Secretary of Defense Graham Claytor
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff David Jones
- Director of Central Intelligence Stansfield Turner
- Zbigniew Brzezinski
- Hamilton Jordan
- David Aaron
MINUTES
The President began by saying that he wanted to try to keep the meeting short and not go into great detail, but he wanted a general discussion about what is taking place in our foreign and defense policies. It was his sense that the last two weeks were the worst since he has been in office. We are confronted by several important issues which are not directly related but which are tied together in terms of the overall posture of the U.S. and the impression that our country is making at home and abroad. The President said that after a general review this afternoon, he wished to get together again, perhaps at Camp David this weekend, after our subordinates have had an opportunity to clarify the issues and define the options.
The President’s analysis of the current situation was as follows: at best we have a stagnant situation in Iran and Afghanistan, as well as in the Israeli/Egyptian peace talks. We have a deteriorating position, and perhaps worse, with our European Allies. Finally, our relationship with the Soviet Union is dormant and perhaps deteriorating as well.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]
As for Afghanistan, it was the President’s judgment the Soviets are going to stay in that country for at least a year. He thought they were making progress against the resistance and they were succeeding in driving a wedge between ourselves and our Allies—with the help of the Allies, particularly the French.
[Page 643]The President said it was important to develop a definition, for ourselves and for our Allies, of a neutralist Afghanistan and try to build world support for it along with a concomitant condemnation of the Soviet military occupation. Such a concept would facilitate enlisting European support for our efforts against the Soviet invasion.2
On the issue of the Europeans, the President thought that now that we have our COCOM proposals, we have an opportunity to test their intentions. The French probably will not accept tighter COCOM rules, but we can put pressure on them as well.
The only bright spot, said the President, is our effort to boycott the Olympics. That seems to be gaining momentum every day.
As far as the USSR is concerned, the President said that he had been toying with the idea of a frank and tough letter to Brezhnev. It would make clear that there would be no resumption of normal trading and commerce so long as the Soviets are invading Afghanistan. At the same time, the letter would make clear that we are prepared to take steps to improve our relationship if the Soviets are prepared to have a neutral Afghanistan.
In the meantime, they must realize that we will take the steps necessary to protect our security, particularly since their actions threaten detente.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]
The Secretary of State said he was clear in his own mind what we want on Afghanistan neutrality, but he did not know whether the [Page 644] French would go along. He thought it was important that we stay close to the British whom he thought supported our position fully. The President responded by saying that we should be prepared to go public with our views on Afghan neutrality. The Secretary of State agreed and suggested that we could be most effective by staying close to the British. Dr. Brzezinski then reviewed the points elaborating the elements of Afghan neutrality which had been developed that morning in the SCC meeting.3 Harold Brown commented that we should be clear in our own minds whether the Soviet Union would accept these principles. The President said that he assumed that they could not, but he was concerned that the Soviets were getting away with their current activities in terms of world opinion, indeed, in terms of our Allies’ opinions, too.
The Secretary of State thought that all the other European Allies would go along with our definition of Afghan neutrality except the French. Harold Brown added that the French may take the same substantive position, but do not want to be linked to a collective position.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]
Secretary Brown said that we have a good case to present to our Allies on what the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan means to them. When he tries it out on them, they admit that the oil resources of the Persian Gulf are more important to them than to the U.S. and that the implications of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are more severe for them than for us. He thought it would be useful for the President to give a speech supporting the speeches already given by the Secretary of State and himself on the Afghan issue.4 The Secretary of Defense expressed concern that the Europeans may be so afraid of the Soviets that they want to appease them. On the other hand, they may simply be deceiving themselves. He thought that we should rub their noses in the strategic facts of life created by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.
As for the Soviets, he did not believe that we needed to change our policy of being prepared to cooperate where possible, and to compete when necessary. When they push, he said, we must push back [Page 645] from a position of strength. He added that we also want to move on arms control, but we cannot do this in the face of actions of the sort going on in Afghanistan.
Dr. Brzezinski commented that the Europeans understand the problem. Indeed, Giscard himself had identified the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as a strategic threat. So it is not that they do not understand. The fact is that they are afraid of the Soviet Union and they are trying to preserve detente in Europe, a detente that is divided from Soviet aggressive behavior in the rest of the world. Their second concern, he said, is that the Europeans do not believe that we are consistent. So they do not want to go along with us and then ultimately see us reverse our position. The Germans are particularly concerned that should this happen, they will have to pay a very high price for having supported us and then be left holding the bag.
Dr. Brzezinski thus said he favored a constant, measured and assertive posture. No mixed signals and no radical departures.
As for a letter to Brezhnev, he was against it. Our main problem is that we have not been able to both communicate effectively and convey patience. A letter, he said, is a dead instrument. It does not really convey meanings very thoroughly. He thought that conversations between Cy and Dobrynin were the best avenue. It was a shame that we cannot talk to others in the Soviet hierarchy, but Dobrynin had confirmed to him that Gromyko was now the only interlocutor. Dobrynin said that Brezhnev might have been able to do it in the past, but was no longer able to do so. He thought that a letter to Brezhnev or a meeting with Gromyko that was not well prepared in advance would not be helpful. The key thing was for all of us in all of our contacts with the Soviets to be steady in our position.
Dr. Brzezinski said that the neutralization scheme, as developed by the SCC, put us in good posture. He thought that perhaps the Islamic Foreign Ministers might be induced to put forward such a scheme when they met.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]
Admiral Turner then said that the major emerging issue from his analysis is whether we are going to stay consistent. Thus he questioned the idea of any neutrality proposals or any letter to Brezhnev. The Soviets feel we are falling apart with the Pakistanis and that the Europeans are beating a path to their door on the neutrality proposal. The Soviets are not suggesting neutrality and for us to do so only undermines the strength and credibility of our position. The Secretary of State disagreed with this analysis. He said that we have to put the monkey on their back about withdrawing. The President added that neutrality must be preceded by the Soviet withdrawal. Admiral Turner replied that he could not see why we had to get into a discussion of [Page 646] neutrality simply to put the issue of withdrawal first and foremost. Secretary Brown said that there is a connection since the Soviets might withdraw with a subservient regime left behind.
The President said that Soviet withdrawal is not likely within a year. The question is how to hold the Allies together during this period. If we only emphasize withdrawal he thought that the Allies would desert us. He added that Brezhnev had said in letters to himself, to Giscard, to Indira Gandhi that the Soviets would withdraw when their reasons for going into Afghanistan had been eliminated.5 That is a ridiculous position, but we still have to put them on the defensive politically.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Afghanistan.]
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Meetings File, Box 2, NSC Meeting #27 Held 3/18/80, 3/80. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Aaron. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room.↩
- In a memorandum to Brzezinski, March 15, in preparation for the NSC meeting, Brement concluded: “The next nine months are going to be the most critical test we have faced with the Soviets since the Korean war.” Brement based this analysis on the assumption that the Soviet leadership, despite its surprise at the initial, vigorously negative worldwide response to the intervention in Afghanistan, would likely dig in its troops there and build both international and political acceptance for the intervention as well as tactical gains in Afghanistan. Brement noted that since January a series of missteps in U.S. policy had turned the tide in the Soviets’ favor. These included: a split between the United States and its European allies over how to respond to the crisis in Afghanistan; ongoing Pakistani susceptibility to Soviet intimidation; and numerous shortcomings in the U.S. ability to punish the USSR with the Olympic boycott and the grain and technology transfer embargoes. To mitigate these problems, Brement counseled that the United States must strengthen Afghan resistance forces with Chinese and Pakistani help; increase pressure on the European allies for a united front; challenge Soviet adventurism elsewhere through covert means; increase the U.S. military presence worldwide; and explore alternative channels for high-level U.S.-Soviet communication. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 3–10/80) In a memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, March 17, Thornton agreed with Brement’s basic assumption that the momentum was with the Soviet Union, but doubted the efficacy of attempting to reverse it. Instead, Thornton asserted, the U.S. capacity to defend its “vital interests” in the region were limited: “We cannot, and hence should not, seek to defend them where the Soviets have an overwhelming geopolitical advantage. (Ibid.)↩
- See Document 236.↩
- Vance delivered a speech on Afghanistan at the Chicago Council of Foreign Relations, March 3, in which he acknowledged that no quick solution to the crisis was within reach and a U.S. response was required that balanced firmness and “the indiscriminate confrontation of earlier times.” The speech was reported in Bernard Gwerzman, “Vance Urging a Balanced Response on Afghanistan,” New York Times, March 4, 1980, p. A3; and reprinted in the Department of State Bulletin, April 1980, pp. 12–16. Brown delivered a speech on March 6 to the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, that discussed the Afghan crisis in the context of U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf. An excerpt from the speech was reproduced in the Middle East Research and Information Project, MERIP Reports, no. 90, The Vietnam Syndrome (Sep. 1980), pp. 20–23. The speech is also printed in the Department of State Bulletin, May 1980, pp. 63–67.↩
- The letter from Brezhnev to Carter is likely a reference to the hotline message of December 29. See Document 114.↩