212. Memorandum From Thomas Thornton of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Afghanistan—What Next?
Background
One of our problems in dealing with Afghanistan is that we haven’t really expected a satisfactory outcome—i.e., a Soviet withdrawal. Our secondary objective—making the Soviets pay for their actions—is of considerable value but is certainly not a long-term policy goal. Given the Pakistani reluctance to be very involved with us (and the Chinese), I am concerned that, in some regards at least, we may find that we cannot extract a maximum price from the Soviets. The press leaks will make the Paks even less amenable and may, on their own, undercut our position in general. (S)
From reading the intelligence reporting, I gather that the Soviets are finding the going a lot tougher than they expected. They probably realize that they are in for a long and costly operation but are no doubt determined to do whatever is necessary to secure their border. I have little doubt that they can succeed ultimately. (S)
There is a lot of diplomatic activity going on. The Soviets are dropping hints about willingness to come to a compromise solution. The British are talking about an “Austrian” solution. The President’s comment about a Muslim occupation force has stirred interest.2 Jayawardene is trying to do something. Most important, perhaps, is the tough line that India is taking in private while still keeping its options open in public. (S)
Evaluation
This all may or may not provide us with something more than diplomatic and propaganda maneuvering space. I continue to believe that all alternatives are going to founder on the Soviet desire to have [Page 591] absolute security along its borders. But I am no longer as convinced as I have been in the past. They may be looking for a way out. (S)
The odds are, also, that initiatives by the Sri Lankans, Indians, etc., are not going to get off the ground. None of these countries has a very good track record for effective diplomatic work. The Indo-Pakistani rivalry is also a barrier. But neither of these considerations is absolute. India and the other regional states may just be sufficiently disturbed that they could put something together. (S)
RECOMMENDATION
Even if the well is probably dry, I think we should put the bucket down. It won’t cost much, and we could just possibly find something there. Specifically:
—We should have an intelligence assessment of how much the Soviets are paying for their action and what the chances are that they would settle for some sort of alternative outcome. We should evaluate the Soviet feelers that have been put out.
—We should seriously assess the possibility that the Indians (or somebody else) might be able to play an effective intermediary role. And we should develop an idea of what that role might be and how we should stimulate or otherwise relate to it. (E.g., might the President urge Mrs. Gandhi to take leadership; if so, what would we be willing to concede?)
—We should consider what kind of alternate arrangements would be acceptable to us and staff them out carefully. (E.g., the idea of a Muslim peace-keeping force has its virtues, but it is not likely to be attractive to India—which is inevitably going to be a principal actor.) (S)
I suggest that you bring this complex of questions up at the Tuesday SCC and ask that a working group of State, CIA, NSC and, if necessary, DOD, be established to come up with answers on an urgent basis.3 (C)
Alternatively, I could draft a tasking memo, but I think it is better to get the matter discussed in the SCC and launched from there. (C)
I am attaching a cable from Moscow, quoting the Pakistani ambassador, that you should read.4 (S)
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, North/South, Thornton, Country File, Box 91, Afghanistan: 1/80–1/81. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action.↩
- In a news conference on February 13, Carter called for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and a Soviet commitment not to invade other countries, and suggested the use of a peacekeeping force comprised of Muslim troops during the transition period between Soviet withdrawal and the establishment of a neutral Afghan Government. (Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, p. 309)↩
- No record of a February 19 SCC meeting was found. The SCC did meet on February 22. The summary of conclusions of the meeting is in the Carter Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box 109, SCC 277, 2/22/80, Security Framework for the Persian Gulf. See also Document 214.↩
- Attached; printed as Document 210.↩