16. Letter From Pakistani General Zia to President Carter1
Your interest in the possible implications of the recent coup in Afghanistan and in my personal assessment of this event, has been conveyed to me by Ambassador Hummel.2 The correct assessment of the change of regime in Kabul and of its wider ramifications is, indeed, essential to enable us to determine our response to it. Your personal awareness of the importance of the new situation that has arisen and your keenness to have the right answers, are most welcome.
As soon as the events began to unfold in Kabul, we took the initiative to consult Ambassador Hummel and have remained in close touch with him ever since. We have in the course of these consultations [Page 38] also briefed him in detail about these developments and our perception of their wider repercussions in our own region and beyond. Ambassador Hummel, no doubt, has communicated to you our views which I hope have been of some interest.
Neither are the facts of the latest turn of events in Afghanistan obscure nor is their interpretation a difficult exercise. The leftist coup in Kabul has replaced a 200-year old monarchic tradition in Afghanistan with a communist-oriented, if not communist, Government which was immediately recognised by the Soviet Union and has its full backing. India joined Bulgaria, the most subservient Soviet satellite of Eastern Europe, to follow the Soviet lead without any hesitation or delay whatsoever. The collapse of Daoud’s regime with which we were making good progress towards a settlement of our differences, may have been welcomed in New Delhi. India is allied to the Soviet Union under the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation of 1971 and acts in tandem with it, at critical moments, despite the illusion of a shift in its policies.3
The facts of how the coup was engineered are not in dispute. Soviet trained pilots in Soviet supplied MIGs and Soviet trained officers in Soviet supplied tanks joined together to wipe out President Daoud and his family, in a swift and bloody operation, closely following the pattern of events in Addis Ababa not long ago.4 The Afghan Police Force which was exclusively West German trained, was also eliminated.
The Khalq party which has formed the new Government is composed of leftists known to have been closely associated with the Soviet Union and the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party over a period of many years. President Taraki also served for a while in the Afghan Embassy in Washington where his denunciation of the Afghan ruling family resulted in his removal from office.5 He is now not only President of Afghanistan but also the head of the Khalq Party with which an extremist faction called Parcham merged in October 1977. [Page 39] The leader and founder of the extremist Parcham faction is now the Vice President and Deputy Prime Minister in President Taraki’s Government. The overwhelming majority of the remaining members of the Government are all of the same hue.
Paragraph 8 of the ruling Khalq Party’s manifesto issued in October 1977, specifically mentions the Durand Line, the recognised international frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan, as a “colonial imposition” and pledges support to the so-called “national movement of the people of Pakhtoonistan” in our territory. In his very first press conference on May 6, 1978, the new Afghan President raised the matter of the Durand Line saying, of course, that he wanted a peaceful settlement of this border issue with Pakistan.6
The entire flavour and rhetoric of the new regime in Kabul conform to classic communist norms. The country itself has been re-named the “Democratic Republic of Afghanistan” on familiar lines. The regime’s lip service to Islamic values and non-alignment is transparent enough. The need for such camouflage to gain time for the regime to consolidate its position, is evident.
If we go along with these professions in an effort to ensure the continuity of the dialogue we had initiated with President Daoud, this does not mean that we are under any illusion or have been lulled into a false sense of security by the regime’s protestations. We know that the Afghan barrier has been breached and our country lies directly in the path of the flood which rolled out of Czarist Russia in the last century and is now flowing in full force towards the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf.
It is the nature of the response to this situation which is the subject of controversy among our friends and allies. This is unfortunate because time is running out. Nothing will stop the Soviet Union from pursuing its expansionist policies if events encourage it to believe that smaller countries are expendable in the overall context of America’s global strategy.
In our estimation the advent of the leftist regime in Kabul is an event of historic proportions. The change is of a fundamental nature which will have a profound impact on the balance of power in our region and beyond. Its consequences for Pakistan are incalculable. These and related matters are receiving our urgent attention. I am convinced that these are of deep concern to you also and hope that you will be able to spare some time to give attention to the measures [Page 40] needed to meet an entirely new situation which has materialised earlier than we had expected.
We are also in the process of comparing notes with our other friends. My Adviser on Foreign Affairs is at present in Iran and will be meeting the Shahanshah. For Iran the situation could be as grave as it is for us. It may not be empty rhetoric to say that unless timely action is taken to block the Soviet avalanche, the oil resources of the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula may be lost to the West with consequences that need no elaboration.
I am unable, Mr. President, to say in greater detail what I have to say in a short letter. It is not possible to convey to you in this communication the exact nature of the forces that may have been released by the transformation of the Afghan scene. A fuller elaboration of this theme which is of vital concern to us and I hope also to you, can better be undertaken through a personal exchange of views at a mutually convenient time.
With profound regards,
Yours sincerely,7
General
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders, Box 15, Pakistan: President Zia-ul-Haq, 2/78–7/79. No classification marking.↩
- In telegram 4264 from Islamabad, May 1, Hummel outlined a proposed Presidential message to Zia regarding the situation in Afghanistan. The message emphasized that the United States remained committed to the stability of South Asia and recognized the centrality of Pakistan toward that end. In telegram 112361 to Islamabad, May 3, Vance authorized Hummel to deliver the message orally on the basis that a letter from Carter “might enhance Pakistan’s concerns, as well as raise unrealistic expectations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780188–0749 and D780185–0567, respectively)↩
- The Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship, and Cooperation was signed in New Delhi on August 7, 1971.↩
- A possible reference to the Ethiopian revolution of 1974, during which Marxist military leaders brought down Emperor Haile Selassie. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. E–8, Documents on Africa, 1973–1976, Document 122. However, the more likely reference is to the assassination of Teferi Bante, Chairman of the Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), along with five other leaders of PMAC on February 3, 1977. The assassination of Teferi Bante and his associates, all enemies of Mengistu Haile-Mariam, cemented Mengistu’s role as leader of the Ethiopian revolution.↩
- In telegram 3372 from Kabul, April 30, the Embassy noted that Taraki served as the press attaché in the Afghan Embassy in Washington, 1952–1953. In telegram 4262 from Islamabad, May 1, the Embassy reported that Taraki made “anti-monarchist speeches” during his tenure in Washington and consequently requested asylum in the United States, which was turned down after “intense pressure” from King Zahir Shah. Taraki subsequently returned to Kabul where he was arrested. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780185–0099 and D780185–0561, respectively)↩
- The press conference was reported in telegram 3697 from Kabul, May 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780194–0927)↩
- General Zia added the two closing lines by hand.↩