Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XII, Afghanistan

156. Draft Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom¹

Washington, January 10, 1980

Subject: Letter From President to Prime Minister on Afghanistan. For the Ambassador.

1. S—Entire text.

2. You should request appointment with Prime Minister Thatcher at earliest opportunity to deliver letter personally from the President concerning coordinated Western response to Afghanistan crisis (text at para 4 below). (FYI: Similar messages are being sent to Schmidt, Giscard, Cossiga, and Clark.)

3. In delivering letter, you may draw as appropriate on following points:

—President Carter asked that I request this appointment with you to deliver a personal message from him concerning the situation in Afghanistan and to convey to you his views regarding the Western response to that crisis.

—We completely share your view of the Soviet invasion as a serious threat to peace, and we intend to follow through vigorously on the measures announced by the President on January 4.

—The President has asked that I pass on to you his very great appreciation for the public support you have given to our position.

—We have valued our close consultations with you, both at the London and Brussels meetings last week, and in our discussions together, and we look forward to continued close cooperation. We have been particularly grateful for your vigorous démarches in Third World capitals, urging those countries to join in condemnation of Soviet actions.

—Now that the focus of world attention has shifted to the upcoming UN General Assembly debate on Afghanistan, we must continue to seek a strong, united Western response, both in Southwest Asia and in the context of East-West relations. If we fail to do so, the Soviets may only be encouraged to take similar moves elsewhere.

—The President looks forward to staying in the closest possible communication with you, as our two governments further develop their positions, and he has asked me to be available to you and your government to assist in any way possible.

4. Begin text of letter:

Dear Margaret:

As I know you will agree, the Soviet Union’s invasion and occupation of Afghanistan are matters of the gravest concern. In my view, the Soviet action represents one of the most serious security challenges which our countries have faced in the post-war era. This naked aggression has implications in Southwest Asia and the Middle East, as well as globally, in the bilateral relationship between each of our countries and the Soviet Union, and in the multilateral relationships which have developed among the countries of the West and the Warsaw Pact involving European matters in the past decade. A failure on our part to respond adequately to the Soviet challenge in Afghanistan can only encourage Moscow to move in the future even more aggressively. Pakistan, Iran, the Gulf, Yugoslavia, and even Turkey come immediately to mind. By the same token, a strong united Western response can correct Soviet perceptions, restrain Soviet behavior and ultimately advance the cause of détente to which both our countries are dedicated over the longer term. I know that you share my view that in these circumstances, it is imperative that you and I and our representatives in Washington and London maintain close and continuous consultations and coordination.²

You are already familiar with the measures which I announced on January 4 involving our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, and I appreciate your support for these actions.³ I had previously announced my decision that the SALT II Treaty not be called up for Senate action in light of the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan. I did not withdraw the treaty because I believe its ratification would be in the interest of the West, and I hope that circumstances will, in time, make it possible for me to request that the Senate proceed with action on the treaty. Further, I believe that it is important to continue our efforts in MBFR to reach agreement with the East which will lower military forces and tensions in Europe and to pursue vigorously our TNF arms control proposal. In my judgment we should also continue to participate in the CSCE process which if carefully managed promotes Western interests.

However, I feel strongly that we would be making a grave error should we, in the interest of preserving an atmosphere of détente, attempt to separate developments in Southwest Asia involving the Soviet Union from the bilateral or multilateral relations which we have with the USSR. The process of détente can continue only if we, collectively and individually, make clear to the Soviet Union that actions such as its invasion and occupation of Afghanistan must have serious consequences for the Soviet Union in other areas of the world, including Europe.

The Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan is simply not consistent with détente in Europe, and this must be made clear to the Soviet leadership. If Moscow does wish to pursue détente, then in the wake of Afghanistan it must give us evidence of such a desire. The most convincing confirmation of Moscow’s desire to retrace its steps back to policies consistent with the principles of détente would be an early and total withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. To this point, I regret to say that we have seen no evidence that that is Moscow’s intention and the continually growing USSR deployment in Afghanistan appears to us to suggest that the Soviet Army went to that small and defenseless country to stay. And in the light of other Soviet activities in the region—especially in Ethiopia and the Yemens—we would have to regard a prolonged Soviet occupation of Afghanistan as part of a calculated strategic thrust against the West’s vital interests.

We have already noted a predictable tendency in the Soviet Union’s propaganda to try to divide the United States and Western Europe over the matter of Afghanistan. Indeed, I think we can expect the Soviets to launch a “peace offensive” in Europe in the near future. Moscow will undoubtedly hope that by offering various inducements to West European countries they can secure a “business-as-usual” approach by these countries, a tacit agreement to let concern about the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan fade away. I know that you will be particularly sensitive to this Soviet objective and will work with me and our colleagues from the other Western European countries to ensure that this Soviet aim is not realized.

Finally, I want to assure you that I am prepared to commit the United States to take the necessary steps to enhance security in Southwest Asia and the Middle East, not just because of U.S. interests, but because of the broad stakes the West in general has in this region’s stability and the flow of oil. In this effort, it will be important for the United States to have the support—and in some cases the direct involvement of our European allies. The challenge to our common and crucial interests in this area is unprecedented; it calls for an unprecedented and coordinated Western response. This includes support for Pakistan, intensified political involvement with specific nations stretching from Southwest Asia to the Eastern Mediterranean, increased security involvement and military presence, increased economic assistance, as appropriate, and arms support to friendly nations. The United Kingdom’s role in this effort will be particularly important and I look forward to learning of Peter Carrington’s impressions after his visit to the region.⁴

I want to thank you for your support in these trying times. I will be anxious to have your views in the coming period on the posture that we should adopt to convince this Soviet leadership and the following one that they cannot undertake naked aggression such as in Afghanistan without the most serious penalties for them.

Sincerely, Jimmy Carter

End text.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Office File, Country Chron File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/80. The draft telegram was attached at Tab C to a covering memorandum (not printed), January 10, from Brzezinski to Carter. Also attached but not printed are draft telegrams containing similar messages from Carter to Giscard d’Estaing (Tab A), Helmut Schmidt (Tab B), Francesco Cossiga (Tab D), and Joe Clark (Tab E). In the covering memorandum, Brzezinski noted: “The telegrams lay out our appraisal of the strategic consequences of the Soviet invasion and convey our conviction that a strong and united Allied reaction will be necessary both in Southwest Asia and in Europe.” Brzezinski recommended that Carter approve the telegrams. Carter placed a checkmark beside “Approve,” and wrote “All ok.” in the right margin. The message was sent as telegram 8257 to London, January 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880030–1295, N800001–0589)
2. An article in the President’s Daily Brief, January 10, noted that the British had taken the most “aggressive stance” among the NATO Allies, who so far had been “unable to agree on a strong response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.” The article also noted that France opposed the British call for the Alliance to apply sanctions against the Soviet Union, advocating instead that nations should respond to the invasion bilaterally. Meanwhile, the PDB noted, the West Germans were caught in a “dilemma” because “Schmidt realizes that a weak response would give his political opponents a good election issue, but fears that a vigorous reaction would undermine Ostpolitik, the keystone of 12 years of Social Democratic foreign policy.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, PDBs)
3. See Document 109. For Carter’s January 4 address, see footnote 5, Document 145.
4. See footnote 6, Document 145. Subsequently, Carrington visited the region in February. Telegram 3930 from Bonn, February 29, reported on a meeting between Carrington and Genscher. Both men agreed that the European Community should attempt to determine the likelihood of Moscow’s intention to withdraw, but they were under no illusions that in fact, “the Soviets are digging themselves deeper every day.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800105–0084)