155. Article in the National Intelligence Daily1
SPECIAL ANALYSIS
PAKISTAN: Reaction to Afghanistan
[less than 1 line not declassified] CIA
The Pakistani Government sees itself today as weak, isolated, and clearly threatened by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Pakistani officials believe that Soviet combat troops will soon be operating in Afghan border regions and that action against the insurgents will spill over into Pakistan. Despite their fears, Pakistan’s military leaders are cautious about openly seeking US support. (S [handling restriction not declassified])
Pakistani officials fear that once Afghanistan has been pacified, Moscow and Kabul will turn their attention to Pakistan. They see a possibility of an Afghan incursion into Pakistani areas along the border where Afghan refugees are concentrated, but they have a much greater fear of attempts to assist dissident tribesmen in Pakistan’s border provinces. (S [handling restriction not declassified])
Pakistan’s sense of isolation has been increased by Indira Gandhi’s victory in India, which will rekindle the Pakistanis’ fear of a Moscow—New Delhi alliance bent on destroying their nation.2 (S [handling restriction not declassified])
Caution Toward US, USSR
In deciding whether to embrace US support, Pakistan’s military leaders must take into account anti-US sentiment in Pakistan that they fear may be turned against the government by opposition political leaders. Pakistani leaders, moreover, view the US as undependable because of its termination of military assistance during Pakistan’s wars with India and its opposition to Pakistan’s nuclear policy.3 (S [handling restriction not declassified])
[Page 451]In the period before the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Pakistani leaders considered attempting to normalize relations with Afghanistan and the USSR. Even now, there is some sentiment in the government for keeping the Soviet option open. Senior foreign affairs adviser Agha Shahi, who is thought to hold this view, may be pressing the government to demand maximum commitments from the US in the hope of demonstrating that Washington cannot be counted on. (S [handling restriction not declassified])
President Zia and most military leaders would prefer—in the best of worlds—to return to a close relationship with the US. Zia and other top officers are all anti-Soviet, and few of them believe that better relations with the Soviets would do more than buy time. They recognize that any longer term benefits would founder on the higher priority the USSR will—in a crunch—always give India. (S [handling restriction not declassified])
Military Assistance
In recent years, Pakistani foreign policy has emphasized ties with Islamic and nonaligned nations—a policy that probably will continue. For Pakistan to establish close ties with the US again would require Washington’s willingness to provide the military equipment Pakistan believes it needs to assure its security. The Pakistanis believe a military aid package must contain sophisticated weaponry, preferably including A–7 aircraft—previously denied them by Washington. (S [handling restriction not declassified])
There probably would be little give in Pakistan’s position on the nuclear issue. The Pakistanis believe strongly that a nuclear capability is critical for Pakistan to become a secure and important Third World power. There is no dispute over this objective in Pakistan—Zia’s opponents also support it—and any compromise on it, regardless of other aid from the US, would meet strong public opposition. (S [handling restriction not declassified])
Zia would probably regard a joint Sino-American effort to resupply and reequip his forces as a particularly attractive proposal. The Pakistanis are heavily dependent on their relationship with China. If they are to risk incurring Soviet wrath, they would like to have their two great-power allies united behind them. The popularity of China among Pakistanis would also be a useful counter to their generally critical attitude toward the US. (S [handling restriction not declassified])
The conclusion of a US military assistance program with Pakistan would cause a furor in India. Indira Gandhi can be expected to launch a vigorous campaign against new arms deliveries to Pakistan even though India’s armed forces are overwhelmingly superior to Pakistan’s, both in equipment and numbers of personnel. (S [handling restriction not declassified])
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 81B00401R: Subject Files of the Presidential Briefing Coordinator for DCI (1977–81), Box 8, Afghanistan Crisis—January 1980, NIDs. Top Secret; [codeword, handling restriction, and text not declassified]. The full version of this National Intelligence Daily was not filed with this collection. The article printed here was found in this form.↩
- Indira Gandhi was sworn in as Prime Minister of India on January 14.↩
- President Lyndon B. Johnson suspended military aid to Pakistan in September 1965. See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXV, South Asia, Document 190. Carter again suspended aid to Pakistan in April 1979 pursuant to the Symington Amendment. See Document 102.↩