117. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Mark) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Christopher)1
SUBJECT
- The Impact of Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan on the Afghan Civil War, the Region, and the USSR’s Standing
SUMMARY In the current Afghan situation, the USSR has a bear by the tail. It became entangled in an opportunistic and ideologically attractive grab to take advantage of the probably fortuitous emergence of a Marxist regime in Kabul in the revolutionary coup of April 1978. It cannot now let go without suffering damage to its image as a Marxist superpower that poses as a reliable ally of socialist and would-be socialist regimes. It also wants to avoid the risk that a hostile state will appear on yet another—and sensitive—stretch of the Soviet frontier. Yet, as it holds on, it becomes ever more deeply enmeshed in an Afghan civil war, which pits a highly unpopular, fractious, and factionalized minority grouping of leftists against the great rural tribal majority, who hate all that the leftists stand for.
Given this unattractive prospect, Moscow has now begun to escalate its intervention in Afghan affairs in the hope that this will improve its chances to reduce the just mentioned negative aspects of the situation. It is trying to insure that it will gain reliable control over its client regime (which it did not have under Amin) and that Afghanistan will neither sink into anarchy (thus increasing the risk of external intervention) nor become a hostile neighbor to the USSR. Moscow is [Page 329] willing to pay the international costs for its actions, but it probably calculates that its losses will be short-lived. Besides, it may assume that eventual success will bring exploitable dividends in the form of a more respected image as a decisive and powerful actor on the world scene.
To reduce the insurgency, as a follow-up to their drastic moves of this week, the Soviet leadership will heighten military pressures against the insurgents, including some Soviet combat involvement. Thus far, the USSR has brought to bear in Afghanistan a large airborne force, sizable numbers of additional fighter aircraft, helicopters, military air transport, and two motorized rifle divisions. Several other ground force divisions are being readied at least as a backup reserve. These deployed forces can assure the security of Kabul, of the three other largest cities, of several strategically located towns, of roads near the Soviet frontier, and of the land lines of communication from the USSR to Kabul and Herat. If the Soviets were to plan general and large-scale combat actions of their own against insurgent positions throughout Afghanistan, they would need ten to fifteen divisions and major logistical bases. Up to now, we can see nothing initiated in the USSR on that scale.
Accompanying the military moves, it must be expected that Moscow will now start experimenting with new political approaches to lure a respectable proportion of the dissidents away from the insurgent camp. However, we judge that Babrak Karmal’s chances of gaining substantial popular support are as poor as Amin’s and Taraki’s. His words are meant to sound promising to disaffected Afghans, but his predecessors used almost identical language without result. Tribal groups detest the Marxist trappings of the regime, which seems doomed to a very narrow base of followers—and these almost exclusively in urban areas. Political gains for Babrak would require major political concessions and a reduction of the Soviet presence, but neither he nor the Soviets can afford to go far enough to satisfy the opposition.
We do not yet know how the USSR plans to use the Afghan army in the future. For one thing, the army’s loyalty to the new regime is highly suspect. For another, it is demoralized and understrength, while its recruitment prospects are poor. Still, if it manages now to hold together as a viable institution after Babrak’s further purges, Soviet intervention, together with new training and equipment, could help to rebuild it to a point where, in the spring, it may be able to score some initial successes against the insurgents, provided that there were some Soviet combat involvement alongside.
Regional reaction to the Soviet intervention will be overwhelmingly disapproving. Iran will be very alarmed, but it will remain wrapped up in its own troubles, and will not be distracted from continuing to give priority attention to its confrontation with the U.S. Pakistan will [Page 330] now feel very exposed to Soviet pressures and will urge America and China to give it political and military support, lest it be obliged to kowtow to the Soviet Union. India will also be negative, but its policy reaction will depend on how the repercussions play themselves out around Pakistan. China will denounce the USSR once again and be ready for closer cooperation with the U.S. The Arab states of the Persian Gulf will show great anxiety at what they interpret as further evidence of a Soviet expansionist plan that envisages Moscow’s eventual control over them. Iraq’s strong opposition to the Soviet action will lead it to try to bring about greater mutual security coordination among the Gulf Arab states, but without reliance on Washington. END SUMMARY
[Omitted here is the body of the memorandum.]
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East/West, Brement, Subject File, Box 61, Afghanistan: 11/79–1/80. Secret. Drafted by Mark, Howells, Baraz, and Harris. Presumably prepared for Christopher prior to his trip to London and Brussels.↩