104. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1
15303. For the Secretary. Subject: Afghanistan: Reassuring Pakistan.
1. (S)—Entire text. This is an action message.
2. Like the rest of us, the Pakistanis are still in the process of assessing the implications of the latest events in Kabul. FonSec Shahnawaz this morning gave me preliminary GOP reaction about as follows: the Soviet troops came in during last few days at request of Amin, but Sovs then doublecrossed Amin. Sovs have now thrown into the political arena the last elements of alternative (leftist) leadership, and it remains to be seen whether these Parchamists can maintain the loyalty of the army, despite their use of the label “true Khalq” to describe themselves. It is “inevitable” that the army will suffer severe splits despite Sov milit pressures.
It is [clear?] the new Parchamists are even more puppets of the Sovs than previous leaders, and will be obedient servants of Moscow. There will likely be an initial period of moderation, as after takeovers by Taraki and Amin, but later on Babrak and co. will revert to their natural Communist extremism. The Pushtoonistan issue, on which Babrak earlier was more militant than Taraki or Amin, will later on become even more of an issue than it has been, and Pakistan expects severe pressures along border and Afghan subversion in NWFP and Baluchistan.
3. Our Pak sources suggest, inter alia, that a 30/31 Dec. visit to Kabul by Fon Advisor Shahi will be scrubbed.
4. USG policy makers should consider advisability very quick message to Paks, in next few days. Obviously broader and longer-term reactions will have to await fundamental USG decisions, but now is the time for giving the Paks whatever can be given to reassure them of U.S. concern and U.S. determination to prevent further Soviet expansion in this, or other, regions.
5. Obviously from my limited perspective I cannot make firm judgements on the elements that might be included in any message, but here are my suggestions.
6. Several avenues are open for us. One would be for me to be authorized, specifically, to reaffirm to the Government of Pakistan, at the highest levels, our continuing commitment to Pakistan’s integrity [Page 294] and sovereignty. I could put teeth in this by reaffirming—in response to Agha Shahi’s now three-month-old query—the applicability of our 1959 bilateral to the present situation in Afghanistan. We have really dithered on this matter far too long, in my judgement—the Iran hostage situation, elections in India, and the 21 November events here notwithstanding.2
7. I could be authorized, perhaps, to take this a step further by formally requesting, on behalf of my government, a consultation as envisaged under the 1959 bilateral; events in Kabul over the last 72 hours would seem to me to merit no less a reaction than this. For the request to originate with us (instead of with Pakistan) demonstrates both concern and initiative on our part to a Pakistani leadership made ever-more anxious about the ominous Soviet presence and blatant “occupation” of a neighboring Islamic country, at a time when they have reason to question the prospects for effective USG support.
8. Such a démarche on my part would have even greater impact if at least a portion of what I would be instructed to say could be cast in the form of a letter to President Zia from President Carter, expressing concern about the 25–28 Dec. developments in Kabul and soliciting Pakistan’s views about the meaning of these developments.
9. I could envision a Presidential text that would include the following thoughts: Quote: Dear President Zia: I am deeply distressed at the blatant exercise of Soviet power we have seen in Kabul during the past several days. It is a cruel and brutal violation of the norms of international discourse and relations, and it must not be allowed to go unchallenged by the world community, most especially Afghanistan’s fellow Islamic nations. For my part, I want to convey to you my own sense of deep concern about the events taking place in Afghanistan and to solicit earnestly your appreciation of developments there as we assess in Washington and with our friends what precisely should be the nature and character of the American and free world response. I want also to reassure you, at this difficult moment for Pakistan, of the continuing American commitment to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Finally, I wish to assure you of my desire for the closest of consultations between our two friendly governments as we assess how best to cope with the new threat to the region posed by the Soviet actions in Afghanistan. Unquote.
10. While not attempting to get into longer-range matters for decision within the USG as we come to grips with the USSR’s power grab in Kabul, I nonetheless want to add that we have exhausted the efficacy of oral diplomatic assurances. We have been reassuring the Pakistanis [Page 295] verbally ever since the April 1978 Communist takeover in Kabul. As the waves of 27/28 Dec. events in Kabul wash down the Kabul River into the Indus Valley, Pakistani paranoia and anxiety will naturally rise. Words alone—in the absence of tangible follow-up actions which demonstrate that our interest in the security of the region is matched by a capability to respond to threats—will fall on deaf ears. At bare minimum, we must look for practical steps in the security assistance area which we can somehow pursue despite, and without torpedoing, our non-proliferation policies. (FYI Paks are already aware from Wash leak that we have put a temporary hold on any new military sales, an action I believe was ill-advised when it was taken in early Dec and which now appears ludicrous, as I wrote in a letter to Hal Saunders that should reach him tomorrow. End FYI)
11. Failure to use Pakistan, as one vehicle in our response to Soviet actions in Kabul—will produce a new set of pressures for further dilution of ties with a seemingly helpless United States and for further accommodation with Soviet power, not just here but through the region as a whole.
12. Dept. repeat as desired.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P800040–2162, N800001–0001. Secret; Nodis; Niact Immediate.↩
- See footnote 10, Document 102.↩