Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

67. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, November 28, 1979, 9–10:20 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Iran

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • Warren Christopher**
  • David Newsom**
  • Harold Saunders**

• Defense

  • Secretary Harold Brown
  • W. Graham Claytor**

• JCS

  • General David Jones
  • General John Pustay**

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner
  • Frank Carlucci**

• Justice

  • Attorney General Benj. Civiletti**

• Treasury

  • Robert Carswell**

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski
  • Hamilton Jordan
  • Jody Powell
  • Lloyd Cutler**
  • Charles Kirbo

• NSC

  • Colonel William Odom**
  • Gary Sick

** Present only for first part of meeting.

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Domestic Issues:

1. President’s Views. Dr. Brzezinski reported on the President’s decisions from the previous day’s meeting.² He supports the idea of Senator Mathias’ proposal of a mail campaign. Jody Powell said that was being implemented. The President did not endorse the New York takeover of Iranian agencies; he agreed that demonstrations should proceed so long as Lafayette Park, the Ellipse and the Capitol were not involved. He agreed that we should maintain our position on payment of Iranian students. (C)

2. Iranian Assets. Litigation is picking up. In particular, we anticipate a major judicial challenge in London about the NIOC account of $3 billion held by the Bank of America. Treasury and Justice are taking steps to get counsel there, and Secretary Miller will be in London today for talks. A ruling could be produced within a few weeks. The Japanese are not being helpful on financial matters. They will be contacted with a more direct appeal for cooperation. (S)

3. Iranian Credit. State, Treasury and CIA will present options for the meeting tomorrow in response to the President’s suggestion that we step up efforts to restrict Iranian credit access. (S)

4. Immigration. 20,000 students have been interviewed and the Attorney General believes that it is time for a high-level note of congratulations to the INS. A draft will be prepared. Guidelines for exemption in cases of humanitarian concern will be required by next week to prevent deportation of minority groups and other individuals put into jeopardy. (C)

Political-Military Issues:

1. International Court of Justice. In view of the postponement of the Security Council session until this weekend, the Secretary of State recommended and the SCC agreed that it would be desirable to proceed simultaneously with our suit in the ICJ,³ subject to further discussion with the President later today. The Attorney General registered concern about the timing of an approach to the ICJ, that it might introduce an element of confusion into our various approaches, and that it could give rise to counter-claims and charges of intelligence activity. Secretary Vance said that those claims are going to be put forward this weekend in any event. (I feel you should know that this step will lock you into up to three weeks of litigation, making other alternatives more difficult.) (S)

The SCC then went into restricted session with only those principals who had been present at Camp David for a discussion of our overall strategy.⁴

Public Posture on Hostages. Before beginning the principal topic, Secretary Vance noted that the report of hostages being moved out of the embassy to other locations⁵ was probably going to leak soon since it was known in at least four capitals and rather widely in Washington. He proposed that we be prepared to respond quickly with a statement which would say that we had heard this rumor, that we are checking it out, but that we cannot confirm its accuracy. We should also be prepared to state that we have sent a démarche to the Iranian authorities on this issue, and we may wish to background on the possible implications of this act in order to structure the speculation in the press. On one hand, it means less centralized control. On the other, it may fit together with information about mining the embassy walls, etc., as evidence that this is a measure to protect the hostages. State is preparing a statement which will make these points and reiterate that we hold the authorities in Tehran accountable for the safety of the hostages. (C)

Next Steps: (All of the following is Top Secret)

Dr. Brzezinski opened the discussion by noting that we may be facing a situation where Iran will continue to defy all of our diplomatic and international moves while gradually undercutting international and domestic U.S. support by focusing on U.S. intelligence activities. In the meantime, we will have locked ourselves into a litigation strategy which ties our hands. The President had asked the group to think about the following options, to reflect on them, refine them and discuss them with him later:

1. Seek strong condemnation of Iran in the Security Council;

2. Have the Shah leave the country this weekend. There is concern that Khomeini may at some point commit himself to trials if the Shah is permitted to leave the country;

3. Call publicly for the embargo of all shipments to Iran until the hostages are released, and ask other nations to support us in this;

4. Seek sanctions against Iran under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter;

5. Mine Iranian ports and issue a statement that strong punishment will be inflicted on Iran if any of the hostages are harmed; adding that the mining will be lifted immediately once they are released;

6. Taking of stronger reactions which have been planned in the event the hostages are harmed.

Dr. Brzezinski wondered if we should not escalate the situation in a measured way as a means of bringing other nations into support for us rather than let the crisis subside into a condition of normalcy.

Hamilton Jordan observed that it was not only the President’s political situation that was at stake but also U.S. national interests. He was surprised that the situation had not turned sour already, but he did not see how the country could go on for two or three months this way.

Secretary Vance agreed but noted that the question is what can be done to change the situation in an effective way without making it worse.

Hamilton Jordan said that once the Shah leaves, they will have to respond. With all that is going on, a lot might happen by next week. We should not escalate until we have exhausted diplomatic remedies. Our interests will not be fully satisfied unless all the hostages are safely returned.

Secretary Vance observed that items 1–4 could be done without seriously threatening the hostages. The break point comes at mining.

Dr. Brzezinski and Secretary Brown said that the threat of mining could be used to get others to cooperate with us in bringing pressure on Iran.

Secretary Vance responded that, if that were done under Chapter 7 sanctions, that would be one thing. If not, it would be quite different. Hamilton Jordan added that the Soviets could veto sanctions, and that would mean the end of SALT II.

Each participant was then asked for his views.

Secretary Brown said the key was whether or not the hostages were directly threatened. If so, we should be ready to carry out severe actions. He agreed that a decision to mine would put the hostages under more serious danger. There was a 50–50 chance that some might be killed in response. The question is how long we can wait. Over time the chances of harm coming to the hostages increases and our ability to act declines. Items 1–3 could be done quickly.

Secretary Vance said it will take at least a month to exhaust available diplomatic remedies. He did not believe we would get the support even of many of our close allies on a blockade, noting that not one country was willing to join us in 1967 opening of the Strait of Tiran.⁶

General Jones said that the key was to keep world opinion and the Moslem world with us. Strong action could work either way depending on whether it was perceived as justified or not. He noted that his French counterpart recommended against the use of force as counterproductive in this situation. The French would probably not join with us in an economic embargo. If we mine harbors and some hostages are killed, we may be seen as guilty. We might consider mining only imports to start.⁷

Secretary Vance said that before mining we should get virtually all Americans out of the Moslem world.

Admiral Turner said the U.S. position was eroding, noting the events in Mecca and Pakistan. Those in Tehran are as convinced as we are that their position is righteous. If we get ahead of Khomeini, we risk losing world opinion, yet we must stand up at some point. He had no answer as to when.

Jody Powell agreed with Harold Brown that the danger to our people increased over time, and our position at home is eroding. Time works against us and appears to work for Khomeini. He favored taking some action to reverse this situation. However, such action would not only put our people in danger but it was unlikely Khomeini would respond positively in the near future. We should know what we intend to do if any of the hostages are harmed. A rescue operation—even if unlikely to succeed—might be desirable. We should not go after Chapter 7 sanctions unless we think there is a good chance we will succeed. A Soviet veto would be undesirable.

Hamilton Jordan agreed, noting that other things we might do could also damage SALT.

Mr. Kirbo said that as long as we know our people are safe, the public will stay with us.⁸ If they pull people out of the compound, there will be rumors that they are being killed one at a time. We should not take drastic actions as long as we are fairly sure they are there. If that vanishes, it becomes very difficult. He was unsure about the Soviets. Cutting off supplies might do the job, but if the Iranians kill someone, we must kill someone. Khomeini was the only one he wanted to hit.

Dr. Brzezinski summarized the following points of agreement:

1. Any such act (mining or military) increases the danger to the hostages.

2. If any hostages are killed, we should react forcibly. Mining was not enough. (Our act should be precise, not indiscriminate.)

3. We should exhaust all diplomatic recourse.

4. We should take the first four steps now.

Secretary Vance agreed we should do points 1 and 2 on the President’s list, but felt that we should not ask other countries for embargo until all diplomatic recourse has been exhausted. That will take three weeks to a month.

Secretary Brown said we should not wait for one thing: we should insist immediately—perhaps in the press conference tonight⁹—that there be daily visits to the hostages by neutral observers.

Mr. Kirbo said he had heard nothing we could do to defend our honor without bad results and possibly getting us mired down over the long run.

Secretary Vance agreed.

Hamilton Jordan said that the hostages could continue to be held indefinitely while we do nothing.

Dr. Brzezinski added that in the meantime we can expect trials, intelligence documents and a shift of attention to U.S. illicit activities.

Secretary Vance said that he considered mining would produce harm to the hostages and he would not advise it as long as they are safe—even if trials begin. He did not interpret “interrupting commerce” as meaning mining necessarily. It could also be an embargo.

Dr. Brzezinski argued that without physical interruption, others would not join in.

Secretary Vance believed that the Security Council session would go on for a week or so and that negotiations would accompany it while Bani-Sadr was in New York. This might result in some new movement. He would like to have our case before the ICJ before Bani-Sadr presents his case in New York. Hamilton Jordan agreed.

Secretary Vance added that a threat of mining or military force could have exactly the opposite effect desired, i.e., it could turn many of our friends against us. He preferred a peaceful blockade to mining.

Secretary Brown argued that a blockade forced us to take the last act of sinking a ship whereas mining placed the burden on the ship that entered the mined waters.¹⁰ Mining was more passive than a blockade.

Secretary Vance reported that the Shah is unlikely to be able to travel before about one week.

All agreed that the discussion had been useful and would provide the basis for a discussion with the President.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 17, SCC Meeting #212 held 11/28/79. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter wrote “Zbig, C” in the upper right corner.
2. See Document 62.
3. Carter underlined “to proceed simultaneously with our suit in the ICJ,” then wrote “ok” in the left margin. On November 29, the United States filed a case with the ICJ against Iran for violation of the principles of international law, for supporting the actions of those holding the hostages, and for “threatening to subject the hostages to trial.” The application and the Court’s response of November 30 are in Department of State Bulletin, January 1980, pp. 37–41.
4. See Document 51.
5. See Document 63.
6. Egypt imposed a naval blockade on the Strait of Tiran on May 22, 1967, blocking all Israeli shipping through the Red Sea. President Lyndon Johnson tried unsuccessfully to get the Strait reopened.
7. Carter underlined “only imports” and wrote a question mark in the margin.
8. Carter underlined most of this sentence and made a checkmark in the margin
9. Carter held a press conference on November 28 at 9 p.m. in the East Room at the White House to address the situation in Iran. For the full text, see Public Papers: Carter, 1979, Book II, pp. 2167–2174.
10. In the left margin, Carter wrote: “I agree.”