Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

63. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 27, 1979, 2–2:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• Secretary Cyrus Vance
• Secretary Harold Brown
• Admiral Stansfield Turner
• Zbigniew Brzezinski

After a review of the urgent cables from the British Embassy in Tehran, to the effect that our hostages might be dispersed,² it was decided:

1. Security Council session to go ahead at 3:00 PM as planned. The proposed statement to be approved this PM. The session to be resumed Saturday night after Bani Sadr arrives.³

2. We are to seek confirmation from our own sources as to whether our people have been moved to other locales in Tehran. ZB requested Vance to seek confirmation from the Iranians that all of our hostages are still alive.

3. The group approved a message from Vance to Bani Sadr requesting that all hostages be kept together and not dispersed because that heightens the danger to them.⁴

The group agreed that it would be dangerous for the Shah to leave the United States before this coming Monday AM.⁵

1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 10. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House. At the top of the page, Carter wrote: “Zbig, J.” Brzezinski initialed beneath the note.
2. Telegrams 1242 and 1243 from the British Embassy in Tehran to the FCO, repeated to Washington, November 27. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 30, Iran 11/21/79–11/27/79)
3. See Document 66. The statement made by McHenry to the press following the Security Council meeting on November 27 is in Department of State Bulletin, January 1980, pp. 49–50.
4. The CIA found inconclusive evidence to confirm whether the hostages had been removed from the Embassy. (NFAC Spot Commentary, November 27; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 30, Iran 11/21/79–11/27/79) Vance’s message to Bani-Sadr, transmitted in telegram 306448 to Bonn, November 27, asked for clarification of the reports and noted that “grave consequences” could result if the reports were accurate. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 35, Subject File, Iran Cables & Memos 11–12/79) Bani-Sadr told Ambassadors of the EC–9 in Tehran that he was trying to obtain a guarantee from Khomeini that there would be no trial and that he believed the hostages were still in the Embassy compound. (Telegram 1257 from the British Embassy in Tehran to Washington, November 28; Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Iran NODIS Cables Nov 1979)
5. Carter drew an arrow pointing to the last sentence and wrote: “Earlier, if possible—He should leave as soon as possible after they cease whipping themselves. J”