5. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Iran
You asked how our contingency plans held up when put to the test. Obviously, the answer is: not at all. The extraordinary effort which has been exerted over the past nine months to reinforce the Chancery building proved futile when the mob managed to penetrate the base [Page 8] ment. Our security people believe that it was an inside job, but we may never know.
Our previous plans called for buttoning up the Embassy, keeping only a tiny handful of people there on alert, and dispersing other employees to central points unlikely to be known to the demonstrators. If the mob had attacked last Thursday2 as we expected, I think we would have come through.
The demonstrators were extremely well informed and organized. They knew exactly where to go, which building to attack, when the guard force would be at a low level of alert, and were even able to produce an acytelene torch when they ran into a steel door. Their success was due neither to good luck on their side nor bad luck on ours. It was organization, not luck.
This incident has led me to question whether it is even realistic to talk about security when your embassy faces a large, well-organized mob which can choose its time and place, and where police protection vanishes at the first sign of trouble.