I agree with their views, though I am less persuaded that the students in
the embassy may act independently of Khomeini. The initial debriefings of our 13 released
hostages seem to indicate a close loyalty to Khomeini on the part of the student captors.3
Attachment
Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence
Agency5
Washington, November 21, 1979
SUBJECT
- Dangers if the Shah Leaves the US
I. We are concerned that an early departure of the Shah from the US
would increase the risks faced by the hostages.
A. The present tenuous equilibrium in the hostage situation would be
broken by the Shah’s departure, especially if it occurs in the
emotional religious mourning period over the next four weeks.
—Early on, such a move might have been interpreted by the
captors and the Khomeini
regime as an act of good faith by the US.
—Now, it would increase their frustration over their inability to
bring the Shah and the US to account for past actions and to
prevent future US/pro-Shah involvement in Iranian
affairs.
B. The captors have been operating in a very well organized manner,
but we think they might split over how to react to what they would
see as a US effort to circumvent their rightful claims. Individually
or as a group, they might over-react.
—We believe their public announcements show a significant
degree of tension over possible US retaliatory moves against
them.
—As little as a single frustrated captor’s angry outburst or blow
(or a slight provocation by a hostage) might spark a
disintegration of the group’s internal control that could lead
to abuse of the hostages.
C. As the captors see it, the US will have given an absolute no to
their demands that the Shah be returned to Iran.
D. Some, if not all, will also see his departure as the first step in
a new US attempt to overthrow the Iranian revolution.
E. At the very least, the Shah’s departure is likely to precipitate
trial of the hostages.
—Despite a statement on 20 November by a government spokesman
that the Revolutionary Court would [not] conduct any trial, it
is not certain that the Khomeini regime could easily take control of the
hostages from their captors.
—Khomeini apparently had
some difficulty in arranging the release of the thirteen women
and blacks.
[Page 126]
—Any effort by the regime to remove the hostages remaining on the
compound from their captors’ control would be seen by the latter
as indicative of the regime’s lack of trust in them and even of
its intention eventually to compromise with the US.
II. We believe the group at the Embassy, and possibly Khomeini and some of his most
influential advisors, would not now back off under any circumstances
short of a US agreement to return the Shah.
A. In our opinion the captors’ shift of emphasis in their statements
to US espionage in Iran suggests that they now realize that the US
will not meet their demands and that they are trying to force a
complete severance of Iran-US contacts.
B. Consequently, the captors are likely to underscore further their
“proof” of the “guilt” of these particular individuals held as
hostages.
C. [1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]
D. [1 paragraph (7½ lines) not
declassified]
—[1 paragraph (4 lines) not
declassified]
—[1 paragraph (4 lines) not
declassified]
III. Circumstances of the Shah’s departure could modify the reaction
in Iran—but probably not change it fundamentally.
A. His removal to Mexico would be a lesser provocation than his
arrival in, or stated intention to go later to Egypt, which has
actively opposed the Khomeini
regime.
B. Statements by the Shah permanently renouncing any Pahlavi claims to power and assets
in Iran, and/or offering to account for or return some assets would
be generally disbelieved and create far less impact than if they had
been forthcoming in the immediate aftermath of the Embassy
takeover.
C. The coincidence of the Shah’s departure with the highly emotional
period of Moharram, the Shia time of mourning in commemoration of an
important early martyr, is likely to intensify reactions by the
Khomeini regime, the
captors, and the populace to his move.
