359. Editorial Note

On September 10, 1980, the Iranian Majlis gave an overwhelming vote of confidence to the government of Mohammed Ali Rajai, who had become the Prime Minister in August, and approved the 14 members he had nominated to his Cabinet. (Telegram 241776 to all diplomatic and consular posts, September 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800433–0232) Mohammad Karim Khodapanahi became Minister of Foreign Affairs. Following the appointment of the [Page 941] Cabinet, the Islamic Revolutionary Council, which had ruled Iran since January 1979, dissolved. The Council’s legislative powers had been handed over to the Majlis in May, and its executive powers were now transferred to the new government as of September 10. (Telegram 243049 to all diplomatic and consular posts, September 12; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800435–0050)

Simultaneously, the Majlis Foreign Affairs Committee recommended to President of the Majlis, Hajatolislam Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, that the Majlis discuss the hostage issue. (Telegram 240485 to all diplomatic and consular posts, September 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800431–0291) Ayatollah Mohammed Khomeini, spiritual adviser to the militants and Deputy Speaker of the Majlis, stated to the press that Iran “harbors no particular feelings of ill will toward the hostages” and suggested that the seizure of the Embassy must be viewed as “merely a minimal reaction” to years of U.S. oppression. As preconditions for release of the hostages, Khomeini said the United States should apologize and repent for its past crimes, eliminate the freeze on Iranian assets, stop the harassment of Iranian students in the United States, and end the economic sanctions against Iran. (Telegram 241776 to all diplomatic and consular posts, September 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800433–0232) His statement closely mirrored Rajai’s speech in Qom on September 8 which served as his response to Secretary of State Edmund Muskie’s letter. (See Document 344.) Reiterating America’s transgressions, Rajai stated that “we do not compromise or make deals.” However, he suggested that “if we are sure that you had repented, we would talk.” (Telegram 240485 to all diplomatic and consular posts, September 10, National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800431–0291)

Watching the American diplomatic approaches to Iran and the unfolding of the Iranian political situation, Chargé Bruce Laingen wrote: “We are allowing ourselves a glimmer of guarded optimism.” (Message from the Swiss, September 9; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 33, Iran Update 9/80)