358. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)1
SUBJECT
- Clandestine Option in Iran
1. Several weeks ago I delivered a proposal to you for a clandestine option for helping to resolve the situation in Iran.2 [3½ lines not declassified]
2. A recent intelligence report on Iran has made it clear that the Iranians are seeing the development of an internal opposition to the Khomeini regime which is separate from the external elements that are generally tainted by association with the Shah. The following is a quotation from that report:
“Because of the deteriorating situation in Iran, [less than 1 line not declassified] rumors of plotting were widespread. [less than 1 line not declassified] the recent televised trial of alleged coup plotters had further incited rumors that nationalistic groups were conspiring against Khomeini. [less than 1 line not declassified] Iranians who saw the trials had been particularly impressed by the comportment of the younger defendants. They had not asked for forgiveness, but defended their actions by stating they were acting on behalf of the country. Their sincerity, outspokenness and the fact they did not have any apparent ties to the old regime had convinced people that there were still nationalistic elements in Iran who were working to bring down the regime. [less than 1 line not declassified] the government had erred in broadcasting the trials. [less than 1 line not declassified] the stories regarding the activities of nationalistic groups were only rumors and [less than 1 line not declassified] no firm evidence to confirm their existence [portion marking not declassified]
3. Another recent intelligence report states, “With respect to the economic situation in Iran, Beheshti conceded that the impact of the American embargo and freezing of Iranian funds in the United States has been far more effective than the Government of Iran had anticipated. Beheshti stressed the point that the Iranian Parliament must begin solving economic problems immediately or face the prospect of civil unrest as food and fuel shortages become acute.” [1 line not declassi [Page 940] fied] Bazaari merchants are growing increasingly anti-Khomeini as a result of the chaotic economic conditions in Iran. [less than 1 line not declassified] the leaders of a large group of Iranian “homofars” (military non-commissioned officers who are technical specialists), who were in the vanguard of the anti-Shah revolution, recently approached former Prime Minister Bazargan complaining that the revolution was being “betrayed.” The homofar leaders, who claim control over 5,000 armed military personnel, asked Bazargan to suggest a means by which they could “seize control” of the revolution. [portion marking not declassified]
4. The above two paragraphs are examples of a general trend in the erosion of support for Khomeini among the key segments of Iranian society that brought him to power. If the elements required to bring about a change of government in Iran—a credible opposition leadership, an organization inside Iran, and the erosion of support for Khomeini among the dynamic elements of society—the latter was always perceived as the most difficult. This erosion may have begun and it might be possible to speed up the process [less than 1 line not declassified].
5. In sum, I continue to believe that it would be to the U.S. advantage to reinforce this impression of patriotic internal opposition to Khomeini, but that if we don’t start soon we will not have such a capability for some time to come. [portion marking not declassified]
- Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 82M00501R: 1980 Subject, Box 13, Folder 1. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified] Signed September 10 and hand-carried to Brzezinski.↩
- Attached; summarized in footnote 2, Document 348.↩
- Printed from a copy with Turner’s typed signature and an indication that he signed the original.↩