Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

356. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, September 5, 1980, 9–10:35 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Followup on Security Framework in the Persian Gulf—XVII

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Secretary Edmund Muskie
  • Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher
  • Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs

• Defense

  • Secretary Harold Brown
  • Ambassador Robert Komer, Under Secretary for Policy

• JCS

  • Chairman General David Jones
  • Lt. General John Pustay

• CIA

  • Director Stansfield Turner
  • Ray Huffstutler, Director, Office of Strategic Research

• OMB

  • John White, Deputy Director

• White House

  • Zbigniew Brzezinski

• NSC

  • General William E. Odom
  • General Jasper Welch
  • Captain Gary Sick

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

Dr. Brzezinski opened the meeting with a review of the agenda items: first, the non-paper for Gromyko; second, the intelligence briefing for the Allies; and third, Defense actions which may be taken. (TS)

Non-Paper for Gromyko

A lengthy debate took place between Dr. Brzezinski and Harold Brown on the one side and Muskie and Christopher on the other about being explicit in the non-paper for Gromyko that Soviet military action in Iran would lead to a direct military confrontation with the United States. (TS/S)

Dr. Brzezinski argued that to promise the Soviets as the draft non-paper² does, that we will not intervene in Iran, and at the same time to be ambiguous about U.S. resort to military actions if the Soviets invade Iran, would possibly be read by the Soviets as an invitation to invade. Brown made more or less the same argument. (TS/S)

Muskie and Christopher argued that we should not surrender the future option to avoid confronting the Soviets militarily over Iran because in some cases, such as one or two Soviet divisions in Tabriz only, Congressional and public support might not be adequate for a U.S. military action. Muskie argued that we risk bluffing because we do not have the military capabilities to defeat the Soviets in Iran. Christopher argued that we should not be so specific to the Soviets when we are not sure what we have in mind for military actions even among ourselves. (TS/S)

Thus the argument was joined. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski and Brown cited the example of Berlin as a place where we were not capable of a successful defense but nonetheless deterred the Soviets by ruling out ambiguity about whether we would respond. (TS/S)

Brown insisted that we do have some idea of how we would respond militarily. We could arm the Chinese. (TS/S)

Dr. Brzezinski responded that the Chinese are unlikely to enter the fight with the Soviets if the U.S. is not willing to fight in Iran. (TS/S)

Muskie returned to what the JCS had said at the previous SCC about our ability to conduct a defense in Iran.³ The absence of an effective military capability disturbs Muskie. When Brown and Dr. Brzezinski once more cited that we were not in military shape to defend Europe in the early years after World War II, Muskie insisted that that was different. We at least had some forces on the ground in Europe. If it only takes a trip wire, as Komer had insisted about the role of two or three platoons of U.S. troops in Iran, then why do we have all those U.S. divisions in Europe? Perhaps we should withdraw some of them. (TS/S)

Dr. Brzezinski tried to change the line of analysis by asking what would happen if we leave the situation ambiguous for the Soviets and in fact if the Soviets intervene in Iran. We will be in the soup! Will the dilemma about whether to respond militarily be any easier in that event? (TS/S)

Muskie insisted that he can reduce the ambiguity for Gromyko in his oral statement, but he does not accept this non-paper because of its explicit promise of a military reaction. Christopher called it “dangerous.” Muskie explained that he would make the following points to Gromyko orally:

—We are extremely troubled by the military activities of the Soviet Union on Iran’s borders.

—This region is vital to us.

—Gromyko should understand the dangerous consequences that could follow from Soviet military activities. (TS/S)

Muskie again insisted that we do not have a real military capability, and Christopher added that we must preserve the President’s option to judge what is in the United States interest at the time of such an intervention if it occurs in the future. (TS/S)

Muskie offered the political judgment that the Congress would ask whether or not a nuclear war would be worth it for 11 percent of our oil. (TS/S)

Brown asked what would happen if the Soviets invade Iran and we do nothing. Do we really believe that our losses would be only 11 percent of our oil supply? (TS/S)

Muskie retorted that if it means losing Europe, the American people might even accept that loss rather than risk nuclear war. (TS/S)

Harold Brown countered, but what about a Soviet attack on Europe, would we accept the loss or attempt to defend it? (TS/S)

Muskie insisted that NATO is different; we have forces there. If we cannot defend Europe, he added, we ought to ask what the Defense Department is all about. (TS/S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked Muskie if he accepts the proposition that the loss of the Persian Gulf would lead to the loss of Europe. (TS/S)

Muskie agreed that it would. (TS/S)

Dr. Brzezinski then asked what the Soviets will see as their options in such a case if the U.S. leaves some ambiguity about whether it would respond militarily. (TS/S)

Muskie insisted that he could remove all the ambiguity in his oral statements to Gromyko without the explicit text in the non-paper, in particular by telling Gromyko that there is a “high risk” of a military confrontation. (TS/S)

Dr. Brzezinski pointed out that we have given these kinds of warnings to the Soviets before but have failed to act when the Soviets ignored them. (TS/S)

Muskie admitted that he did not know the record. (TS/S)

Dr. Brzezinski said that Gromyko has heard all this talk before about Afghanistan—several weeks in advance of the invasion—but that did not deter the invasion. We were equally explicit about the high risk if the Soviets increased their naval activities in Cam Ranh Bay. They did not heed that warning, but we have yet to respond. We have a credibility problem with the Soviets which must be taken into account in communicating our judgments to the Soviets about the stakes in Iran. (TS/S)

In the end, agreement was reached to propose to the President the text of a non-paper (attached at Tab A) which included the following sentence as an acceptable compromise: “Any military attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf, including specifically any Soviet military action in Iran, could lead to a direct military confrontation with the United States.” It was agreed to submit the non-paper for Gromyko to the President for his review (Tab A).⁴ (TS/)

Intelligence Briefing for the Allies

Turner and General Jones will work out a final version of the intelligence briefing text which was tabled at the meeting this morning. It will be circulated next week for their comment and reaction. Unless there are strong reservations, the final version will be used by General Jones for briefing the NATO allies. (TS/S)

[1 paragraph (7½ lines) not declassified]

Thus, the intelligence indicates that the Soviet threat is less imminent but more ambitious than we originally recognized. (TS/S)

Possible Defense Actions

The JCS recommendations of actions to consider doing now were reviewed (attached at Tab B). It was agreed that most of them are already in progress and need no SCC attention. Discussion centered mainly on whether to brief Congressional leaders now (in addition to members of the intelligence committees who already have some awareness [less than 1 line not declassified]), and how to approach the question of a Defense supplemental budget request, both in size and the time for its submission. Brown and Muskie expressed concern that a supplemental budget request could escalate the situation with the Soviets and create political excitement within the United States. (TS/S)

[heading and 6 paragraphs (15 lines) not declassified] (TS/S)

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 57. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The Tabs are not attached. Carter wrote “Top Secret, J” in the upper right corner.
2. Not found.
3. The September 2 SCC meeting concluded that, for the September 5 SCC meeting, CIA and DIA would brief on what the United States could tell its European and regional allies about the Soviet threat; the Aaron group would develop talking points and draft the non-paper for Muskie’s September meeting with Gromyko; and Defense would report on horizontal escalation possibilities. On an attached September 3 note, Brzezinski wrote to Carter: “These minutes are unusually important. An NSC meeting may be needed. Zbig.” Carter then wrote in the upper right corner of the SCC Summary of Conclusions: “Zbig—Set up an NSC meeting next week when all principals can be present (incl. VP). JC.” (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office File, Box 22, SCC #337 Held 9/2/80) See also Document 350.
4. Muskie met with Gromyko in New York on September 25 and read aloud the non-paper, which Gromyko described as piling “word upon word.” No copy of the non-paper was found. The memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, vol. VI, Soviet Union, Document 302.