336. Memorandum of Conversation1
MEETING WITH SARESHTAHDARZADEH MOHSTOFI (SHAHPAR)
FROM: WILLIAM G. MILLER
Mr. Shahpar called this morning saying that he wanted to see me as soon as possible because he had word from Shapur Bakhtiar, Mr. Ebdehaj and others. I met him at lunch. He said that Bakhtiar, Oveissi, General Jam, Nazih, the Saudi government, and to some extent the Iraqi government, were looking for United States approval and assistance. I asked what he meant by approval and assistance. He said that the situation in Iran was deteriorating daily and that unless action is taken soon, events will force Iran into the Soviet orbit. He says that one in five of all the military in Iran are under the influence of the “Communists”. I said, did he have evidence that the Soviet or Tudeh party were active. He said that the Tudeh party is bitterly opposed by the Khomeini government and the Soviet Union is distrusted by almost all Iranians. He said, however, that the borders are wide open. Infiltration by Persian speaking Soviets is occurring and although his information is that there are not large numbers, there could be. His concern about the “Communists” is that they are better organized than any other group. By the “Communists” he means the Tudeh cells and the leftist groups within the Fedayeen. He said that there was no coup; that he knew personally that none of the Iranian groups had supported a coup; and that in fact it was a device by the Khomeini government to curb and crush opposition groups. He said that a number of his own relatives had been killed.
I asked about the relations between Bakhtiar, Oveissi and the other major exile groups. He said that they were in communications with one another but that all agreed that only the military groups who were in Iran were about to do anything. That politicians like Bakhtiar could talk on the outside but that the only real action could come from military groups within Iran. He said that the groups opposed to Khomeini had the capacity now to take over all of Southern Iran, including Khuzistan. He said that the Ayatollahs Shariat Madari, Qomi, and Khoei, and one other, whose name I missed, were in contact with the outside groups, although they were under house arrest. Khoei is in Iraq. He said that Boyer-Ahmadi had 20,000 troops armed with guns. The Qashqai had [Page 897] 40,000, and they were all good fighters with weapons. He said that for all practical purposes, southern Iran is in their control should they choose to exact [attack?] it, but they would need ammunition and anti-tank weapons to hold the area. He said that he was prepared to detail the names and groups of the military in Iran who would be involved. He said that the main contact for military matters outside of Iran is the present Khomeini military attaché in Iran, an Air Force colonel named Reziani (phonetic). He had a list of names which he wanted to give me but I did not take it. He said that he was prepared to arrange for contact with all of these groups.2
- Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Records, Iran 1980. Top Secret.↩
- Shahpar also met with Sick on August 26. Sick, who found Shahpar “interesting,” noted that Shahpar’s plan was to use the Crown Prince as a figurehead around whom the people could rally based on his assessment that Bakhtiar was “getting nowhere and Oveissi was hopeless (’He wants to make a coup through the newspapers.’)” [text not declassified] (Memorandum from Sick to Brzezinski, August 26; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 42, Subject File, Iran Papers 8/80–12/80)↩