335. Memorandum From the Commander of the Joint Task Force (Vaught) to the Director of the Joint Staff Hanson and Service Operations Deputies1
SUBJECT
- SNOWBIRD Training and Preparation Program (TS)
1. (TS) General: Operation SNOWBIRD, the planning and preparation of a joint task force to accomplish the rescue of the American [Page 893] hostages in Iran was tasked to the undersigned by competent civil authority on 26 April, 1980. In order to provide the best chance of securing operational security, a cover operation involving DRE was approved on 23 May 80 and briefed to JCS on 3 June. Training and preparation for SNOWBIRD was placed under the cover operations, HONEY BADGER and ICE BOX. Since definitive intelligence has not been available, it was necessary for the Joint Task Force to design a number of possible options and train a wide spectrum of forces. To date, these forces include 2,477 personnel and 136 various aircraft. Most of these forces were incorporated into a July 80 training program that was briefed to the Service OPSDEPS on 2 July. This document recapitulates the major training events, lessons learned, costs and future needs to provide a reasonable assurance of future SNOWBIRD success. The HONEY BADGER exercises incorporated many of the training and validation tasks that had to be accomplished to prepare the Joint Task Force to execute SNOWBIRD Options One through Eight.2 ICE BOX activity was to evaluate the feasibility of Option Nine.3 Before and during the July training, a number of increased aviation and communications capabilities were attained, a number of techniques were developed and a number of force deficiencies identified. These deficiencies are incorporated into the overall future training program. An additional, separate activity was the coordination and planning for Option VII and VIII, the use of commercial or USN ships as launch platforms. Finally, this document includes conclusions and recommendations concerning future actions for SNOWBIRD and Special Operations in general.
[Omitted here is a description of Honey Badger and Ice Box, with projected costs.]
9. (TS) Conclusions: (See Inclosure 14). Due to the lack of definitive intelligence, approval for the use of launch bases, the absence of an existing means to infiltrate the release force and the lack of total force proficiency, it is not possible to execute the SNOWBIRD mission at [Page 894] this time. Progress will be paced by intelligence production, but is also dependent on procurement and training. It is believed that launch bases can be obtained, given approval to seek the necessary authority. Force proficiency must be maintained and improved or a substantial delay in mission execution will occur should it be ordered. Currently it is believed that the mission could be executed within three weeks given the requisite intelligence. Although compromise of the mission through continued training and procurement activity is possible, there is no known disabling compromise to date.
The JTF staff of 32 personnel is inadequate to handle a number of administrative tasks such as budgeting, since operational functions must have the priority. Should additional administrative requirements be levied, an augmentation of both personnel and working space would be required. The current relationship with the CIA is unsatisfactory but a practical solution has been reached to support the mission. Currently, SNOWBIRD IX, the LOH option, is considered to be the most probable and is thus being used as a model for force structure and equipment decisions. Option X, designed for multiple, dispersed targets may be more appropriate and is currently under consideration as a model.
[Omitted here is material on JTF achievements and CTJTF.]
In the final analysis, it must be concluded that the United States is ill-prepared to conduct any sort of Special Operation. The Army has subjected its Special Operations forces to a 70% reduction from their pre-Vietnam level. A further cut of 10% is forecasted for FY 81. The Air Force has cut its Special Operations forces by 75% during the same period. CIA apparently stands without either the Special Operations personnel or funds to support sizeable clandestine, military endeavors. Currently, almost any unprogrammed CIA action activity has to be approved by seven committees of Congress. Special Operations has been an unhealed casualty of the Vietnam war. The events of the last year have clearly indicated that immediate remedial action is essential. The JTF has accomplished much but the continued lack of an adequate national Special Operations capability may well plague the United States in the future.
10. (TS) Recommendations: (See Inclosure 15). It is recommended that the JTF be provided with $34.3 million to fund SNOWBIRD activities through 30 Sep 80. It is also requested that JCS press the intelligence community to use all available resources to fulfill outstanding SNOWBIRD requirements. In order to secure authority and essential information concerning a launch base, it is recommended that the JCS approve a JTF approach to the [2 lines not declassified]. It is further recommended that the JTF be dissolved between 1 and 15 November and the SNOWBIRD mission passed to the CTJTF. In order to capture experience and properly brief the new commander and staff, it is recommended that [Page 895] the CTJTF commander and staff be phased in beginning on 15 August, participate in the JTF training during September and assume the SNOWBIRD mission on 1 November 80.
In order to further define the JTF relationship with other organizations, it is requested that the OPSDEPS consider providing guidance as to a continuation or revision of JTF coordination with both the Department of State and the J–5 of the OJCS. Heretofore, the [2 lines not declassified]. Additionally, the JTF has been restricted in its coordination with J–5.
Finally, it is recommended that the OPSDEPS consider actions to improve the national capability to conduct Special Operations. The DJS could be requested to task OJCS to identify specific deficiencies in the CIA’s ability to support the armed forces in clandestine operations and make specific remedial recommendations. This action could be forwarded to the NSC by the JCS on or before 1 November 1980. The OJCS might also be tasked to identify the necessary actions to expand and improve our military Special Operations capabilities by 1 October 1980. This action could be presented to the Secretary of Defense by the JCS by 30 October 1980.
Major General, USA
- Source: Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff Records, RG 218–07–0002, Records of J–3 DDSO, Box 3, Iranian Hostage Crisis 1979–1984, binder JTF Capability Review. Top Secret. The 15 enclosures are attached but not printed.↩
- Explained in enclosure 1, “HB Training Tasks.”↩
- Option IX envisioned “the clandestine penetration of hostile airspace, the surprise, night-time, air-landed seizure of an airfield, the landing of an extraction force composed of light helicopters, hostage evacuation and finally, force extraction. The concept was first conceived by the Joint Task Force Commander in June” and focused on acquiring and training an LOH (light observation helicopter) unit.↩