Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

327. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, July 29, 1980, 9:02–10:10 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Iran

PARTICIPANTS

• State

  • Warren Christopher
  • David Newsom
  • Harold Saunders

• Treasury

  • G. William Miller
  • Robert Carswell

• OSD

  • Frank Kramer

• Justice

  • Benjamin Civiletti
  • John Shenefield

• JCS

  • David Jones

• DCI

  • Stansfield Turner

• Office of the Vice President

  • Denis Clift

• White House

  • David Aaron
  • Hedley Donovan
  • Lloyd Cutler
  • Jody Powell

• NSC

  • Gary Sick

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

This meeting was intended as a general update of the situation in Iran and any outstanding issues in advance of the PRC on our Iran policy scheduled later in the week. The DCI opened the meeting with a general review of the hostages and the political situation. We cannot pinpoint the location of the hostages. Beheshti and the hardline Islamic militants are winning, while Bani-Sadr and Ghotbzadeh are losing power. The DCI foresees a gradual drift toward civil strife, probably with no decisive outcome of the power struggle for some time. There is recent information that Admiral Madani may have gone underground with the Qashqais, which may portend the beginning of a dissident formation with some potential on the ground. Khomeini appears to be motivated by a hatred for President Carter, and there is a possibility that the hostages may be used to embarrass the President prior to the elections, possibly by some form of trials. The Department of State is preparing a cable to nations throughout the world asking for an approach to the Tehran regime urging release of the hostages.² Mr. Christopher noted that many of the countries will make their own judgment about the timing of any démarche, and they may insist on waiting until a new government has been formally installed. (S)

Interest Sections

The FBI has been investigating the killing of Ali Tabatabai.³ Some lines run to the Iranian Interests Section of the Algerian Embassy in Washington. The FBI wishes to interview Mr. Sajadi, the Iranian national (but American resident alien) who runs the section. It appears this will be worked out. There were some mixed signals initially, and the Iranians thought we wished to close down the Interests Section and eject Mr. Sajadi. They threatened to retaliate by closing the U.S. Interests Section in Tehran. The State Department pointed out that the Iranian Interests Section in Washington is of greater importance to us (because it handles the myriad cases of Iranians in this country) than is the U.S. Interests Section in Tehran, which is primarily a convenience and an investment in the future. All agreed that if the FBI investigation develops solid information leading to the conclusion that the Iranian Interests Section was involved in the Tabatabai murder, we should act promptly to close it or take other appropriate action. The Attorney General will keep the SCC informed as the investigation proceeds. (S)

Iranian Students

The Attorney General reported on the deportation proceedings against Iranian students. Since the review of students was initiated on November 14, 370 Iranian students have either been deported or have chosen voluntary departure. A total of 9,000 students were found out of status. Proceedings are underway against all of them, but it is a slow process. 2,000 of this group have requested asylum, and their cases are pending. (U)

Of the approximately 160 Iranian students arrested over the weekend in connection with the pro- and anti-Khomeini demonstrations, about 80% were pro-Khomeini.⁴ Although a modest bail was set, the vast majority refused to identify themselves, and the judge ordered them to remain in jail until they presented proper identification. The failure to identify themselves may render them out of status and subject to deportation. The combination of this fact together with possible criminal prosecution in connection with the demonstration, may shorten the tortuous deportation process. All of the jailed Iranians have hired a U.S. lawyer to represent them. (C)

Iranian Claims Litigation

Justice is intervening as a “friend of the court” in a claims hearing against Iran in New York.⁵ Our objective is to persuade the court not to make judgment on the case because of its possible implications at a delicate moment in the hostage situation. Regardless of how the judge decides, it could complicate eventual negotiations for the hostages’ release. Mr. Christopher executed an affidavit last night and is prepared to testify in person if essential. The Attorney General does not favor using IEEPA to attempt to prevent the court from issuing a judgment in the case. He believes that such an effort would ultimately fail and would undermine the authority to use IEEPA in other areas. No decision on IEEPA is required until we see if the amicus approach is successful. (C)

[1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]

With regard to the assets of the former Shah, there is no way to determine the extent of his holdings in this country. Property and other assets can be held in forms which do not reflect identity of ownership. The Iranians have filed a claim in New York to retrieve these assets, but thus far they have been unable to figure out where to look. Mr. Aaron commented that we might wish to issue a public call for such information at some point if it appeared necessary as part of the hostage negotiations. (S)

1. Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 10. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right corner.
2. The appeal is in telegram 202298 to all diplomatic and consular posts, August 6. It expresses particular concern that the allied nations urge Iran not to put the hostages on trial. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800366–0240) Responses from various countries are listed by country and telegram response number in an August 5 memorandum from Tarnoff to Brzezinski. Tarnoff informed Brzezinski that the general tone of responses was “supportive and sympathetic, but there is little in the way of specific suggestions or plans for action so far.” (Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Group Demarches)
3. See Document 313.
4. Rival demonstrations in Washington on July 27 pitted pro-Khomeini groups against anti-Khomeini groups, including the Iran Freedom Foundation founded by Tabatabai. More demonstrations were held the next day. (Donald P. Baker, “Iranian Groups Clash in D.C.,” Washington Post, July 28, 1980, p. A1; Donald P. Baker and Donnel Nunes, “Jailed Iranian Demonstrators Face Possible Deportation,” Washington Post, July 29, 1980, p. B1)
5. In a July 25 memorandum to Christopher, Owen provided the pros and cons of renewed U.S. Government efforts to seek stays of the Iranian claims and assets cases pending in U.S. courts. (Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Iran Claims/Assets Litigations) Tim Deal provided Brzezinski with information on current lawsuits involving claims against Iran. (Memorandum dated July 24; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 101, Meetings File, 7/17/80 Ad Hoc Group re Iran)