Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

29. Memorandum for the Record by the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders)¹

Washington, November 14, 1979

In a telephone conversation with an American contact, I received the following report at 0700: the American contact had received a phone call from Khalid al-Hassan in Germany. The report was as follows:

—Hani al-Hassan, the PLO representative in Tehran, saw Khomeini for three and one-half hours Tuesday, November 13.

—They have set up a committee consisting of Khomeini, Hani al-Hassan, a representative of the students in the American Compound, a representative of the Foreign Ministry (possibly Bani-Sadr himself).

—The committee is going to arrange that the “blacks, women, and children” be released to the PLO today.² (Khalid al-Hassan’s advice was that the U.S. should not be overly grateful to the PLO in public because it would complicate their role in Iran.)³

Next, Hani al-Hassan has asked Khalid al-Hassan to check out in the United States whether the following scenario could be worked out with the USG: an announcement would be made that the Shah would leave the U.S. on “x date.” An announcement would be made in Tehran that the hostages would be released on “x date.”

Khalid al-Hassan also wanted to check out whether it was true that Ramsey Clark had said that the Shah’s assets could be turned over to Iran. I responded with the standard line on this subject—that any Iranian who felt he had a rightful claim to any assets that might be present in the United States would have access to the courts for pursuing that claim.

During the course of Khalid al-Hassan’s phone call, he warned against too many people muddying communications channels. He said that the PLO is uncomfortable with Ramsey Clark and feels that he is not well plugged in. In this connection, we were asked not to tell anyone outside the Executive branch of this conversation—particularly not Paul Findley.

Relations between Khalid al-Hassan and Abu Walid are close. (Note: I presume from this comment that they would not regard the Abu Walid channel as a muddying of the waters.)

Finally, Khalid reported that hatred of the U.S. in Iran is so great that the PLO would prefer not to be thanked for anything it achieves in this situation.

1. Source: Department of State, Official Files of [P] David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lot 82D85, Iran 1979. Secret; Eyes Only. Copies were sent to Vance, Christopher, and Newsom. Turner passed similar information to Vance and Brzezinski under a November 14 covering memorandum. (Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Swiss Channel)
2. In a November 14 telephone conversation which took place at 7:30 p.m., Ambassador to Lebanon John Dean informed Saunders that he had received a letter from the PLO stating that Iranian authorities would release the women and African-American hostages by November 16 and expected “in writing a declaration by the USG announcing the exact date of departure of the Shah.” (Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Memoranda of Conversation)
3. On November 13, Khalid al-Hasan stated that Arafat had “put himself so far out on a limb at this point that he will do anything necessary for a successful conclusion of the PLO-Iranian talks over the hostages.” Al-Hasan added that Arafat “is now acutely sensitive to misinterpretations of his motives,” which are “strictly humanitarian” and not founded in political gain. The PLO would thus “issue what are basically disclaimers (including anti-U.S. statements) to protect its flanks.” (Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Iranian Embassy Students)