267. After Action Report1
RESCUE MISSION REPORT
The Countdown
12 to 24 April 1980
On 12 April, CJCS instructed COMJTF to finalize planning for deployment of the force. COMJTF recommended Thursday, 24 April, based on many considerations, a primary one being moon illumination.
A series of interrelated but separate actions were initiated, one of the more significant being a training exercise to practice helicopter refueling using one C–130 aerial tanker and four helicopters on the desert as a final verification of this capability.
On 15–16 April, COMJTF conducted a two-day meeting in the Pentagon to review the plan with commanders, affirm command and control matters, evaluate force readiness, review contingencies, and make an overall assessment of mission success should it be executed on 24 April.
On 16 April, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the plan. That evening, the President approved the plan after he was briefed by COMJTF, Deputy COMJTF, and the commander of the ground rescue force.2 The President stated that deployment flow should proceed with 24 April as the planning date for execution. The NCA would direct [Page 729] COMJTF to execute, delay, or cancel the mission based on conditions existing at the time of decision.
Through the period 19–23 April, the forces deployed. By mid-afternoon on 24 April, the forces were in place and ready for execution.
Execution and Abort
24 and 25 April 1980
On the evening of 24 April, after 5½ months of planning and training under very tight OPSEC, eight RH–53 helicopters took off from the aircraft carrier NIMITZ and began a journey of nearly 600 nautical miles at night and low altitude to a preselected refueling site, Desert One, in the desert. The C–130 element with the ground rescue forces was also in the execution phase on a different track and time schedule to Desert One. Approximately two hours after takeoff, the crew of Helicopter #6 received cockpit indications of an impending rotor blade failure; landed; verified the malfunction (an automatic abort situation); and abandoned their aircraft. The crew was picked by another helicopter, which then continued the mission individually.
Approximately one hour thereafter, the helicopter formation unexpectedly encountered a dust cloud of unknown size and density. The helicopters broke out of the first area of suspended dust but, within an hour, entered a second, larger and denser area. While attempting to navigate through this second area with severely degraded visibility, a second helicopter (#5) experienced a failure of several critical navigation and flight instruments. Due to progressively deteriorating flight conditions that made safe flight extremely questionable, the helicopter pilot determined that it would be unwise to continue. He aborted the mission, reversed course, and recovered on NIMITZ. Eventually six of the original eight helicopters arrived at the refueling site in intervals between approximately 50 minutes and 85 minutes later than planned.
While en route, a third helicopter (#2) experienced a partial hydraulic failure, but the crew elected to continue to the refueling site believing repairs could be accomplished there. Upon landing, however, the crew and the helicopter unit commander determined that the helicopter could not be repaired. A hydraulic pump had failed due to a fluid leak, and no replacement pump was available. Even if a pump had been immediately available, there was insufficient time to change it, repair the cause of the leak, service the system, and complete the next leg prior to daylight. The helicopter was unsafe to continue the mission unrepaired.
Earlier, it had been determined that a minimum of six operational helicopters would be required at the refueling site to continue the mission. Since at this point there were only five operational, the on-scene commander advised COMJTF by radio of the situation, and he [Page 730] in turn communicated to Washington the status of the force and his intention to abort the operation and return to launch base. The President concurred in the decision that the mission could not continue, and preparations began for withdrawal of the five operational helicopters, the C–130s, and the rescue force.
While repositioning one helicopter to permit another to top off his fuel tanks for the return flight, the first helicopter collided with one of the refueling C–130s. Both aircraft were immediately engulfed in flames in which eight crew members died and five other members of the team were injured. Since the C–130 was loaded with members of the rescue force awaiting extraction, even greater injury and loss of life were avoided only by swift and disciplined evacuation of the burning aircraft. Shortly afterwards, ammunition aboard both aircraft began to explode. Several helicopters were struck by shrapnel from the explosion and/or the burning ammunition, and at least one and possibly more were rendered nonflyable. At this point, with time and fuel running out for the C–130s, the decision was made to transfer all helicopter crews to the remaining C–130s and to depart the area.
[Page 731]- Source: Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff Records, RG 218–07–0002, Records of J–3 DDSO, Box 1, Iranian Hostage Crisis, B104–114 Mission Abort Announce. Unclassified.↩
- See Document 261.↩
- Secret.↩