235. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)1
SUBJECT
- Next Steps on Iran
There are two categories of additional steps which we need to consider: (1) interim steps which can keep the pressure up over the next 48 hours while we wait for transfer of the hostages; and (2) sanctions which can be used in addition to those we already have in our pocket.
Interim Pressure
1. Ask Allies to make a new démarche to Bani-Sadr stressing the importance of prompt action.
2. Private message through Swiss or other channels telling them we will be unable to hold off beyond Saturday morning.2
3. Message to selected Third World capitals (especially Pakistan, Syria, Turkey, Algeria) informing them that we will have to proceed soon with the sanctions unless there is tangible movement in Tehran.
4. Preliminary consultations at the UN about possible new resolution condemning Iran, revival of sanctions in the Security Council, or some other move which they will hear about—even if we do not go ahead.
5. Sharply increase the VOA broadcast time in Farsi—even if only for a day or two. Fill the time with rebroadcasts of Christopher’s statement on Afghanistan, indications of growing restiveness in the U.S., read editorials which call for more action, do updates on the U.S. military presence in the Arabian Sea, interviews with U.S. military figures about the U.S. presence.
6. Close an area of the Arabian Sea for a naval live firing exercise.
7. On the clandestine broadcasts, drop some rumors about U.S. intentions. [3½ lines not declassified]
8. Citing the TASS attack on the U.S., plant a story that the Soviets have sent a secret message to Khomeini telling him to resist the U.S. pressure and offering him their full support if he does. If the story is [Page 622] good enough, it will feed the rumor mill and put the Ayatollah on the defensive.
9. Institute visible, spot surveillance of Iranian diplomats.
New Sanctions
Many of the above suggestions would also be useful in building an atmosphere of uncertainty in Tehran even if we go through with the sanctions. The following are some additional steps we can take if we decide to openly resort to graduated pressure tactics. The key word is graduated, since any package we invoke is going to be more effective if it is seen only as the first step and if there is real concern in Tehran that more stringent measures are seriously being considered.
1. Tighten up Immigration. We probably should do this anyway. Exactly what are the guidelines which INS is using to screen Iranians coming into the country?
2. Students. Can/should we toughen the limitations on renewal of Iranian student visas after this semester is over? Could we require written statements by school officials about political activities of Iranian students? Can we simply require that all student visas be formally renewed prior to beginning a new semester?
3. Spot Interrogation of Merchant Shipping. This would be a first step. It could be stepped up if desired, but a limited program could raise fears while being portrayed as normal maritime activity.
4. Economic Transactions. Can we ask the allies to privately ask their companies to deliberately slow down all financial and commercial transactions with the Iranians? This would not require legal steps, and each country could do it in its own fashion. It might even be attractive to them as an alternative to more severe measures.
5. UN. Any attempted new action against Iran at the UN is a two-edged sword. However, my guess is that the Iranians are not any happier about relying on the Soviet veto than we are—it shows how low they have sunk in world opinion. Merely undertaking some kind of effort will be seen as threatening by them, although it has a down side for us as well if we fail to gain as many votes as last time or force a new Soviet veto.
6. ICJ. Are we totally on hold at the World Court? Can we ask for them to accelerate their consideration of the case on the grounds that danger is increasing? When do we expect a final judgment? Will the judgment increase our ability to press the allies for sanctions?
7. Diplomatic Representation. We could renew pressure on our allies and others to reduce their diplomatic presence in Tehran, or, at a minimum, to communicate to the Iranians the fact that they see a dangerous situation developing which could require them to reduce [Page 623] their presence. We would have to take some unilateral steps which would add conviction to their démarches.
A Negotiating Strategy
We cannot maintain our present posture of watchful waiting for more than a few days without losing credibility entirely. We must also not lose sight of the fact that the transfer of the hostages—even if successful—is not the end of the game. The final negotiation for release is still ahead of us and will be even tougher. We need to have cards in our hand for the next round which will give us some negotiating leverage—things we can give up or things which we can renounce doing—which will keep the negotiations from being focused entirely on U.S. concessions on matters of basic principle.
Even if we decide not to go ahead with tangible punitive acts, we need to create an environment of uncertainty and potential threat which will keep the Iranians focused on the immediacy of the problem and, if possible, for them to set deadlines for themselves. This is the necessary counterpart to the carrot we have been brandishing. We must have the private channels of communication, but we should also be doing things which raise doubt in their minds about our real intentions. Pure carrot is going to be ineffective without some stick in the background.
There are a number of things we can do which create uncertainty and even fear in the minds of Iranians but which we can blandly explain away as not our doing or as unrelated to Iran. We have been playing the game totally in the open. We should reach down a little into our bag of tricks.
I recommend a brainstorming session with the Agency, DOD, State and some selected members of the NSC Staff which would come up with a menu of largely deniable actions which could be orchestrated over a period of time to build pressure and tension. We were doing this for a while, but the effort ceased as the UN Commission took over. It is time to start some new systematic thinking about the end game.