23. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Mark) to Secretary of State Vance 1

Prospect of Indefinite Impasse in Iran

We think that enough evidence is now on hand to warrant the judgment that

1) diplomatic action has almost no prospect of being successful in liberating our hostages in Tehran;

2) no economic or other American pressure on the Iranian regime (including U.S. military action) is likely to be any more successful in securing their safe release; and

3) with a continuation of present conditions, the detention of the hostages could continue for some months.

No significant improvement has taken place in the status of the American hostages despite seven days of exceptionally intensive American diplomatic efforts. The Iranian authorities have made it clear that they are—and will remain—scornful of all foreign initiatives to effect the release of the hostages

On the other hand, during the same period, the Iranian position has solidified, and the Iranian determination to stand firm has been greatly strengthened:

—With ever increasing enthusiasm, the great majority of Iranians has supported the Embassy seizure. Demands for the return of the Shah and attacks on the U.S. are being voiced with growing stridency. Khomeini and others have played on the martyrdom theme by praising the glory of dying for Islam and the nation.

—The adamancy of the national leaders and of the “student” captors is now so intense that none but Khomeini himself now has any flexibility in this affair (not that he has shown any signs of a desire to exercise such flexibility in any event).

—The Iranian authorities have enunciated a conceptual framework of self-justification, and it has gained great national acceptance. According to them, the Shah is a criminal, and human decency demands his [Page 52] return to Iran for condemnation. He has been a U.S. puppet, through whom America plundered Iran and destroyed its cultural and social fabric. The American embassy was not a normal diplomatic mission, but rather an espionage center, through which the U.S. exercised its control over the Shah and Iran. Thus, the embassy and its staff have lost all claim to traditional diplomatic immunity.

—The Iranian authorities have begun an international campaign to present their position to the world. Their explanation of what is going on coincides neatly with the thinking of many “establishmentarians” in Third World countries. Some radical nations may soon state public support of Iran. Others will probably accept Iran’s arguments privately. In any case, Iran’s currently prejudiced standing in international eyes is likely to be retrieved in the coming weeks among many Third World governments, and Iran will gain prestige for having successfully humiliated Washington. The Soviets, by their reluctance to speak out in behalf of established diplomatic principles, and by their support of the justice of the Iranian students’ cause, are positioning themselves to exploit the situation.

—We do not anticipate that the Iranian authorities have any present intention of harming the hostages, but the situation is unstable and could change, given the volatile nature of Iranian mass emotions. Moreover, if, as seems probable, economic conditions deteriorate further in Iran over the next six months, and if this evolution generates new political turmoil, it is impossible to foresee what might happen to our hostages, should they then still be in captivity.

Only two contingencies offer a possible escape from the impasse: The Shah’s death, or the Shah’s transfer to a third country. Although the “students” in the embassy compound have insisted that the latter event would not lead them to release the hostages, Iranian leaders have not been so precise. Still, we cannot be at all certain that they would not accept the students’ position and continue to hold the hostages to induce the U.S. to bring pressure on Mexico (or the Shah’s other country of asylum) to extradite him to Iran. On the other hand, Khomeini might decide at some point after the Shah’s departure that he had gained maximum advantage from the affair, that he could claim a great victory over America, and that he should end the matter by expelling the hostages (and, probably, by breaking diplomatic relations with the U.S.).2

  1. Source: Department of State, Official Files of [P] David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Lot 82D85, Iran Update Nov 1979. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. Drafted by Mark, Harris, Green, and Grummon. Copies were sent to S, D, P, S/P, NEA, S/S, and S/S–I. An unknown hand wrote “Urgent” in the upper right corner of the memorandum.
  2. Vance wrote in the margin next to this last sentence: “good point.”