191. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Saunders) to Secretary of State Vance 1
SUBJECT
- Contacts with the Lawyers in Iran
Attached are two memcons reporting (1) a lengthy conversation with Villalon this morning and (2) the translation of a cable from Ambassador Lang.2
Some extracts from today’s conversation follow:
—Because of Ghotbzadeh’s inability to get along with the Commission’s co-Chairman, the two lawyers have been given a middleman role.3 They do not like this assignment and are attempting to get out of it. It is clear from our contacts with the UN that the co-Chairman would like to see them out of the process.
—The lawyers have criticized the Commission for its apparent rigidity in not yielding to Iranian requests to move around the city, [Page 498] i.e., to give the appearance of a more active investigatory effort. Apparently the lawyers persuaded the Commission to split up and for separate members to take different assignments.
—As we know, the Revolutionary Council two days ago approved a visit by the Commission to the compound.4 Ghotbzadeh has experienced trouble in dealing with the captors. They offered to allow the Commission to see only some of the hostages. Ghotbzadeh today gave them an ultimatum demanding that all of the hostages be seen. If the captors refuse, the Revolutionary Council will send an open letter of protest to the Imam. The lawyers suspect that possibly 20 of the hostages are not being held in the compound.
—The Commission met with Bruce Laingen and his two colleagues today secretly. We have confirmation of this from the British.
—The transfer of the hostages to a hospital or other place has been approved “at the highest level.” Two intervening stages will be necessary, i.e., a visit to the compound and a partial report by the Commission (both steps envisaged in the scenario).
—Beheshti is described as making serious trouble for Bani-Sadr (this is contradicted by the apparent support of Beheshti on the Revolutionary Council for the scenario).
—Bani-Sadr is said to have persuaded Khomeini to give authority over the hostages to the new Parliament because Bani-Sadr and Khomeini were upset that Waldheim jumped the gun in announcing the Commission, and thus deprived Iran of the opportunity to declare a diplomatic success.
—The two lawyers are fully aware of our concerns about the lack of tangible progress. They continue to feel there is a strong commitment in the Iranian leadership to the scenario and Bani-Sadr as having told the Commission that he would adhere to the scenario “point by point.”
—Because of their role as intermediaries between the Iranians and the Commission, the lawyers are hesitant to promise that they can leave Iran for a meeting with us. They prefer to await developments over the next 24 hours. They suggest that possibly one of them could meet with one of us outside Iran.
The Lang telegram covers much of the same ground as the telephone conversation. In the cable, Lang is asked by the lawyers to urge [Page 499] us to keep cool and avoid compromising public statements. There are several references to Khomeini’s state of tension and impatience with the continuing crisis. The lawyers intend to work on Khomeini to accelerate the date of release, i.e., before the convening of a new parliament. Lang reports the lawyers’ commitment to a series of reciprocal small steps, the same procedure outlined by Ghotbzadeh in his statement which appeared yesterday in the Washington Post.5
- Source: Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan’s Confidential Files, Box 1. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted by Precht.↩
- A record of the February 27 telephone conversation with Villalon is attached but not printed; the February 27 cable from Lang, not attached, is ibid.↩
- Reference is to Chairman Aguilar. In the February 27 telephone conversation referenced in footnote 2 above, Villalon said that Waldheim had made every possible mistake which could be made, pointing to the fact that the Commission had involved itself directly in the matter of the transfer of the hostages from the compound, which was outside its role, and to Aguilar’s statements that the Commission’s goal was to “settle the crisis” as a means of pressuring Ghotbzadeh.↩
- As reported in telegram 50233 to all diplomatic and consular posts, February 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800097–0838) In the February 27 telephone conversation referenced in footnotes 2 and 3 above, Villalon stated that a “grave confrontation” existed between the Revolutionary Council and the students, but the visit to the hostages was assured.↩
- Michael Weisskopf, “Ghotbzadeh Says U.N. Mission Will See American Hostages,” Washington Post, February 29, 1980, p. A1.↩