165. Memorandum From the White House Chief of Staff (Jordan) to President Carter1
As I told you, Secretary Vance has taken the position that he does not want to hear the tape of the Waldheim meeting with the Revolutionary Council2 or hear [read] the transcript. You may want to defer reading the transcript until you confer with him.
I believe that even if you don’t read it, it is important that you know what actually happened.
Let me begin by saying that I know that the Secretary-General was trying to identify with the Iranians, appear neutral in his role as Secretary-General and create an atmosphere that might result in progress on the hostage issue. He also was under a certain amount of pressure due to the fact that his life was in danger several times.3
Having said that, let me make these observations:
1. The Secretary-General did not present on behalf of the world community the view that Iran was in violation of international law. This should have been stated in a tactful way during his meeting with the Revolutionary Council.
2. He tried to identify with the Iranians at the expense of representing the world community.
3. Because he did not clearly state the U.S. or United Nations position on the situation, the members of the Revolutionary Council were left to draw their own conclusions about where things stood.
4. The tone of Waldheim’s remarks was apologetic, defensive and at points obsequious. There is no way that the Council—particularly the religious, non-secular members—could have concluded that they were dealing with either a strong man or a strong organization.
Consequently, while recognizing the critical role that the United Nations and the Secretary-General have to play in resolving the crisis, I believe that you should consider reading the transcript just so that [Page 438] we will not be dependent on Waldheim doing any heavy negotiating for us.
My French friends and Cottam have said a number of times that the Foreign Minister was frustrated and disappointed that nothing had happened as a result of Waldheim’s trip. That must be because he left the impression that he was sympathetic to their cause and imprecise about what would have to happen on both sides. As a result, Waldheim probably has less credibility with them because they will have concluded that Waldheim left Iran convinced of the justice of their own cause and was blocked by the U.S. from following through.
Enough on that, but I hope that you will keep my harsh comments private.
Because the issue that we are dealing with is so important and sensitive, I want to make a few points:
1. Absolute confidentiality is essential. Most of the inter-governmental communications on this should be oral and limited to a very tight group.
2. My personal involvement on a continuing basis is important and essential in a couple of ways. First, it has been a signal of our willingness and seriousness to negotiate in a respectful manner. Secondly, it is important that someone with a political sense of things here and [in] Iran be involved on a continuing basis.
3. Hal Saunders and I should work on this as a team. He and I complement one another—he has an understanding of the area, the personalities, is an excellent draftsman and represents the Secretary well.
4. If we are able to put this thing together, it is going to be like one of those trick billiards shots where you have to hit five sides before the ball goes in the pocket. For this reason, we are going to need to put together the UN, Panamanian, etc., pieces together. For that reason, I will need to be involved in every part of the discussion and negotiations. This should not take much of my time, but is essential in terms of tying this thing all together. Right now, Hal Saunders and I are the only two people in the government who have a precise sense of both how this thing can be done and also how difficult and sensitive it will be.
So, at the risk of appearing immodest, I would suggest that you say sometime during the meeting today4 if we decide to go ahead that you want Hal Saunders and I to work as a team and that you want me involved in every dimension of the discussions to both keep you informed and to measure domestic political impact.
[Page 439]Mr. President, I had a hunch last week that this might turn into something. Because of Bourguet, I am increasingly convinced that it can and will.
- Source: Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan’s Confidential Files, Box 34, Iran 1/80. Eyes Only. In the upper right corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote: “Ham. J.”↩
- According to Saunders, to establish their credentials, at the January 25 meeting (see Document 164), Bourguet and Villalon presented Jordan with a cassette tape recording from Ghotbzadeh of Waldheim’s meeting with the Revolutionary Council at the beginning of January in Tehran. (Saunders, “Diplomacy and Pressure,” American Hostages in Iran, p. 119)↩
- See Document 132.↩
- Not further identified.↩