Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

163. Summary of a Special Meeting¹

Washington, January 24, 1980, 4:30–5:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Iran Strategy

PARTICIPANTS

• The Vice President

• State

  • Secretary Cyrus Vance
  • Harold Saunders

• Defense

  • Secretary Harold Brown*
  • Graham Claytor

• CIA

  • Admiral Stansfield Turner

• White House

  • Hamilton Jordan

• NSC

  • David Aaron
  • Gary Sick

*Only present for first few minutes

SUMMARY

Per your instructions, we met to review our Iran strategy.² We reviewed the key channels which are now being used: the United Nations; the PLO, which may be useful again in the future; the Sudanese Sadiq al-Mahdi; Professor Richard Cottam who talks directly with Ghotbzadeh; Swiss Ambassador Lang in Tehran, who has access to key individuals for relaying messages; the Egyptian journalist Heikal; and the French lawyers who will see Ham and Hal Saunders again tomorrow.³ All agreed that we should keep all of these channels open and exploit any others which may become available. However, none of them have any immediate prospects of producing significant movement toward release of the hostages.

The key problem remains that we do not have an authoritative individual with whom we can negotiate. The elections this weekend may produce someone who will be willing and able to take more direct action. Some believe that once the new President is elected, Khomeini will accept a less active role and turn over greater authority. However, this may not occur until after the legislative elections in late February, and there is considerable skepticism that it will happen at all. The French lawyers told Ham that a new President will immediately be faced with a challenge from the clerical elements on the Revolutionary Council and will be unable to take independent action. The French lawyers felt that the runoff period after the preliminary balloting this weekend may provide the most promising window for a U.S. initiative, by approaching opposing candidates with a U.S. plan.

Three basic strategies were examined, which are not mutually exclusive:

1. Accept a high-risk strategy in which we agree to take a series of steps unilaterally, with some corresponding steps by the Iranians to confirm acceptance at each point. This would mean we would have to give up our present position of demanding release of the hostages as a starting point. We would have to be willing to play some cards without real assurance that the hostages would be released at the end of the procedure. The objective would be to give moderate elements sufficient ammunition to go to Khomeini and try to persuade him that the Americans had been defeated and the time had come to release the hostages. The French lawyers and Cottam believe this is the only strategy which will pay off.

2. Focus our attention on getting the hostages out of the embassy and out of the custody of the militants. If successful, this would undercut the militants’ political leverage and eventually make it easier for the government to decide to release the hostages. Our tactics would be to focus on the condition of the hostages and the need to move them to more adequate quarters with better care, for humanitarian reasons. They have shown themselves to be sensitive to such arguments in the past.

3. Focus primarily on the Islamic Conference and the Islamic states as a means of getting through to Khomeini.

There are mixed views about the usefulness of pursuing sanctions aggressively. Some believe that the threat of sanctions merely stiffens the back of the regime and weakens the bargaining position of the moderates. Others think that the sanctions are taken very seriously in Iran and that they create domestic political pressure to find a settlement. All agreed, however, that pushing sanctions before the election and before the Islamic Conference meeting would be counterproductive.⁴

We recommend proceeding as follows:

—First, we will focus on the forthcoming Islamic Conference as a means of getting our views across to the Iranians from a group of states and leaders who would be credible in their eyes. State is actively pursuing this.

—Second, State will develop a series of alternative negotiating strategies which we might use after the Islamic Conference and after the initial balloting for President. These will be reviewed at a subsequent meeting.⁵

—Third, we will collect and examine names of private individuals who might be able to organize a global effort drawing attention to the plight of the hostages on purely humanitarian grounds. A non-American with leftist credentials would probably be ideal, if we can find such a person and persuade him to undertake the effort.⁶

All agreed that we should not make any concessions unilaterally until we have an authoritative interlocutor on the Iranian side. That will almost certainly not occur until after the elections. In the interim, our present negotiating position should be maintained.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Council, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 10. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter wrote “Zbig, J” in the upper right corner.
2. Brzezinski told Turner the meeting was necessary because he was “having difficulty keeping it together.” (Memorandum from Turner to Carlucci, McMahon, and Cogan, January 24; Central Intelligence Agency, Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, Job 95M01183R: Policy Files (1977–1981), Box 1, Folder 3: DCI Turner—Eyes Only Files—Memos and Meetings with Various Officials and Subjects) In a January 23 note sent to Brzezinski for this January 24 meeting, Turner wrote: “Iran is rapidly crumbling,” the left is making advances, “the hostage issue is forcing us to cause Iran to crumble and not to give help, advice, support, etc.,” “the time is coming when timely resolution of the hostage crisis will be in the national interest,” and “a rescue attempt may be the only avenue open to us.” (Ibid.)
3. Villalon and Bourguet; see Document 164.
4. In the left margin, Carter wrote: “[illegible—Push?] for very firm sanctions, but minimal publicity.” The Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers held an emergency session in Islamabad January 27–29 to discuss the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.
5. In the left margin, Carter wrote: “Expedite, to me.”
6. In the left margin, Carter wrote: “Andy OK.” Reference is to Andrew Young. In a February 6 memorandum, Brzezinski informed Carter that Jamaican Prime Minister Michael Manley was sending a team to Algeria to pave the way for a Young visit to Iran should Carter so decide. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East File, Box 31, Subject File, Iran 2/80)