Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

162. Memorandum From Gary Sick of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 24, 1980

SUBJECT

• Iran

We are approaching a new point in our relationship with Iran where some fundamental choices must be faced. Our basic dilemma can be defined as follows:

—With the Soviet threat to Iran growing more explicit (and given our new level of commitment in the area) we will have a greater interest in propping up any anti-communist regime in Tehran, and there will be a growing inclination to try to fashion a cooperative relationship with the Khomeini regime after a new president is elected;

—But the very presence of the Khomeini regime lends itself to continued collapse of the society, the danger of civil war, and the very real risk that the left will capitalize on the foibles of the present leadership to strengthen its position for a takeover from within.

The questions we must ask ourselves at this point are:

1. Is the Khomeini regime salvageable? Is it capable of evolving over time into a government which provides even the minimal level of internal stability and self-defense capability?

2. Is the risk of a communist takeover in Iran greater from an actual Soviet intervention, or is the greater risk an internal growth of leftist power?

3. How can we simultaneously seek to get the hostages back, bolster an anti-communist regime, and strengthen Iran’s capability to resist a possible Soviet intervention?

In my view, the regime in Iran is perilously close to total collapse. Khomeini is committed to an unrealistic vision of a pure Islamic society, but he is leaving the organizational work to God. He is an old man, physically unwell, and totally lacking in any practical sense of how to manage anything, let alone a major nation. The people of Iran were thrilled at his leadership in bringing down the Shah, but fundamentally they do not share his vision. As time goes on, the gap between his image and the reality of governmental chaos have become increasingly apparent, and his support is waning. His hospitalization will reinforce the sense of uncertainty and drift. It will remind everyone of his mortality and the absence of any structure to provide continuity if he is incapacitated.

The process of seeking alternative to Khomeini’s leadership was already well underway, and it is gaining momentum daily. The Kurds will not be reconciled with him. They have learned they cannot trust him and they are naturally inclined to grasp such moments to assert their own nationalistic aspirations. Azerbaijan is simmering just below the level of full scale rebellion. It is only the uncertainty of Shariatmadari’s status—and the possibility that he might be harmed—which restrains them from even more overt opposition. Khomeini has met their demands with naked force and contempt. They are not going to be wooed back into his fold. The other tribes—Qashqai, Baluchi, Khuzistan Arabs—recognize weakness when they see it, and their open opposition to the central regime is the best evidence of how they view the prospects of the present regime.

The regime itself is a collection of second-rate, venal, power hungry, self-centered, inexperienced and disreputable individuals. There is not a good mind or a good idea in the lot. The power struggles which at first were hidden beneath a superficial unity have now emerged into public view. One of the current rumors in Tehran is that the Forgan assassination group² in fact does not exist at all—it is the invention of the ruling mullahs for their own political assassinations. No one in Tehran today believes that Ayatollah Taleghani died a natural death. Rather, he is considered to have been too much of a rival to Khomeini and was quietly dispensed with. The fact that these rumors have credibility is unmistakable evidence of the decay of the revolutionary elite.

People have seen mullah rule, and they are appalled. Khomeini’s son-in-law is rumored to be exporting large amounts of money to Swiss accounts. The level of bribery and corruption extends from the lowest level (where the local mullahs and komiteh members “borrow” cars, furnishings and bank accounts of their opponents) to the very top. Nothing in the performance of the present regime has given any basis for encouragement about the future.

Khomeini insists on retaining all power to himself. He makes pronouncements and expects them to be carried out according to his vision. When things go wrong, he fires those most directly involved—or those who have been fingered by the members of his court. As a result, everyone shuns responsibility and all the “officials” of the government and the Revolutionary Council spend all their waking hours (and probably their nightmares as well) scheming about how to maintain Khomeini’s personal support. This is about the best we can expect so long as Khomeini is alive. Ironically, if he dies, the game will return to square one and it will be every man for himself.

In the meantime, the left is organizing itself. The Tudeh Party expects Khomeini’s imminent collapse and is positioning itself to inherit as much of the wreckage as possible. If the present chaos drags on, the left will continue to ingratiate itself with Khomeini as one of the few reliable bastions of support, and he will be forced to rely on them more and more heavily.

The presidential elections will probably change very little. The election will be boycotted by major sections of the population, and the remainder will probably split according to personalities. Any president, even if elected by a genuine majority, will find himself in the same position as poor old Bazargan—and the new president’s fate is likely to be about the same. Khomeini will not brook real independence, so the new president will either have to be a total rubber stamp or he will have to set about building an independent power base. The latter is more likely, but it is also dangerous to the health—politically and otherwise.

The threat of internal collapse and the emergence of the left as the dominant power strikes me as much more imminent and likely than an actual Soviet military intervention. Any prolongation of Khomeini’s faltering regime only increases that risk. Our objective should be to hasten the downfall of the present regime. We need not do much actively, for it is falling of its own weight. But we should beware of taking tactical steps in the context of the Soviet invasion which artificially breathe new life into the present leadership and give the Iranian public the false impression that there may be more there than meets the eye.

They are troubled by sanctions. We should use that weapon, and reinforce it with some hype and propaganda. It undercuts the credibility of the mullah rule and it puts pressure on them where they feel it—in their domestic support.

We should continue with our contacts with dissident groups. Our objective should be to encourage those groups who have real influence—particularly those in Azerbaijan which stand between Tehran and the USSR and who have the manpower, talent and political determination to provide some kind of alternative regime. They also have an invaluable religious asset in Shariatmadari, and a network of fellow Azeris in key positions throughout the country, including the military.

We need not delude ourselves into thinking that we can mastermind a countercoup. That would be both infeasible and historically foolish. But we can quietly promote some degree of cooperation among various key groups and assist them to communicate among themselves.

We can also help to promote political ideas which promise Iran something more than the obeisance to personality. Where is a program? Who has any political ideas which go beyond just getting themselves elected to the highest possible office? If there are such people or such ideas, we should make sure they get the widest possible exposure.

We need to build an alternative to the left. Obviously we cannot do this ourselves, but more and more Iranians are thinking exactly this way, and we have some ability to reinforce it through intelligent propaganda and selective support. Although this appears to be a long-term strategy, it may in fact develop much more quickly than we think if the present regime simply folds up—as it may. If nothing else, the clear acceptance of that objective as a policy goal would provide a structure to our thinking about the future of Iran which is now lacking.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 30, Iran 1/11/80–1/31/80. Secret. A stamped notation in the upper right corner of the memorandum reads: “ZB has seen.”
2. Purported to be a religious extremist assassination group that followed the teachings of Ali Shariati. The leader, Akbar Goudarzi, reportedly was arrested January 8. (Report by UN High Commissioner for Refugees, February 1, 1999; www.unhcr.org)