160. Telegram From the Embassy in Panama to the Department of State1
678. Dept Please Pass to White House for Hamilton Jordan. For Secretary, Deputy Secretary and Asst Sec Saunders. Subject: Iranian-Panamanian Contacts.
1. (C–Entire text)
2. Summary: President Royo, with concurrence of General Torrijos, promised Ghotbzadeh this evening2 that early tomorrow morning he would send the GOI a cable agreeing to receive formal extradition request from GOI, stating that the Shah was “under the care of the Government of Panama and that his movements are subject to prior approval by the security forces of the country” (i.e., stopping short of the words “under arrest”). Royo will add a paragraph stating that now it is up to the GOI to comply with international law and to release the hostages. The decision to take these steps was made following indications received through the Panamanian Ambassador in Paris that they would aid in the release of the hostages. Gabriel Lewis and “Rory” Gonzalez, recently back from Paris, concur that the calculated risk was worth taking. The Shah will be briefed tomorrow morning and assured that he will not be handed over. Royo and Torrijos asked that I visit the Shah to indicate that we are aware of the plans. End summary.
3. I was called to General Torrijos’ home at 7:30 p.m., where he, President Royo, V.P. De la Espriella, Gabriel Lewis, “Rory” Gonzalez, and Col. Noriega (Intelligence Chief) were meeting. They explained that at 3 this afternoon Ghotbzadeh telephoned Lewis saying that he wished to speak to Royo to request that Panama take certain measures, [Page 423] i.e., to arrest the Shah and to initiate the extradition process, Lewis said he would call back in three hours as he had to locate Royo. He asked Ghotbzadeh that, if Royo were to agree, would this help in the release of the hostages, and Ghotbzadeh replied affirmatively.
4. Following this call, Col. Noriega spoke with the PN Ambassador in Paris, who had been in communication with Tehran and had been told that such steps were necessary “to prepare the Revolutionary Council” (ie, for release of hostages). He also reported that Ghotbzadeh was sending an “intermediary” to Paris early Wednesday morning,3 who could then travel to Panama at the right moment.
5. Following this conversation, the PN Ambassador to Paris called Ghotbzadeh and said that Royo was presently in a meeting with his top advisers considering the matter.
6. Royo called Ghotbzadeh at approximately 6 p.m. (I heard the tape which was made of the conversation, held in English; Ghotbzadeh’s voice was not always intelligible.) Royo said he agreed to receive the request for extradition of the ex-Shah. He said the GOP would initiate procedures for extradition when it received the formal documents required by Panamanian law, i.e., copy of the Iranian order for arrest, documents evidencing crimes, and applicable laws of Iran. Ghotbzadeh asked repeatedly whether Shah would be arrested, whether he could say order for arrest was issued, etc., and Royo ducked the question each time. Royo stated only that the Shah was “in a safe place,” that he was “well protected by our security forces,” etc. He promised to send Ghotbzadeh a telex early Wednesday a.m. confirming the agreement. Ghotbzadeh indicated he would make such communication public and said: “I believe what you are doing (word missed) toward a peaceful solution to the problem.” Royo said: “I hope our response under international law can be a help.”
7. Royo and Torrijos discussed the telex Royo should send early Wednesday (Royo promised Ghotbzadeh it would be sent by 7:30 a.m.). He said that it would consist of three paragraphs: in the first he would state that the Shah was under the “protection and care” of the GOP and that “his movements were subject to previous authorization of the security forces of the country.” The second para would state that the GOP was prepared to receive the formal extradition request, and would describe the documents required under PN law. The third paragraph would appeal to the GOI to release the hostages and say, in effect, that he hoped the example of Panama’s fulfilment of the law would help the GOI take measures to free the hostages and bring about respect for international law. The implication at least would be that the GOI’s [Page 424] compliance with international law would determine Panama’s further action, Royo said.
8. Torrijos said that Col. Noriega would go to Contadora to brief the Shah on these developments. He and Royo asked that I go to Contadora later in the morning to let the Shah know that we were familiar with the Panamanian plans.
9. I pointed out that Panama was giving away the only two cards in its hand without any assurance of results. My argument did not prevail, however, in the face of all those present who insisted that it was the right moment for a calculated risk. They seemed to have confidence that Ghotbzadeh would perform and that even if he were not elected President, that he was in such high favor with Khomeini that he would wield great power.
10. In a post-meeting phone conversation with Lewis, I said I thought it unfortunate that Royo had given in so quickly without putting together the whole deal and coordinating with us. Lewis gave a verbal shrug of the shoulders and said it was important now to make sure Royo’s telex was carefully drafted so that it did not make any commitments as to the arrest and that it show clearly that Panama’s intention is to work to free the hostages. He agreed that he would not have committed himself to send the cable but felt it was too late in view of Royo’s promises.
11. I arranged with Royo to meet with him at 6:45 a.m. in his office and that he would not send the cable prior to such time, so I could advise him of any information received from Washington tonight.
12. Hamilton Jordan informed me at about 10:30 p.m. that he was very concerned about timing and felt Royo’s telex would be a great mistake. He said to tell Royo that as a result of the weekend trip, President Carter had ordered a complete review of our negotiating posture and had said we should work with the Panamanians.4 He asked that I try to stop the telex to Ghotbzadeh and get Royo’s representatives to Washington. He said to tell Royo that Ghotbzadeh was on his way out politically, had told a contact of ours he could not win the election, and had made many unkept promises to us. Perhaps the telex was a good idea for later, but we had to coordinate. I said that if necessary I would call him from Royo’s office.
13. Lewis called the PN Ambassador in Paris about 11:45 p.m. He learned that the French intermediary had not yet arrived from Tehran but would be in shortly. Lewis asked that the intermediary call him no later than 5 a.m. Panama time so that we could have his overall assessment prior to my meeting with Royo. Lewis quoted the intermedi [Page 425] ary as having said previously that he would be willing to meet with U.S. officials (he said Hamilton Jordan) any time. I told Lewis the question of a timetable for any action plan was of major concern to us, as well as an assessment of the chances of success based on conversations with different leaders.5
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 60, Panama 6/79–1/80. Confidential; Niact Immediate; Nodis.↩
- January 22.↩
- January 23.↩
- See Documents 157 and 159.↩
- According to the New York Times Tehran radio reported Ghotbzadeh spoke by phone with Royo regarding extradition. (“Panama tells Iran that the Shah is in Its ‘Care’ but Not Under Arrest,” New York Times, January 23, 1980, p. A1)↩