Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume XI, Part 1, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–September 1980

159. Memorandum From the White House Chief of Staff (Jordan) to President Carter ¹

Washington, January 22, 1980

In the next several months, you will shape, define and execute a new American foreign policy that will not only set the tone for U.S.-Soviet relations for the next twenty years, but will largely determine whether or not our country will play an effective role as the leader of the Free World and, in that way, diminish the possibility of nuclear confrontation. We live in a more dangerous world today than it seems we have lived in since the Cuban missile crisis.

For you to pursue this new policy and to execute the decisions that you must make, it seems to me that you have to be relatively unrestrained both politically and substantively. For that reason, it seems that we must have two very high priorities over the next 30–45 days.

First, we need to eliminate Kennedy from the political race so that you will not be preoccupied with the campaign nor restrained politically from doing whatever is necessary to meet the Soviet challenge. You will need to have the time to focus on this problem and the flexibility to make decisions that will be unpopular with some of the elements of the Democratic Party—the registration decision is a good case in point. Also, if we wrap up the nomination, it will give us more time to prepare for the general election and pull the party together for a tough general election campaign.

This means that we need to make an all-out effort to beat Kennedy in both Maine and New Hampshire. I will be working with Kraft and Strauss² on this. It will not be easy but can be done.

Secondly, and a much more difficult goal is to find some way to resolve the hostage situation in the next 30–45 days so that we can begin to build a relationship—however tenuous—with the Iranian government that undermines Soviet influence in the country and discourages Soviet military intervention.

I would not want to imply in any way that you, Cy, Zbig or the excellent team that has been working on this matter have not done everything humanly possible to obtain the safe release of the hostages. Our position which was developed at the Camp David meeting³ was correct both substantively and politically. Based on my own recent involvement in this matter and discussions with both the French contacts and with Professor Cottam, I have concluded that the situation does not exist now nor will it exist in the near future whereby the hostages are released simultaneously with the other steps we are willing to take. For that reason, it seems to me that we have to at least consider taking some risks in obtaining their release that were neither feasible or advisable before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This is not to suggest that we have to abandon any of our basic principles, but that we are going to have to consider modifying our tactics.

The substantive gap between the Iranians and ourselves is significant. The internal political situation is so fragile and fluid that no present or future leader of the civilian government will be able to agree in advance to the simultaneous release of the hostages. Rightly or wrongly, they will argue that to create the proper political atmosphere for obtaining Khomeini’s blessing for the release of the hostages, there must be some actions taken that can be used with Khomeini and by Khomeini as evidence that he has won the battle with “the U.S. imperialists.”

If this analysis is correct, it would mean that we would need to develop a scenario that included the early release of the hostages after some steps that tested each other’s seriousness of purpose. I doubt very much if Ghotbzadeh or the future leadership of the government would be able to agree in advance to a scenario that had Khomeini’s blessing. Professor Cottam says that Khomeini does not think or operate in that way.

This would mean that through direct or indirect channels we would have to develop a joint scenario with the risk that it would not be successful and presumed on the front end that the steps that we took would create the proper atmosphere for Ghotbzadeh, or Bani Sadr or Beheshti to go to the Ayatollah and say that, “we have won, and it is time to let the hostages go”. The great risk would be that Khomeini would reject their plea and we would be back at square one having used up most of our bargaining chips.

Such a scenario would only be useful if we had good reason to believe that Khomeini himself is looking for a way out. If he is not, then the risks would not be worth taking.

If this was done, it would have to be done in a way that did not appear to Khomeini or to the others in the Revolutionary Council as a sign of U.S. weakness that could then only invite a possibly harder line.

If you are interested in pursuing this possible course of action, it would require you, Cy, Zbig, the Vice-President and others addressing several questions.

1. What would be the best scenario we could develop that did not undermine our nation’s principles, but at the same time sends a positive signal to the moderates in the Revolutionary Council that could be used effectively with the Ayatollah for the release of the hostages?

Let me give you an example of the kind of scenario that might be developed:

Step 1. Statement by President Carter that “beyond the resolution of the hostage crisis, the United States desires to have a friendly relationship with the people and government of Iran”.

Step 2. Iran responds with a statement by either the Foreign Minister or new President that “the early release of the hostages is a goal of the Revolutionary Council”.

Step 3. UN resolution is introduced with U.S. support establishing a commission of inquiry.

Step 4. Statement from Iranian official that at the time that the commission completes its report, it will release the hostages.

Step 5. If step 4 takes place, U.S. supports UN resolution. If it does not, U.S. vetoes resolution in the Security Council.

Step 6. Commission of Inquiry is set up with a ten day limit on its activities. Travels to Iran to receive testimony.

Step 7. Commission completes report and on agreed upon date, issues report simultaneous with announcement from Iran that the hostages will be released within twenty-four hours.

Step 8. At the time the hostages are put on plane, the Panamanian government announces that it has received formal request of extradition and that it will be referred to their Attorney General in accordance with Panamanian law.

As I wrote this, I was just thinking out loud. It would probably be better to use the Panamanian “card” earlier and also to build in additional steps and gestures to safeguard this process. But, it is my opinion that some scenario like this will have to be worked out before our people are freed. I believe that U.S. public opinion would support our taking such a chance although it would look bad if we failed.

2. If such a scenario is developed, what is the best way to present it—through Waldheim, the PLO, direct contact or other means? Since there are several parties involved—the Panamanians, the United Nations, etc., it seems that we would have to make a decision as to how to present this.

3. Thirdly, and of critical importance, when would we present this?

A basic decision would have to be made as to whether or not it would be best to pursue this during the run-off or after the election of a new President.

Assuming that Ghotbzadeh does not make the run-off—and you can see from the attached “Memcon”⁴ that he no longer thinks that he will—a critical question would be whether or not the contacts that we have had with him could be transferred to the new leadership. We should do what we can to encourage Ghotbzadeh to transfer these contacts to the new leadership. This could also be a way that he could keep himself involved and possibly ingratiate himself with the new leadership.

Another thought is that if Ghotbzadeh is a lame duck, possibly he and/or Khomeini would be willing for him to take the heat for resolving the hostage situation.

I am just thinking out loud, but it seems after your State of the Union Address, you should spend some time with Zbig, Cy and his excellent team talking these things through. I strongly believe that we do need a new approach that is inherently risky for both our country and for you politically.

Also, you should review the attached “memcon”.⁵ Our trip was taken seriously. I hope that we are not undercutting Waldheim’s credibility with Ghotbzadeh, but Hal Saunders and Cottam report that he has been down on Waldheim for the past several days for some reason.⁶

1. Source: Carter Library, Office of the Chief of Staff, Jordan’s Confidential Files, Box 34, Iran 1/80. Eyes Only. Presumably this is a version of the 5-page memorandum Jordan recalled as approved by Vance, Brzezinski, and Carter on January 23. (Jordan, Crisis, p. 125)
2. Tim Kraft resigned as Carter’s campaign manager in September 1980; Robert Strauss replaced him.
3. Presumably a reference to the November 23, 1979, meeting; see Document 51.
4. Not attached. Reference is to a January 22 memorandum of conversation in which Ghotbzadeh told Cottam that he “had no chance to win in the elections” and that “he was sick and tired of being Foreign Minister and he wanted out as soon as possible. He would remain, however, until the hostage crisis was ended.” Cottam noted that it was his impression that Ghotbzadeh “was counting exclusively on the French channel to Jordan.” (Department of State, Records of David D. Newsom, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Subject Files, 1978–1981, Lot 81D154, Memoranda of Conversation)
5. Not attached, but the meeting was reported in telegram 1314 from London, January 20. See Document 157.
6. Jordan added the following handwritten postscript: “I remain willing to go to Iran if that is ever necessary. Also, shouldn’t we inform Waldheim of this?”