Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

386. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter ¹

Washington, June 28, 1980

SUBJECT

• UN Resolution on Jerusalem (S)

At Tab A² is a memorandum from Warren Christopher, setting forth the arguments either for an abstention or a veto or non-participation in the vote on the UNSC Jerusalem Resolution—now scheduled for Monday afternoon.³ The memorandum does a good job in setting out the various arguments. (S)

Because of the gravity of this issue—and the risks in any vote—I believe it would be useful for you to meet on Monday morning with the Vice President, Ed Muskie, and me to discuss our vote and related statement. Given Don McHenry’s deep involvement and concern, I believe it would also be useful for him to be present (his telegram to you is at Tab B—note, however, that the operative text of the resolution is that contained in Chris’ memorandum). (S)

Sol Linowitz has asked to be recorded as follows:

We should not be party to any effort to make Jerusalem a political issue at this time. Under other circumstances, maybe we should abstain on a resolution containing many of these formulations. Under current circumstances, we should veto with a statement that deals not with the resolution’s substance, but rather states as our reasoning that this resolution, at this time, would not advance the solution of Jerusalem or the Palestinian problem, and would indeed hinder the search for solutions. Therefore this resolution should not be permitted to gain the force of law, as it would if we only abstained. (S)

With regard to Chris’ memorandum, I would only note that the option of “non-participation” might be a distinction that would be noted in the Security Council, but would make no practical political difference in Israel. With regard to the draft statement,⁴ I would note that it does not support the Camp David process, and have included a draft paragraph (Tab C) that might be inserted to correct that deficiency. (S)

I want to underline one other point: the vote we cast on this resolution will have some impact on the autonomy talks, and especially on the Burg-Ali-Linowitz meetings on Wednesday⁵ and Thursday. As Chris notes, a veto would cause problems for Ali; but an abstention would have problems for Burg—and could (if followed by unilateral Israeli acts) also spill over onto Egyptian attitudes. Equally important, we have been predicating many of our recent acts—bridging beyond May 26; softening the European statement; and taking a firm line on UN resolutions—on our commitment to Camp David. That position wears progressively thin as the talks do not restart, and as there is a widespread assumption that we will not make any serious effort to get a significant agreement before our elections. Thus the position Linowitz takes with Burg and Ali this week—and the position you take with them on Wednesday⁶—will largely set the tone for months to come: whether we will take an aggressive or relatively relaxed stance towards the pace and intensity of the negotiations. (S)

To help clarify the issues involved, we will convene a Senior Level Meeting⁷ on Monday afternoon, to present a strategy for the Burg-Ali meetings to you for your approval. (S)

RECOMMENDATION

That you meet with the Vice President, Muskie, and me on Monday morning to decide on our UN vote:⁸

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—(5/80–6/80). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. The date is handwritten. Carter initialed “C” in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, indicating that he saw the document.
2. Attached but not printed is the June 28 memorandum from Christopher to Carter.
3. According to a June 27 memorandum from Brzezinski to Carter, the vote was postponed at U.S. request. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 37, Israel: 6/20–30/80)
4. Attached but not printed is the undated draft statement.
5. July 2.
6. See Document 387.
7. No record of a Senior Level Meeting on June 30 has been found. Under a July 2 covering memorandum, Brzezinski forwarded to Carter a July 1 briefing paper from Muskie for the Burg-Ali meeting. Copies of both documents are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 86, Sensitive XX: 7/80.
8. Carter approved the recommendation to meet at the White House and approved including McHenry in the discussion. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Mondale, Muskie, Christopher, Linowitz, Brzezinski, Saunders, and Hunter in the Cabinet Room from 9:18 a.m. to 10:36 a.m. on June 30. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) On June 30, the United States abstained in the vote on Security Council Resolution 476 (1980). The resolution passed 14–0. (Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980, p. 402)