Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

380. Memorandum From the President’s Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations (Linowitz) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 6, 1980

SUBJECT

• Status of Egypt-Israel Autonomy Negotiations

I thought you might want to have this very brief report on where things stand now with reference to the effort to get the autonomy talks started again and how we have been going about it.

Ever since the visit of Mubarak,² I have been working with the Israelis and the Egyptians endeavoring to evolve a satisfactory formula which might cover the concern expressed by the Egyptians with reference to the Jerusalem Bill³ in the Knesset. I tried out several alternate approaches with the Israelis after first checking with Roy Atherton to get some assurance that the Egyptians would be agreeable to them.

As you know, the Israelis feel that they have not misbehaved in any way in connection with the Jerusalem Bill, and are unwilling to offer any assurances as to what the Government might or might not do if the Bill were to issue from the committee to which it has been referred. The most the Government of Israel is willing to say is that it will not “interfere” with the legislative process of the Knesset in connection with this Bill. This obviously will not satisfy the Egyptians, as I have forcefully indicated to the Israelis.

The central fact is that Jerusalem is such a politically sensitive and explosive issue and, therefore, Begin and his colleagues are unwilling to say anything about what they might or might not do if a Jerusalem Bill were to appear on the floor of the Knesset. As you will remember, all but very few members of the Knesset voted to refer Geula Cohen’s Jerusalem Bill to committee when it was offered by her.

This morning I thought we had resolved the issue fairly well.⁴ The plan was for me to write a letter to General Ali indicating that the Israelis had given assurances that they would not “interfere” in the legislative process in connection with the Bill—and that I understood this to mean that the Government would take no action in the Knesset in connection with the Bill. Burg approved this; but after he talked to Begin he telephoned to say that Begin had disapproved it.

In conversations thereafter with Roy Atherton we agreed that the best way to proceed in order to get the negotiations going would be as follows:

1. Roy will make an oral presentation to Ali and perhaps Sadat⁵ about the facts in connection with the Jerusalem Bill and the reasons why the Israeli Government finds it exceedingly difficult politically to say anything in writing about the plans with respect to the Bill. We hope that this may allay Egyptian concerns, even though it falls far short of what they had originally requested.

2. A letter would come from you to President Sadat⁶ calling upon him to resume the negotiations as soon as possible and pointing out that we are in a far stronger position to have an impact on Israel and her policies if we are in negotiations with her.

3. Roy will hand the Egyptians a copy of Ed Muskie’s forthcoming speech on the Middle East⁷ in which Ed will call for no further unilateral steps by either party and urging the parties to return to the negotiating table.

If all of this works as it should, then I would propose that the announcement be made by the United States about the resumption of the talks. We could merely say that after extensive discussions with Israel and Egypt and clarification of the situation with reference to several points raised, the parties have agreed to resume negotiations immediately. I would not think that it would be profitable to elaborate beyond this brief statement.

At the same time, we would hope to be able to say that General Ali and Minister Burg are going to be in Washington next week and meet with me in order to discuss how to get the negotiations moving again and to make plans for the next negotiating sessions.

It will not be possible to get word from Egypt until sometime Sunday⁸ as to whether this course of procedure is agreeable, and we shall then have to make sure that Israel is fully in accord. Conceivably all this might be worked out in time for Ed Muskie to say something about it in the course of his speech Monday noon.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 19, Egypt: 6/80. Secret; Nodis. Copies of the memorandum were sent to Muskie and Brzezinski. The memorandum was forwarded to Carter under a June 6 covering memorandum from Brzezinski. (Ibid.)
2. See Document 377.
3. See Document 371.
4. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter held a foreign policy breakfast meeting from 7:35 a.m. to 9:25 a.m. on June 6, attended by Mondale, Muskie, Brown, Donovan, Cutler, Jordan, and Brzezinski. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found. In the published version of his personal diary, Carter wrote of the meeting: “At the foreign affairs breakfast we discussed the Mideast peace talks. Begin is shaky and we don’t want to do anything to prop him up because he’s a major obstacle to success, but we’ve got to show our leadership, keep the Camp David process alive, and stop the abandonment of the process by Egypt.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 435)
5. The substance of the U.S. proposal was sent to Atherton in telegram 149590 to Cairo, June 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880143–1871) Atherton met with Ali, el-Baz, and Amre Moussa on June 7 to deliver the U.S. proposal for the resumption of the autonomy negotiations. (Telegram 12674 from Cairo, June 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870047–2490)
6. See Document 381.
7. Muskie delivered his speech to the Washington Press Club on June 9. See footnote 7, Document 370.
8. June 8.