379. Memorandum From Edward S. Walker in the Office of the President’s Special Representative, Department of State, to the President’s Special Representative for Middle East Peace Negotiations (Linowitz)1

SUBJECT

  • THE CURRENT SITUATION

The situation in the West Bank and Gaza, in the Arab world generally and in terms of the negotiations is deteriorating.

Begin’s first act as Defense Minister2 was to suspend publication of two out of three West Bank Arab newspapers. (His action was, strictly speaking, justified since the newspapers had evaded the censor by placing editorial comment in news stories.) The Israeli authorities also apparently suspended Arab women’s organizations after an attempted sit-in organized by one such group in three homes which were sealed by Israeli authorities in Nablus (the comparison of Government action in this case to its lack of action against Israeli women sitting-in at the Hadassah building is vivid in West Banker’s thoughts and in those of many Israelis, some of whom reportedly had come to Nablus in a show of solidarity with the Palestinian women). Attempts by shopkeepers to close their businesses in reaction to the bombings3 of West Bank mayors were forceably broken up by the IDF and two or three Arab youths were wounded by IDF fire during a scuffle at one Arab town. Several more schools have been closed just as students were preparing for critical examinations and, as Mayor Freij told Brandon Grove, since Weizman left there is no address in the Military Government to which the Arabs can turn. As you know, Mayor Shawa of Gaza has resigned4 [Page 1260] and the few remaining West Bank mayors, including Freij, are considering similar action. The quality of life has plummeted in the territories and many, including Sam Lewis, expect a cycle of violence and repression which could turn the clock back ten years. This ultimately could lead to repugnance in Israel and even greater pressure for new elections.

Begin is no closer to solving his ministerial problem. He and Sharon engaged in a vitriolic exchange at Sunday’s5 Cabinet meeting which will make it all but impossible for Sharon to support Shamir’s appointment as Defense Minister and equally impossible for Begin to withdraw it. If Sharon votes against the government he is required by Knesset procedures to resign and Begin is apparently backgrounding the press that this would be no great loss. Sharon’s defection would not bring down the government but would make Begin’s majority and survivability very tenuous.

Begin, in an almost irrational Knesset speech,6 compared the German government to the Nazis and the French to the Vichy. He reiterated Israeli policy on Jerusalem and used the line that the government does not intend to “intervene” in the Knesset handling of the Cohen Bill.7 While the intent may have been to be helpful, the message was couched in a way which will be interpreted by the Egyptians and other Arabs as anything but helpful.

Burg talked to Sam and said he was anxious to come to Washington to see you and is ready to travel on 36-hour notice. Burg once again tried out Begin’s formula of the Government not “intervening” in the matter of the Cohen Bill but asked Sam for any other suggestions. Burg would like to get a formula worked out before coming to Washington. Sam is skeptical that any formula Begin could agree to would satisfy the Egyptians and suggests we not spend much political capital in pursuing this track. He also points out that the government is beginning to press its own version of a basic law on Jerusalem which could come out of committee or at least be considered in committee in a matter of weeks or no more than months. Thus, even if we get a reassurance on the Cohen Bill we must be careful not to mislead the Egyptians and set the stage for a future walk-out which causes even more damage. Sam suggested getting Burg and Ali together (Ali is currently indisposed due to a recurrence of his rheumatic arthritis), back-to-back Burg and Ali visits or a shuttle by you in the area. However, Sam is [Page 1261] having doubts about the value of any action, at present, given the sour atmosphere which he expects to persist for some time to come.

Sadat told Roy that the situation was very bad and urged us to try to calm things down. However, in a very brief aside during a group meeting he asked Roy to tell President Carter “when he wants to resume negotiations, I am ready.” This was not the tone of Osama El-Baz’ remarks to Roy who did not see how negotiations could resume under current conditions. Sadat makes it sound easy, but Osama may be more accurate in his sense of what is healthy for Sadat to do right now. Khalil is, meanwhile, off to London for discussions with key leaders there.

If Israeli extremists have set back the clock in the West Bank, Arafat and al-Fatah have done the same at a Damascus gathering by re-establishing the goal “to liberate Palestine completely and to liquidate the Zionist entity politically, economically, militarily, culturally and ideologically.” The conference went on to say that the only way to achieve this goal is through armed struggle. While the tougher formulation of Fatah’s goals is a product of frustration, and probably also a move by Arafat to out maneuver his extremists, it has given Begin a handle to rally support behind him.

The Jordanians are telling us that the US is being blamed for the attacks on the West Bank mayors and it seems to be a consensus in our Embassies and the Consulate General in Jerusalem that our stock has hit a new low. The Jordanian Prime Minister,8 a cool head, has urged us to take a strong public posture against Israeli action in the West Bank. A UN Security Council debate is likely in the next few days to discuss Israeli activities in the territories at which we will be pressed to come down hard on Israeli practices. This debate apparently has taken precedence over the proposed debate on Jerusalem.

  1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Middle East, Subject File, Box 5, Autonomy Talks: 6/80. Secret; Nodis. Printed from a copy that does not bear Walker’s initials.
  2. Begin assumed the office of Minister of Defense following the resignation of Weizman on May 25.
  3. On June 2, Mayor Shaka of Nablus and Mayor Khalaf of Ramallah were wounded in separate bomb attacks on their automobiles. (Telegram 1768 from Jerusalem, June 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800269–0981) On June 7, the United States decided to offer medical assistance in the form of a military medical team and transfer to a U.S. medical facility to Shaka, who was in a hospital in Amman, and to Khalaf, who was hospitalized in Nablus. (Memorandum from Brzezinski to Brown, June 7; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 37, Israel: 6/1–19/80)
  4. Shawa resigned on June 2, shortly after the bomb attacks in Nablus and Ramallah. (Telegram 10084 from Tel Aviv, June 2; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800270–0060)
  5. June 1.
  6. Excerpts of Begin’s June 2 address to the Knesset are in Israel’s Foreign Policy, Historical Documents, vol. 6: 1979–1980, Document 97.
  7. See Document 371.
  8. Sharif Abdul Hamid Sharaf.