363. Memorandum of Conversation1
SUBJECT
- Summary of the President’s Meeting With Ambassador Sol Linowitz
PARTICIPANTS
- President Jimmy Carter
- Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher
- Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Special Representative of the President
- Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member (notetaker)
The President said that he thought there were going to be negotiations for 40 days, and several had gone by!
Ambassador Linowitz said that there have been discussions going on at lower levels.
The President said he had been disconcerted by the report of the SCC 2 on Ambassador Linowitz’s trip. There seemed to be no clear-cut decisions. Maybe he has a distorted view, but this is his impression. He is concerned that there is an apparent timidity about using Ambassador Linowitz’s 10 day trip to the area. The Ambassador should be strong, clear, forceful, and aggressive.
Ambassador Linowitz said that this is what he got out of the meeting. He doesn’t know what is in the minutes. He will not be timid. He will see Begin first thing on arriving in Israel, and take on Begin’s four points.3 Since we did not actually reject them while Begin was here, Begin is saying in Israel, in effect, that we accepted them. Begin is using the notion that the President is known to view them as candidates. The Ambassador will discuss this with Begin. Begin knows that we have an alternative view on points one and two; and the Ambassador had talked with Burg about three and four. He will hit Begin hard on all four points. The first is on making the SGA an administrative council; the second is on the number of people on the SGA equaling the number of functions; the third is on Israel’s having jurisdiction over all its citizens in the West Bank and Gaza; and the fourth is the combining of external and internal security under Israel’s authority.
The President said that he preemptorily rejects all four points.
Ambassador Linowitz said that he will do it. On the third, he will try out our idea on Status of Forces.
[Page 1221]The President said let’s not skim over these. He is bothered by them. Peres had told him that his view is that Israelis living on the West Bank should come under the jurisdiction of the SGA. How you could have settlers scattered all over the West Bank with it any other way bothers him.
Ambassador Linowitz said that we should look at the Panama Treaties, and how we worked it out with regard to the employees of the Panama Canal Company. If someone violates both Panamanian law and U.S. law, we can bring him back here to be tried under U.S. law. So it would be with Israelis on the West Bank. If a crime is not under Israeli law, then the SGA would try him.
The President said that this would be difficult for the Israelis (?).
Ambassador Linowitz said that he doesn’t know whether the jurisdiction problem can be worked out. He thought he would explore it with Begin, and talked about it with Shamir when they were here. They haven’t rejected the idea totally. So let’s try this approach.
The last of Begin’s points concerns security. We could try it on the basis of internal and external security as it affects Israel’s security. And that includes having the assistance of the police, etc. But there must be arrangements to ensure cooperation and coordination.
He doesn’t know what course Begin will be on now. Begin is having a difficult time politically now. Begin did not go back to Israel a hero.
The President said that they had said he had given too much. What was the basis for those allegations?
Ambassador Linowitz said it was the Continuing Committee. There was unhappiness that Begin had agreed to defer any decisions. Second, there was the Weizman caper,4 which will cause increasing problems. There is also talk among various groups about getting out (of the coalition) if Weizman leaves, as may happen soon. Third, there was Peres. He (the Ambassador) had talked with Peres,5 who is not being helpful [Page 1222] in talking about alternative ways to proceed—e.g. the Allon Plan;6 this is no help with the Palestinians. Begin is upset. We should try to help with Begin, but handle him differently from Israel, itself (in terms of the way we present the issues), so that the country will not see us as anti-Israel.
The President said that that is crucial. What about the ultimate question? Should we try to bring all this to a head next month, or be a participant in a willingness to find ways so that the talks can just go on?
Ambassador Linowitz said no (to the latter point), we should do this: Once we have made our position clear on Begin’s four points, we should first insist on an Israeli security presentation early in the talks, so that the advisory groups can be set up. Weizman is going back to Israel7 early so that he can join the talks and meet with General Ali. Maybe we can make some headway on this. Second, there is water. There is a need to get some agreement on principles, so that it can then be put into the Continuing Committee.
The President asked when Weizman would be getting into the talks.
Mr. Hunter said that Weizman was leaving from here early, on Tuesday8 night.
The President asked when he was seeing Weizman.
Mr. Hunter said Tuesday at 1:00 p.m.9
The President asked whether Weizman’s participation was Begin’s decision or something that Weizman was doing on his own.
Ambassador Linowitz said that Weizman was all along a member of the negotiating team. Ali will be there, and Weizman will show up. This might be part of the internal struggle within the Israeli Government.10
On the first two issues, we will surface papers, and therefore leave the land issue. He doesn’t know yet when we should surface our ideas. We will not hold back on our ideas.
The President asked what Ambassador Linowitz would surface on the first two issues.
[Page 1223]Ambassador Linowitz asked whether the President had seen the papers.11
Mr. Hunter said no.
Ambassador Linowitz said that he can leave copies with the President. Here is one on water, land, security, the Continuing Committee, jurisdiction over Israeli nationals, and legislative power. There are suggestions on fundamentals, with some details. There is one he will not use: on East Jerusalem voting rights. These are just ideas.
The President asked Deputy Secretary Christopher and Mr. Hunter if the papers were all right.
Mr. Hunter replied that they are very good.
Ambassador Linowitz said he thought the President had seen them. This is a real course that we are on. He thinks that now there should be more U.S. initiative. Egypt will welcome it.
The President said that he would, too. There will be a debacle on May 26 if the negotiations have not produced a document. Sadat will accommodate him without any real effort. But the Europeans will become active if Sadat and he do not get somewhere. The Egyptians will even try to get the Saudis involved, at the UN or otherwise. Also, if Burg, maybe Ehrlich, and Peres and Weizman—and Dayan would give his vote—are prepared to see matters brought to a head, and if we are seen as playing in Begin’s camp, this will give our concurrence to delay. That will be seen in Israel, too. He feels strongly that we should bring the negotiations to a head. He doesn’t know how accurate Peres is on politics. He (Peres) is almost as unpopular as Begin as a leader. Weizman is the most popular in Israel, and would work with Peres—though the question would be who is on top; Peres would want to be.
Ambassador Linowitz said that Weizman said that he would serve as defense minister under Peres.
The President said that Peres had told him that Burg had been planning to decide in May whether to stay with Begin and go down, or to try to stay alive.
Ambassador Linowitz said that Burg had told him this.
The President said that therefore Peres was accurate. He (the President) would be better off politically if the negotiations are brought to a [Page 1224] head. Begin sees that he will either move or fall (?). He (the President) doesn’t want to make Begin fall, but if Begin sees that he can only keep Weizman and Dayan (?) by moving, this is a strong incentive. He (the President) would like to get as much of an agreement as possible—a reasonable agreement, even if no one loves it. If he goes to Sadat, then Sadat will accept it. He wants to put forward what Sadat will accept—and not attempt to assuage Khalil.
Ambassador Linowitz said that he had talked with Sadat, and told him the substance of his recommendations. He had told Sadat how he planned to handle water. . .
The President said that Sadat didn’t care about details.
Ambassador Linowitz said that he had told Sadat that there could be agreement on principles, with the Continuing Committee taking account of the rest, such as the technical matters. Until there was agreement, then things like the rate of water sharing would continue. Sadat said that was all right; and he (the Ambassador) thinks this will be all right with the Israelis.
The President said good.
Ambassador Linowitz said that he had talked about other issues with Sadat—such as security. Butros and Osama and others find this approach wrong. On public lands, they will try a formulation, even though neither Egypt or Israel will like it: it is that, after autonomy is set up, there can be no settlements by either side without agreement by the Continuing Committee. Therefore, there would be a freeze.
The President asked on which lands.
Ambassador Linowitz said on public lands. Private lands anyone could have.
The President said that Begin would not buy this.
Ambassador Linowitz said he wanted to try it out with the President. If the idea were to leak, we would be pleased.
The President said that it would please him. It is, however, more generous than our position, since it doesn’t call for dismantling.
Ambassador Linowitz said that it would give Israel a veto over Palestinians settlements, and Egypt wouldn’t like that. It would be good if it leaked.
The President said good.
Dr. Brzezinski asked what would happen if Begin rejects it.
Ambassador Linowitz said that he would take the issues one at a time—e.g. water, security, and legislative authority. He can’t see Begin rejecting all the ideas. Begin would reject land and East Jerusalem voting rights. If there is enough progress on other issues, then we can look at what to do with the Continuing Committee with regard to [Page 1225] them. We would not say that we are putting things off, and if we can produce for the Palestinians an SGA and the withdrawal of the military government and the civilian administration, with some other issues left over, then there will be a respectable package.
The President said he thinks that we should keep the Gaza-first idea alive. In private discussions, we should say that we think it should be kept alive. But it is also clear that early public revelation would lead to the conclusion that we are abandoning free elections, as we discussed when Begin was here.
Ambassador Linowitz asked when he should surface the idea.
The President said before the end of the 10-day trip.
Ambassador Linowitz said he was afraid the others would grab at it, and not negotiate seriously on the rest.
The President said that it should be surfaced at the end of the 10 days, before Ambassador Linowitz leaves to come home. There is no secret that the idea has been discussed.
Ambassador Linowitz said that, however, we have not said how we feel about the idea. It is Sadat’s position, and is attractive. Weizman, Peres, and Sharon (?) like it.
The President said that Dayan does, too.
The Ambassador agreed. He thought he would go there for 10 days, then come home and report, and then go out again.
The President said he wanted to leave a thought in Ambassador Linowitz’s mind. If it would not work out completely on the West Bank—and the President was sure this was the case—therefore we could start now on the circumstances under which we should go to Gaza-first. If we delay that to the second round of negotiations, it would not be possible for the governments to consider it seriously in the time remaining.
Ambassador Linowitz said that we will discuss it, and he will do it.
The President said that, on the authority for the SGA, he understands that the only difference is on the definition of security.
Ambassador Linowitz said no.
The President said he wasn’t talking about a constitution, or the number of people to be on the SGA. He means that the only issue of significance is security. Is it deciding on the role of the police, anti-terrorism, and the army? Or is it just internal defense? Or is it internal defense and anti-terrorism?
Ambassador Linowitz said that also there is the question of what is wholly within the SGA’s authority. First, there are questions like international communication and financial issues; there are four or five issues to be resolved, to get from 18 to 22 or so. Second, on the question [Page 1226] of “legislative authority,” he would try to skirt the issue, and not use the words, but try to ensure that the SGA has the powers that it needs. There are no other specific issues. The rest of the problems are like the one on what to do with water. If we can use. . . that is the beauty of the Continuing Committee, if we use it to make unnecessary agreement now on all details.
The President agreed.
Ambassador Linowitz said that Begin should like this—since it means that everything doesn’t have to be decided now.
The President said that even if Begin wants it, he won’t agree on it. He likes to run down a string of tedious points, to see what they can be traded for. Finally he gets to the point of making major concessions.
Ambassador Linowitz asked if he could introduce a sensitive point: when—and he would like to keep this open—he should break off and come home early, if he hits a roadblock. This would show that we are serious.
The President said that when Ambassador Linowitz asks him, he will say yes. In fact, Ambassador Linowitz will be more reluctant than he will be to have the Ambassador come home.
Ambassador Linowitz said he just wants authority to do it.
The President said he guesses that Egypt would pull out first.
Ambassador Linowitz said that if Israel is not forthcoming on security, then Egypt might pull out then. He will tell this to Begin.
The President said that maybe he should send a message to Sadat, and even do so early, so it will arrive by the time that the Ambassador gets there. He will ask that Sadat permit a few days for security to be discussed. Or he would ask that Sadat not pull his people out over security—this is better.
Ambassador Linowitz said that this is good; it will keep the talks going.
The President said he would tell Sadat that we have plans for making progress on schedule, not just for discussions. Before Sadat decides to withdraw, even under difficult circumstances, Sadat should consult with him (the President) first.
Ambassador Linowitz said that this is a great idea.
The President said that, where possible, the Ambassador should (in his approach) quote Camp David directly. Even if it is a matter of three words, this would be better.
Ambassador Linowitz said he knows. Begin is almost Biblical about it!
The President said almost.
[Page 1227]Ambassador Linowitz asked whether the President had anything he wanted conveyed to Begin.
The President said that the Ambassador should stress how extremely important it is that we succeed. He has confidence in Begin as a dedicated and generous leader, to get success. He (the President) had joked with Begin here about Begin’s flexibility, and had said this to ease the tensions.
Ambassador Linowitz said that Begin was talking about his international reputation for flexibility! (laughter)
The President said he thought Begin might do that!
Ambassador Linowitz said he knows what to convey.
Deputy Secretary Christopher said he had nothing to add, and would prepare a cable to Sadat.
The President asked Dr. Brzezinski and Mr. Hunter whether they had anything to add and they said they didn’t.
(The meeting ended at 12:27 p.m.)
- Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 37, Serial Xs—(4/15/80–4/30/80). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.↩
- Reference is to the April 24 Senior Level Meeting, printed as Document 361.↩
- See footnote 5, Document 357.↩
- In an April 16 interview on Israeli television, Weizman called for early elections in an attempt to unseat the Begin government. “Going to the people now,” he said, “in a situation of uncertainty on so many issues could restore public morale and help put the house in order.” (David K. Shipler, “Weizman, in Challenge to Begin, urges Early Vote,” The New York Times, April 17, 1980, p. A6)↩
- No memorandum of conversation for Linowitz’s meeting with Peres has been found. Peres met with Carter at the White House from 9:30 a.m. to 10:05 a.m. on April 24. On this meeting, Carter wrote in the published version of his diary: “I met alone with Shimon Peres, chairman of the Israeli Labor Party. He said he had asked Begin for approval of a meeting with King Hussein and Begin refused. Peres had [British Prime Minister] Jim Callaghan ask Hussein, ‘Would you be willing to negotiate with the Israelis on the basis either of a partition or shared responsibility for the West Bank for a period of time?’ Hussein’s response was yes. He proposed an informal meeting of the U.S. with the Saudis, Jordan, and Egypt re a resolution of the Mideast crisis, and then a report of the results to Israel. He repeated his belief that a Gaza-first arrangement would be preferable.” (Carter, White House Diary, p. 420)↩
- See footnote 10, Document 64.↩
- Weizman was in the United States to receive an honorary degree and for defense negotiations, having departed Israel on April 23. (Telegram 7444 from Tel Aviv, April 23; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800201-0894)↩
- April 29.↩
- Carter met with Weizman at the White House from 1:01 p.m. to 1:32 p.m. on April 29. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.↩
- See footnote 4 above.↩
- Reference is to a series of position papers, dated April 22–23, that were produced by Linowitz on the “most important issues we will face over the next few weeks:” East Jerusalem voting rights, land, water, security, jurisdiction over Israeli nationals, the size of the SGA, and the Continuing Committee. Each paper sets forth objectives and proposed draft language for the Heads of Agreement. The papers, forwarded to Brzezinski under an April 24 covering memorandum from Hunter, along with two Department of State papers on overall negotiating strategy and strategy for engaging the Palestinians, are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 79, Sensitive X: 4/80)↩