Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

356. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 9, 1980, 10:10–11:43 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of the President’s Third Meeting with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Vice President Walter F. Mondale
• Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Special Representative of the President
• Ambassador Roy Atherton, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt
• David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
• Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member (notetaker)
• His Excellency Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
• General Kamal Hasan Ali, Minister of Defense and War Production
• Dr. Butros Butros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
• Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States
• Mr. Osama el-Baz, First Under Secretary and Director of the Office of the Vice President

(From 10:10 a.m., the two Presidents met separately in the Oval Office.² The others—except for the Vice President and Dr. Brzezinski—met together in the Cabinet Room from 10:46 to 10:54, when the two Presidents joined them. The Vice President joined them at 10:57; and Dr. Brzezinski at 11:05).

Ambassador Linowitz began the meeting in the Cabinet Room by referring to the draft Egyptian paper on points of agreement (see attachment).³ First, he wanted to note that we hope that Israel can also agree to whatever is worked out here; therefore we should look at these issues with that factor in mind. Point one⁴ is ok. Point two⁵ is ok, but the word “tackled” should be changed to something else. On point three,⁶ there is a problem: there is a difference between listing powers and responsibilities to be transferred, and providing for transfer of authority. He thought we could skirt this by simply outlining the powers transferred. On point four,⁷ Israel objects to “legislative” authority. Begin says that the SGA can do what has to be done. He said to Begin that you can call what it does a regulation, a rule, a law, or whatever: but the SGA needs authority. Begin did not deny this point; but he is troubled by the idea of legislative authority that could lead to a Palestinian state. Begin wants to avoid that.

Mr. el-Baz said that Egypt had avoided the word in this point of the draft, but not the concept. They need something like this point for afterwards.

Secretary Vance asked Mr. el-Baz to clarify the word “afterwards.”

Mr. el-Baz said that this would be during the negotiations, but it formed a concept in a manner to give the SGA legislative authority. If a different term is used, that is all right; but the concept must be clear. Egypt will not abandon the concept. We can decide to take the Israeli argument into consideration, and defer the question of “legislative authority” now, but then talk about certain forms.

Ambassador Linowitz said that [he] was troubled by the question of “afterwards.” When would this be?

Mr. el-Baz said after the 27th of April.

Secretary Vance asked whether Mr. el-Baz were saying that on the 27th, in the intensive negotiations, the question should be faced regarding words about laws, legislation, etc.

Mr. el-Baz said: yes.

Ambassador Linowitz said that we are kidding ourselves if we think that we could get that from the Israelis.

Mr. el-Baz said that they will try.

Ambassador Linowitz said that he had tried to find words (in the U.S. draft⁸ yesterday) that would not create problems for Begin. This is a prickly subject, and will provoke a strong reaction. Without a categorical change in Begin, it will get a violent reaction on “law” or “legislative.” This approach is ill-advised. The Egyptians can get the authority (for the SGA) without the words.

Mr. el-Baz said that therefore on the 27th of April it can be discussed, accommodating on words. But he does not like many words to be ambiguous, since that would lead to further controversy. If they try accommodating, it is still necessary to know what is important. Can the SGA do these things or not. First there would be the principles (?); second is the right to amend existing statutes; and third, the details can come later.

Minister Butros Ghali said that if one accepted the U.S. paragraph four,⁹ in four weeks Israel will say that it won’t negotiate, that the words don’t require it. If the Egyptian fourth paragraph is accepted, then there can be talks.

Ambassador Linowitz said he did not object to the fourth Egyptian paragraph as such. At the negotiations, Egypt can put it forward and get Israel’s reaction. We are trying to tell the Egyptians what the Pavlovian reaction will be. If the words do not raise problems, then all right.

(At 10:54, the two Presidents joined the larger meeting in the Cabinet Room).

The President joked that he understands that all the technical work was being done in the Cabinet Room, and that the group was trying to undo his and President Sadat’s agreements! He thinks they should go over the paper we had presented and get the Egyptian response.

(The Vice President entered at this point).

President Sadat said that they had submitted another paper.

Secretary Vance said that Ambassador Linowitz sees no problem with the first paragraph. Paragraph two is ok, with a change in the word “tackled.” With paragraph three, there is a fundamental problem, which he will describe later. Paragraph four’s words are all right, but they hide a problem that will come up when the parties meet on the 27th. There is no reference to laws or legislative authority, but, when the parties meet on the 27th, the issue will be raised. Therefore there is a problem.

The President asked if this was a substitute paper.

Secretary Vance suggested that Ambassador Linowitz discuss that paper.

Ambassador Linowitz said that there are differences between us: whether all powers should be transferred, or the document should try to get around that point by listing the powers of the SGA. We are back to “transfer of authority.” We need not get into that issue, if the Heads of Agreement just list powers. It will not advance the discussion to go back to “transfer of authority.” On paragraph four, again: Israel will react to “legislative authority” and “laws,” if described as such under powers and responsibilities, as leading to authority for an independent Palestinian state. Therefore we framed our language to get around this problem. The Egyptian redraft is all right, but we must recognize that it does not remove the problem. It is all right now. On the rest of the paragraph. . . .

The President asked: paragraph 4?

Ambassador Linowitz said: the second part. We are trying to reflect the Israeli position. They are trying to keep defense and foreign affairs for themselves. There is no question that Israel will agree to the SGA’s having diplomatic or consular relations or armed forces. Maybe this formulation (in the Egyptian draft) is all right, but Israel will assert that defense is with them. What does “defense” mean: it is just of Israel or of the West Bank, too? Israel insists on the latter. Second, on foreign affairs and relations with other countries, these would not be exercised by the SGA. Israel demands the right to handle communications and other types of international relations matters. We have no quarrel with the Egyptian language, but there is a problem of ambiguity. Paragraph five¹⁰ is fine, but why did the Egyptians change our language? The Egyptian language is all right. On the language on “coordinating,” the powers will not be unilateral if they are coordinated. Implicit in the Egyptian language is a practical change that will not be acceptable. Israel will say that both have to agree. The next paragraph¹¹ focuses on what would happen if there is no agreement. Therefore, we said that existing arrangements would apply. Why has this been changed? The Egyptian draft does not deal with an important aspect of the problem. Also, this paragraph deals with coordination; not dispute settlement or whether the Continuing Committee has some agreed full powers. Most troubling, from our point of view, is that there is no alternative provided if there is no unanimity. There is a need for a way to go if there is no resolution of disagreements. We thought our proposal was good. Khalil understood it; Burg and Shamir accepted it tentatively, as providing for the continuation of the status quo. Our language¹² was even more precise. On the security committee,¹³ why change “agree to establish?” There is no security committee yet; or is this saying that that is implicit? “To examine security aspects” is all right. And we kept out references to 242, since it is clear in the Camp David Accords that they are under 242.

The President asked if we have an objection to including the reference to 242. Would it hurt?

Ambassador Linowitz said no.

Assistant Secretary Saunders said it would, since it gets into the question of Israeli withdrawal, and Israel may object.

The President said the inclusion of a reference to 242 caused him no problem.

Ambassador Linowitz said that the Egyptian paragraph 8¹⁴ is irrelevant. It may be good to urge this on Israel, but it has nothing to do with areas of agreement.

The President said that we could take the rest of the day to negotiate a draft. (To Secretary Vance: Cy will you sit down in the afternoon, with whomever President Sadat decides, and work this out,¹⁵ with brackets? I will try to do the best I can with the Israelis to get agreement on it). He does not want differences here, between President Sadat and himself, and to try guessing what the Israelis will accept. Let’s do this, and he will then be in touch with President Sadat (after seeing Begin) and seek a common approach.

Mr. el-Baz said that we will not need brackets.

The President said he agreed. With Osama redrafting, though, you never know! When he (the President) was in the Georgia legislature, he had been a slow learner, and found out that in a conference committee, it is better to be the secretary than the chairman. In a meeting of 20 people, he would rather be the secretary. Whoever does the first draft has the advantage. We will try to get agreement and, if not, there can be brackets. President Sadat and he will decide. Did Ambassador Linowitz have anything else?

Ambassador Linowitz mentioned East Jerusalem.

The President said that there are two basic proposals and it may be necessary to discuss them. First, some form of absentee ballotting; or second, delaying a decision by letting the Gaza and West Bank mayors, who are elected, select or appoint the SGA. He strongly prefers the first alternative. If we remove direct elections, this would modify a part of the Camp David Accords, and that might open the door for both sides to modify other parts. He expects that Begin will refuse (to move) on East Jerusalem. This is an untenable position. We will stand firmly and publicly on this. It is an important issue, and it needs to be addressed. Would Ambassador Linowitz like to comment?

Ambassador Linowitz replied: no.

The President said he feels that if Begin is intrasigent on voting rights for the residents of East Jerusalem, he (the President) will push hard and publicly. Instead of letting the SGA breakdown, we could establish it from the mayors. His opinion is that Israel would prefer not to have the SGA set up, since that means the automatic requirement to withdraw the Israeli military government and the civilian administration. A profound change is required, with no delay, to withdraw armed forces, and to assign the rest to specified security locations. Among ourselves, we should be more flexible on what the SGA is, in order to get it set up. When it is established, even without some things, this will be a major development, leading to a step by step increase in the authority and stature of the SGA.

(Dr. Brzezinski entered at 11:05).

Would Ambassador Linowitz like to comment?

Ambassador Linowitz said he wanted to add a footnote. There are two things this skeleton agreement would let happen, in signalling to the Palestinians—as the Egyptians say is their view: first, the military government would be withdrawn, with great consequences. The SGA makes this possible. Second, the Palestinians, as of right, would be at the table, at the Continuing Committee where they can vote on issues they must negotiate. This should be of great significance to the Palestinians in terms of unresolved issues like water, economic relations, and maybe land. If the SGA gets set up, there would be the withdrawal of the military government. This can be viewed by Israel as some departure. If so, they (?) should be ready for it.

Minister Butros Ghali said that unless the SGA has the minimum authority needed, the Palestinians will not come in. Therefore, we should try to show them they will be given a maximum number of powers. If they do not see flexibility, he knows they will not take part, and there would be no Palestinian participation.

The President said we will work for maximum authority. What steps will induce representatives of the West Bank and Gaza, plus Hussein, to join the negotiations?

Minister Butros Ghali said that they (the Egyptians) had sent a note on confidence-building measures.

The President said that was before; what process can be done now to induce their involvement—without involving Begin or the Israelis in the effort?

Minister Butros Ghali said that that was a big qualification.

The President said he knows. He guesses that Begin does not want them to join.

Mr. el-Baz said that the Palestinians want a settlements freeze and a U.S. commitment to what is at the end of the tunnel, nearing self-determination, and the liquidation of Israeli occupation. First, it should be cut down; later it should be liquidated. There must be some real movement on the ground, or a U.S. presence or forces in the area.

The President asked what the last idea meant.

Mr. el-Baz said that Hikmat el-Mazri said that maybe the U.S. could substitute for Israel in the transition period.

The President said he sees.

Mr. el-Baz said that this would be difficult. If we emphasize confidence-building measures, and if we do not get Begin to agree on a settlements freeze or an attractive definition of powers and responsibilities for the SGA, he would like something like the President’s speech¹⁶ of last night (at the White House dinner). If this were repeated, it would be useful. The Palestinians attach importance to the U.S. position; they rely only on the U.S. and on Egypt. Others, like the Arab states, are unreliable.

The President said he would make the same speech to Begin, and underline the principles from Camp David. He needs to repeat his toast almost verbatim, for the benefit of U.S. supporters of Israel, and others. Second, Camp David could be carried out quickly, if the West Bank mayors, others, and Hussein would join the discussions. Absent some action by Begin and the Israelis, what can we do to get Hussein and the Palestinians to join? Should someone contact the Saudis, Arafat, or Hussein? They are playing into the hands of the enemies of Camp David. The whole world would rally to an Israeli withdrawal, and Palestinian rights would have a good chance to succeed if the Palestinians and Jordan were in. He understands why they are not. But where is the key to get them in?

Mr. el-Baz said that the Jordanian and Palestinian positions are different. Jordan and Hussein have their eyes on the West Bank, and would like to move to negotiations with Israel on the lines of the Allon plan.¹⁷ There could be some Israeli-Jordanian talks, perhaps non-governmental, or with Peres or others.

The President said that this is required to be done by Camp David in the second step, which could take place after a few months, and must begin no later than three years. If the Saudis were convinced that Jordan should be in, could the Saudis induce it to do so?

President Sadat said 100%. If only to guarantee their economic assistance, Jordan would immediately come in.

The President asked whether Saudi Arabia could convince Arafat and the West Bank Palestinians.

President Sadat said no, the Saudis are intimidated by them. But they (the Saudis) could bring in Hussein.

The President asked how we could bring in the Palestinians.

President Sadat said that if Hussein joins, then for sure there would be repercussions on the PLO position. They may say that Hussein has joined the Zionist plot, but in their hearts they would try to do their best. They know Hussein; they would not want him to take all the land himself.

The President asked whether Hussein, on balance, was more afraid of Syria and Iraq, or interested in pleasing the Saudis.

President Sadat said both. If Saudi Arabia backs him, he will come in, whatever the threats are from Syria and Iraq—and we should see what is happening in Syria. Saudi Arabia for sure can bring him in. Therefore, this would affect the Palestinian position, since they fear that Hussein wants a united kingdom.

The President asked if that included part of the West Bank.

President Sadat said yes.

The President said that Hussein wants others to do the negotiating.

Mr. el-Baz said that Hussein would not be blamed for anything; he believes it will fall into his lap, sooner or later. He would take the credit, but not the blame.

Ambassador Linowitz said that the Palestinians should join the process. They have no alternative for a better life; and they will get more at the table than absent from it. First, he can see them holding off, expecting a magic formula or a better turn of events after May 26. We should discourage the notion that they would get a better deal later. Second, if they stay away, someone else will speak for them. Israel will say that no matter what Egypt says, when the Palestinians get in they will press for more. Therefore, Israel will hold back: why give anything now, they will say, if they will be pressed for more later. The Palestinians can get the best deal now.

Mr. el-Baz questioned whether the fact of sitting down at the table were an important element. Is it an inducement? Egyptian contacts say this is not so, that it is not a big advance. The first liability is in the Palestinians’ talking with the Israelis without equilibrium, since Israel is in control. Therefore, there is no equilibrium. This could work if the Israelis had said that they would withdraw completely. Without that—either a commitment that Israel would withdraw completely or under some other shield for their fears—i.e. of Israeli de facto control—then the outcome to the negotiations would either be the status quo or occupation. Without a commitment to withdraw there should be the shield of the U.S. position, to show that the Palestinians are not left to the mercy of the Israelis at the table.

Ambassador Linowitz said the Palestinians should welcome the Continuing Committee.

Mr. el-Baz said that they need to know the joint Egyptian-American concept of foreign affairs, with limited exceptions. First, they want a U.S. commitment to self-determination.

Ambassador Linowitz said he had told Crown Prince Fahd that the Palestinians have three courses open to them: to stay as they are now; to resort to force; or to pursue the path of the autonomy negotiations. What else is there?

Mr. el-Baz said that they see two other approaches.

Ambassador Linowitz asked what they were.

Mr. el-Baz said that could combine a UN resolution and some form of international conference, with people like Kreisky and others. The fact is that that would be a multilateral approach, not just with two or three countries. They think others should be involved, including the West Europeans, and self-determination should be included. These developments the Palestinians believe should be done now. Such alternatives seem more promising to them.

Ambassador Linowitz asked how. Would they try to seize the West Bank and Gaza?

Mr. el-Baz said that if there were negotiations under a different umbrella . . . Israel is there, but there could be another 242, and add a resolution on self-determination. They could try to get the Soviet Union and the socialists in. The Palestinians believe objective factors would lead to a different outcome.

Ambassador Linowitz asked whether Mr. el-Baz believed it in that approach.

Mr. el-Baz said he believed it was wrong, or Egypt would be pursuing it. They honestly tell the Palestinians their view. The Palestinians feel there are other options. Second, if the Israeli government doesn’t give anything—and the Palestinians hear this from former Cabinet members and Kreisky and others, they believe there is a disincentive to join Camp David. They wait until Israel changes; they wait for another government.

Secretary Vance asked if the “they” was the predominate Palestinian element, or just some of them.

Mr. el-Baz said that this is hard to measure. But it is the prevailing view among many PLO members and on the West Bank and Gaza. They see the best alternative as waiting, and maybe to get a better deal.

The President said that the Palestinians would get a pretty good deal in Camp David.

Mr. el-Baz said he believes therefore that we should try to strengthen it. This would be the key work to attract the Palestinians.

Assistant Secretary Saunders said we don’t know what the Israeli Labor Party would say about a better deal or a territorial deal. Therefore the issue is confused in Palestinian minds.

Dr. Brzezinski said that when the Palestinians see the map, it will not be a better deal.

Assistant Secretary Saunders agreed: since it is not concrete, the Palestinians don’t see this.

Ambassador Linowitz said that this approach was a disservice.

Mr. el-Baz agreed.

Ambassador Linowitz asked Mr. el-Baz to say more.

Mr. el-Baz said that if we could get a good agreement, this would reassure the Palestinians about their fears of the Israelis. The Palestinians are very pragmatic. It is in their self-interest to cooperate in gaining a better life. Therefore, they need something attractive that we can defend. This is our best argument. Lots of Europeans have been in contact with the Palestinians. With Begin’s intransigence, these factors lead to a negative attitude of wait and see.

The President said that there is another aspect which might prevail, though he hopes not. This is that the Israelis, with the support and cooperation of Egypt and the U.S., might believe they can stay where they are, and blame the entire failure of Camp David on the failure of the Palestinians to take part. We need to do two things: to move forward with Israel, and to get points more clearly defined. Second, we should do all that is possible—with President Sadat’s, Sol’s, and his influence, and to try to get Jordan—at least—and some Palestinians in the talks. Is this hopeless? We should pursue it more. And we should get a clearer picture of what is acceptable to the Palestinians. This is not a final solution, but they should join the discussions. This would put Israel on the defensive. Everyone is concerned—Israel, Jews everywhere, the United States—that Western Europe is severing itself from Israel. This is a major concern to Israeli leaders, except for Begin. If it were obvious that Jordan and the Palestinians and the U.S. and Egypt were all trying to work out an agreement on Palestinian aspirations, and gaining them a voice in their future, this would be very helpful. He thinks we have to go forward. Would President Sadat designate someone to work on the draft?

President Sadat named Minister Butros Ghali and Mr. el-Baz.

The President asked whether they had agreed on a communique.

Secretary Vance said yes, but it had been referred for Israeli agreement. The Israelis had not yet responded. We had gone this morning to ask if it is all right to put it out.

The President said that if the Israelis don’t agree, then delete the reference to the continuing negotiations. He asked if they would be meeting with the press when they left.¹⁸

Mr. Hunter said yes.

The President asked whether the communique could be released later.¹⁹

Minister Butros Ghali agreed.

(The meeting continued with conversation within the two delegations from 11:37–11:42,²⁰ and the meeting adjourned at 11:43).

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—(2/1/80–4/15/80). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room.
2. See Document 355.
3. The draft Egyptian paper is attached but not printed.
4. The text of point one in the Egyptian paper reads: “The objective will be to give new momentum to the peace process through the completion of a Heads of Agreement document by May 26, as another step towards a comprehensive peace settlement.”
5. The text of point two in the Egyptian paper reads: “The Heads of Agreement document will, to the maximum extent, incorporate basic understanding on issues. Details will be tackled subsequently with a sense of urgency.”
6. The text of point three in the Egyptian paper reads: “The Heads of Agreement document will provide for the transfer of authority to the SGA. Accordingly, a list will be drawn of the areas which fall under the jurisdiction of the SGA.”

7. The text of point four in the Egyptian paper reads: “The SGA will have all powers which are necessary for the discharge of its responsibilities.

   “The SGA will not have the power to alter the terms of the Heads of Agreement. Nor will it have the power of conducting diplomatic or consular affairs or establishing armed forces during the transitional period.”

8. See footnote 3, Document 354.
9. The text of paragraph four of the U.S. paper reads: “Within its specified areas of responsibility, the SGA (AC) will have all necessary and proper powers including the power to issue proclamations, decrees, regulations, or orders which may alter existing statutes. The SGA (AC) will not have the power to alter the terms of the Heads of Agreement and its Annexes.” See footnote 7 above.
10. The text of point five of the Egyptian paper reads: “The document will stipulate that the SGA will exercise its powers in such a way as to promote good neighborly relations between the West Bank and Gaza and all their neighbors, including Israel. To this end, coordinating arrangements will be made.”
11. The text of point six of the Egyptian paper reads: “It is agreed that certain areas that require coordination between the SGA and Israel will be referred to the Continuing Committee provided for in the Camp David Accords and consisting of Egypt, Israel, the United States, SGA, and Jordan. The Continuing Committee will operate on the basis of unanimity.”
12. The U.S. version reads: “It is agreed that certain areas, such as water and external economic relations, cannot be negotiated in detail without the participation of the inhabitants of the territories. Accordingly, such areas will be left for detailed negotiations under the aegis of the Continuing Committee provided for in the Camp David Accords and consisting of Egypt, Israel, SGA (AC), and Jordan, with the addition of the United States. The Continuing Committee will operate on the basis of unanimity. Pending agreement on a particular issue, existing arrangements shall continue under the aegis of the Continuing Committee.”
13. Reference is to point seven of the Egyptian paper. The text reads: “A Security Committee will meet during this month to examine security aspects related to the Camp David Framework and Security Council Resolution 242.” On this subject, the U.S. text reads: “The parties agree to establish a Security Committee to consider how to implement security aspects in accordance with the Camp David Accords.”
14. The text of point eight of the Egyptian paper reads: “Confidence-building measures in the West Bank and Gaza prior to the establishment of the SGA will be discussed with a view to creating a favorable atmosphere for the implementation of the agreement.”
15. Linowitz met with Boutros Ghali and El-Baz the afternoon of April 9, from which a new draft working paper was produced. In an April 10 memorandum to Carter, to which he attached a copy of the paper, Linowitz described the new draft as “considerably weaker than we had ourselves proposed” due to “continuing problems which will need to be resolved during the negotiations.” He listed these problems as the Egyptian assertion “(with few exceptions) that there must be a transfer of full authority from Israel’s Military Government and Civilian Administration to the SGA;” renewed Egyptian objection to “the notion that existing arrangements should continue if the Continuing Committee is unable to agree with respect to a particular issue;” whether “Residual Powers” would reside with the Israelis or the Continuing Committee; and the handling of Defense and Security issues beyond the creation of a Security Committee. Linowitz suggested that Carter use the paper in the upcoming meetings with Begin. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 11, Egypt: 1980)
16. The text of Carter’s speech, delivered in the White House State Dining Room at 8:07 p.m. on April 8, is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 617–620.
17. See footnote 10, Document 64.
18. The text of the remarks made by Carter and Sadat to the press on the South Grounds of the White House beginning at 11:45 a.m., April 9, is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, Book I, pp. 622–623.
19. The communiqué of the talks, released by the White House on April 9, is printed in Public Papers: Carter, 1980–81, pp. 623–624.
20. No memorandum of conversation for this portion of the meeting has been found.