Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

354. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 8, 1980, 3:04–4:18 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of the President’s Second Meeting with Egyptian President Anwar al-Sadat

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Vice President Walter F. Mondale
• Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Ambassador Sol Linowitz, Special Representative of the President
• Ambassador Roy Atherton, U.S. Ambassador to Egypt
• David Aaron, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Harold Saunders, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
• Robert Hunter, NSC Staff Member (notetaker)
• His Excellency Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, President of the Arab Republic of Egypt
• General Kamal Hasan Ali, Minister of Defense and War Production
• Dr. Butros Butros Ghali, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
• Ambassador Ashraf Ghorbal, Egyptian Ambassador to the United States
• Mr. Osama el-Baz, First Under Secretary and Director of the Office of the Vice President

The President began by suggesting that this afternoon² they talk about the procedural approach to be followed until the end of May. He believes it useful to get a sense of the key differences there are between Egypt and Israel. He would like to do what they did at Camp David and during his Middle East trip: to reach agreement with President Sadat, with flexibility, and then deal with Begin on that basis. Not everything can be agreed by May 26. We should proceed, as Ambassador Linowitz and Prime Minister Khalil had worked out, to hold continuing negotiations, preferably here. President Sadat can designate whom he wants—Burg would be here for the Israelis—because he understands that Prime Minister Khalil might not be able to be here all the time. That would give us only a month to iron out as many difficulties as possible. Ambassador Linowitz had suggested working out “heads of agreement,” and Khalil and Burg had agreed. This would be agreement on principles, and on specifics. Some of the details could be left until later. (President Sadat said fine.) It would not be possible to get Israeli and Egyptian agreement on all points by then, and since the Palestinians are not in the talks, and on some issues they are needed for agreement, this could be done with their elected representatives or with the mayors. We can negotiate for a month, and then the heads of agreement can incorporate what is agreed by May 26. Second, there should be definition of the specific responsibilities and authority of the SGA. We do not know how large it would be. Egypt prefers having it fairly sizable; Begin wants about a dozen members. One possibility would be to have the mayors on an interim SGA. For the Palestinians, this would give them a voice—either personally or chosen. We have not discussed this possibility with Begin, and do not know his view.

The SGA should have the right to issue proclamations, and to modify existing statutes, but not change the terms of the heads of agreement. It would have no right to change agreements reached between him, President Sadat, and Prime Minister Begin. The Continuing Committee would include representatives of the SGA, Egypt, the U.S. (if Begin agrees), Israel, and Jordan (if and when it will join—he doesn’t know when). We also need to specify that the SGA can act in ways to promote harmony with others. Its relations with us are secondary: what Egypt and the SGA agree to is all right with us. We need, President Sadat and him, to reach an understanding on external defense and foreign affairs. He sees no reason that the SGA should have any. There is no need to specify that any one has control of foreign affairs. The SGA is not a nation, and has no foreign policy to define. Israel prefers to have control over foreign affairs. He prefers just to say that the SGA does not have it.

Once this group is inaugurated—which he believes is the term from Camp David—then the Israeli military authority would be withdrawn, the civilian government would be disbanded, and Israeli forces would go to specified locations. We have discussed that this should be on the periphery of the West Bank. We can presume that this would take care of external defense. He does not want the SGA to have tanks, howitzers, or heavy weapons. Israel would continue to have these for the West Bank.

Difficult issues remain—e.g. public lands, water development, and the number and kind of refugees who could go back to the territories. This is a very important issue (the refugees), and could be decided by the Continuing Committee. Some were specified in the Camp David Accords, and in a number of 1967 refugees’ going back. This committee could turn over an agreement—say in August—to the SGA, as with water rights, and it would then in turn be the responsibility of the SGA to administer the agreement. On another point, the security committee: He prefers that it be headed by General Ali and Minister Weizman. So far, when various issues come up, Israel says that they are security issues. It uses this argument to delay decisions that are not related to security. There is a difficult line to be drawn here. There are genuine defense needs and the control of terrorism. Israel requires some role in anti-terrorism. As to where to draw the line, we need negotiations. Camp David calls for strong police forces—the word “strong” was put in particularly—and they need to deal with Egypt, Israel, and Jordan. He would like to see, over time, the role of the police increase. As it proved itself to be effective against terrorist acts, it would play a useful role.

He has written down, for President Sadat’s study overnight, these various points.³ They reflect his best judgment. Sol Linowitz understands that these points are what he and Khalil worked out. He (the President) modified them to take into account some points made by the Egyptians this morning.

(At that point, copies were passed—see attachment—and the Egyptians read them from 3:16–3:19).

The President said that one Iranian diplomat, scheduled to be deported, has had a nervous breakdown, and wants to stay in the hospital for 24 hours.

The Vice President said that he was fired last night by the Iranians, and fears for his life.

The President said he doesn’t doubt it, but he can go to a third country.

Assistant Secretary Saunders said that the diplomat had been our bet as the best man to handle the transition.

The President said he would not go to the American people and make excuses about a diplomat’s not leaving. He can stay in the hospital for 24 hours, under custody.

President Sadat said that he would be pleased to offer this man asylum in Egypt. Any Iranian could come, openly before the whole world. They have recently taken two Iranian military officers.

The President said that 9000 Iranians have entered the country since the hostages were taken; and we have a total of about 70,000 Iranian students here. He asked Osama el-Baz whether the points in the paper suited him.

Mr. el-Baz joked that anything the President presents is acceptable!

President Sadat said that he and his team would chat together this evening.

The President said that on another issue, we may have problems with Begin on anything agreed here. (President Sadat said right). First, on the U.S.’ being a member of the Continuing Committee, he doesn’t know why, but often Begin would hold out on something like this as a bargaining point. That’s his privilege.

Mr. el-Baz said that this can be seen in the context of the United States’s being a full partner under Camp David. Therefore it can join any committee.

Ambassador Linowitz asked whether this means that, if Israel objects, the U.S. could still be a “full partner” on the Continuing Committee.

Mr. el-Baz said that this is not the point: “full partner” means that the U.S. can join all committee.

Ambassador Linowitz asked whether we can make the Camp David distinction as a “full partner”, but not as a “party.”

President Sadat said yes.

The President asked what the difference was.

Assistant Secretary Saunders said that it would affect the principle of unanimity on the Continuing Committee.

The President said he sees. As he understands it, Egypt has no objection to U.S. membership. If Begin objects to there being a U.S. role with a veto, then it is up to us and the Israelis to agree.

Ambassador Linowitz said that if we can agree on “full partner” with Egypt, then the U.S. has flexibility.

President Sadat said that Egypt insists that the U.S. continue to be a full partner.

The President said that at Camp David, the U.S. was not included in the Continuing Committee. There was an argument at Camp David on refugees that related to this point, and it was decided that Israel and the SGA had to agree on refugees. A separate part of Camp David lists the major role the Palestinians can play. The Continuing Committee is powerful. It can continue what we are doing now, with the Palestinians and Jordanians involved.

President Sadat said right.

The President said it would be new if we were in the Continuing Committee, since that hadn’t been agreed at Camp David.

President Sadat said yes. If there is no U.S. presence as a full partner, he would do nothing.

The President joked that he would turn over the whole problem to President Sadat (laughter).

President Sadat said he had said at Camp David that 90% of the cards are in the U.S.’ hands.

The President joked that he would turn it over to President Sadat and King Hussein. (laughter)

President Sadat said he wants Hussein to take over responsibility for the West Bank (the President agreed). If we succeed here, then Hussein will come in.

The President said that the Continuing Committee should have some full powers—e.g. on deciding when to start the negotiations on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. They have to start by the third year, but can start earlier. If there are differences between Israel and the SGA, or between Israel and Egypt, the Continuing Committee would be the forum, sort of like a supreme court. It can also coordinate, and keep things moving forward.

President Sadat said that Israel tries to exclude the U.S.—as it tried to do with the treaty negotiating.

The President said they tried it at Camp David, as well!

President Sadat said that he believes Begin will not insist on this now. The U.S. has proved itself as an arbiter between the two sides. It is very vital that the U.S. be in.

The President said we are willing.

President Sadat said that the Israelis should not want the Soviet Union to be happy, in saying that the U.S. was excluded!

Ambassador Linowitz asked if he understood correctly: if we continue as a full partner on the Continuing Committee, and under the Camp David Accords, is this agreeable to Egypt?

President Sadat said full partner. . . . There had been two turning points. With the first Disengagement Agreement,⁴ after the October war, there were hot feelings and emotions. It was a deadlock. The first Disengagement Agreement was a U.S. paper submitted after the deadlock. Also at Camp David, without President Carter and the U.S., Begin would not have signed. We will face this in the future. The fact is that the U.S. is a full partner.

The President said he wants to know what President Sadat envisions if we go for Gaza-first. How can we negotiate on one part of the territories only? He can’t see it. Does President Sadat see implementing Gaza first?

President Sadat said he had talked candidly with Begin about this at Aswan. Begin was silent. He (President Sadat) had said, let us agree about Gaza and the West Bank first; but he (President Sadat) would have nothing to do with the West Bank, let us start with Gaza first. He said to Begin: “Do you hear?” And Begin replied: “I hear with three ears,” which meant he felt it in his heart, as well. He (Begin) had asked the same question—do you mean agreeing on Gaza only? Does this mean postponing the West Bank? He (President Sadat) had said no. He (Begin) said in Cairo, that we could start with Gaza after agreeing on the West Bank and Gaza together. He (Begin) declared himself. He (President Sadat) proposed to help him (Begin) with problems of the West Bank. Also, why should they keep Hussein as an outsider?

The President commented that Hussein is throwing rocks.

President Sadat said that when he first proposed this idea to Begin, Begin refused immediately. Then after six months, all the Israelis—including Begin—said that this was a happy solution. There is no threat to Israel from Gaza. On the West Bank, even Israeli editors said that they had misunderstood him (President Sadat). Now they see this as a most happy solution—all the factions in Israel do. At Aswan, he had tried to ease matters for Begin, who heard with three ears, to go to the Cabinet. There was no answer. We need to get his (Begin’s) answer.

The President asked, if the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza want to go together on implementation, is this President Sadat’s first choice?

President Sadat said he would not advise it. There are difficulties on the West Bank: the PLO, Jordan, and the Israelis all maneuver against one another on the West Bank. He does not want to let King Hussein as an outsider upset our work. We should reach agreement, and say we will start implementing it in Gaza. Then the three of us can ask Hussein to resume his responsibilities for the West Bank as Egypt would be doing in Gaza. We could leave it for one or two years, to buy time, then the West Bank would come along.

General Ali said that he last met with the Israelis a month ago, with military authorities, with Palestinian leaders. He asked whether Egypt and the Gazans should apply the SGA in Gaza first. They are ready to start. They are ready.

The President said he has no evidence to contradict this view, but is less sure that the Gazans would be willing, without agreement by the PLO, Arafat, and Hussein.

President Sadat said that he agrees; he does not trust any of them. But if we have a model, he will impose it. Let us get a model in Gaza (and the West Bank?)—for there is no alternative—and Egypt will apply it to Gaza; he will find local mayors to do so.

The President asked if this is not acceptable to them, how will President Sadat impose it.

President Sadat said that Begin should simply have given full autonomy after the Camp David Accords were signed, then said to the Palestinians, when you are ready to sit with us, you can govern yourselves. If they are ready, they can discuss all that is in Camp David. Anyway, we will win, even if they refuse. Time is on our side.

The President asked whether Begin had taken the Gaza-first idea to the Cabinet.

Ambassador Linowitz said Begin is worried that Gaza-first would be a precedent for the West Bank. He thinks that maybe President Sadat means by “impose” that Israel will transfer authority, and let the Gazans pick it up or not. There is a question in Begin’s mind: since there are more difficulties on the West Bank, if there is full agreement on Gaza, and some progress on the West Bank, will we move forward with Gaza-first before finishing on the West Bank?

President Sadat said that he will think of it. This is a breakthrough. It is a subtle idea. Maybe we will be forced to it. He would prefer agreement about both sides, then implementing Gaza first. The West Bank is a quagmire for Hussein, the PLO, and the Israelis.

The President said there is no water rights problem in Gaza. What may happen is that we will set up the SGA in Gaza, and the Camp David Accords say the Israelis withdraw. Therefore Begin does not want to go forward in Gaza, so that he will not have to go forward with the process on the military side. Did this come up in Cabinet, or get discussed?

Ambassador Linowitz said no.

Secretary Vance said that there was some discussion at the end of the Egypt-Israel treaty negotiations. It went to the Cabinet, which voted no, so it was not put in the (joint) letter.

The President said the first he had heard the idea was on the phone after Camp David with President Sadat.⁵

President Sadat said that he heard from Weizman—who is agreeable. Also the Israeli editors saw it as a happy solution.

The President said that we should pursue it as an alternative option. It sounds good, to avoid a breakdown. It may be acceptable to Israeli public opinion.

President Sadat agreed.

The President said that he hears that some Israeli military commanders have turned over some responsibilities, with no publicity.

General Ali said that some Cairo officials were there too, dealing with pupils, students, and passports.

Minister Butros Ghali said that this was not implemented.

President Sadat said the Gazans are against it.

General Ali said it was in his last report.

Minister Butros Ghali (disputing that report) said that the Gazans were still delaying.

President Sadat said they were resisting it.

The President said that some Israeli military commanders, without publicity, were turning over some powers: e.g. some police functions and schools.

Secretary Vance said Moshe (Dayan) had told us.

Ambassador Linowitz said that Mayor Shawaa confirmed this, and also discussed Gaza first.

President Sadat asked what the answer was.

Ambassador Linowitz said at first there was no interest. Then Shawaa indicated that this might be possible if we had not finished the West Bank. He said that this would have to mean there were not much time lapsing, however.

President Sadat said he had no confidence in Mayor Shawaa anymore. Shawaa had sent many messages; but at the last moment the Gazans were intimidated by the PLO. And it would not be a short-time lapse: we must bring in Hussein.

The President asked Mr. el-Baz whether Arafat would permit a quiet takeover of responsibilities by the Palestinians under Gaza-first.

Mr. el-Baz said yes, some jurisdictions could be given to the Palestinians, but not as a long-term solution. For the transition period itself, the PLO would require it to be for the West Bank and Gaza.

The President asked what if it were done one community at a time, on a selective basis. Perhaps Hebron would say yes, and Bethlehem would say no. Would this approach be supported? They could be responsible for maybe 15–20 things, like schools, roads, police.

Mr. el-Baz said the mayors have no courage.

The President asked about Arafat’s position.

Mr. el-Baz said he thought the answer would be no.

President Sadat said that Shawaa said in messages that Arafat had given the green light; then he denied it. We need to do this boldly, as Camp David and the peace treaty were done. Look at the problems of normalization and exchange of ambassadors. Now there is an Israeli flag flying in Cairo, and an Israeli Ambassador—who has not been boycotted. But he is unfit, doesn’t know Arabic or the Arab mentality. He is Polish.

The Vice President asked if the Ambassador came from Poland.

President Sadat joked that he was, along with Dr. Brzezinski and Begin.

The President joked that he knows the trouble he has with all of them (laughter).

President Sadat said the Pope, too!

The President said he is asking about the Palestinians: will they accept responsibility? Will they accept anything?

Mr. el-Baz said that, in general, if there were a genuine transfer of authority, it would be all right, on a de facto but not de jure basis. Let the mayors do it. They will give the green light, while still cursing it and the U.S.

Secretary Vance asked whether the Palestinians would accept the SGA, or the mayors take the responsibility.

Mr. el-Baz said that they would accept the SGA.

The President asked whether they would prefer the SGA or the mayors.

Mr. el-Baz said that they would prefer an SGA leading to an entity. Doing it through the mayors implies fractionating and no entity.

The President said that if we can agree on 40 representatives for the West Bank, a date for elections, and voting for residents of East Jerusalem, would the PLO encourage Palestinians to participate in the election?

Mr. el-Baz said that de facto, yes.

The President asked whether the word would get out.

Mr. el-Baz said yes. Hikmat el-Mazri saw Arafat, and got this point.

President Sadat said that Hikmat el-Mazri had at one time been speaker of the Jordanian parliament.

The President said that there is a problem with Begin in East Jerusalem on voting. Ambassador Linowitz told him (Begin) that they had the right to vote in Jordanian elections. Begin was surprised, and checked to see whether it was accurate. It is illogical for them to be able to vote in Jordan and not in the West Bank. This is a difficult issue.

Ambassador Linowitz said they had only touched on settlements. Begin agonizes about this—even two months of a moratorium is a lot, and he (Begin) rejected his (the Ambassador’s) appeal.

The President asked whether there was more to discuss on Begin.

President Sadat said no.

The President joked that Osama (el-Baz) has really mellowed!

Mr. el-Baz joked that he (the President) should wait until the drafting!

Minister Butros Ghali joked that it is age!

The President joked that he (el-Baz) always agreed with him in general but not in the drafting! He continued that Camp David was a miracle. He talked with Mrs. Carter at noon—and said look at what has been done; it is a miracle. He asked whether President Sadat is running water under the Suez Canal for the Sinai.

President Sadat said it would be done this month, but only opened in October.

The President asked if this tunnel is for traffic.

President Sadat said yes, and room for a pipeline. He had a feasibility plan to send water from the Nile done by Bechtel. The water will be for Ma’adi in the Eastern Desert, and for Suez. The tunnel is near Suez. A man from Bechtel visited him recently, and is doing a feasibility study, for free.

The President asked whether they needed water on the Cairo side.

President Sadat said yes, that they have lots of land in Sinai—and need water for agriculture and drinking, and for use inside.

The President asked whether there were any difficulties in turning over Sinai on time. Did they get good cooperation?

President Sadat said yes, the treaty was implemented very scrupulously. Obligations were honored. Mt. Sinai was turned over early.⁶

General Ali joked that everything had been painted.

President Sadat said that the Israelis used to plow before turning over. Now all was in good condition.

The President asked whether the settlers were still in Sinai.

President Sadat said that they were. The land had not yet been turned over.

The President asked whether they would stay until the end.

President Sadat said the fear of the Israeli government is that public opinion will be shocked the day they turn over Amit, the largest settlement, on the sea. But we have to face it.

The President said it was agreed.

General Ali said that the Israelis were doing two new settlements nearby in Israel. The reason that Weizman did not want to advance the withdrawal is that he was worried that the U.S. would not finish the air bases on time, and that the Amit people would wait until the end. These are problems.

President Sadat said that in the settlements near Arish, they burned everything.

The President asked whether the Egyptians had oceanographers working near Sharm-el-Sheikh.

President Sadat said they had them at Ras Mohammed. They are able scientists; but they had not had an opportunity to act.

The President asked whether President Sadat had instructed the oceanographers to maintain the environment.

President Sadat said he had given strict orders.

The President suggested that General Ali could check. Some scientists are concerned that there is damage.

President Sadat said he has asked a lady U.S. doctor to come to join him in April in Ras Mohammed. (He instructed General Ali to contact the governor).

The President said this would not happen by itself; hotels, for example, dump into the water. President Sadat may not know about it until too late.

Ambassador Linowitz asked President Sadat, as a philosopher, why Begin had been helpful on the peace treaty, but was harder now on full autonomy.

The President said he didn’t remember Begin’s being helpful before!

President Sadat said that before Camp David, he felt they would reach nothing. There was a heavy campaign by each side against the other. He had an inner confidence that was tactical, not strategic. Now Begin gives nothing, because of what he has lived for the last 40 years: the West Bank. A mutual friend of theirs heard that Begin wants the West Bank. This raises difficulties. In history, Begin wants to go down as the man who made peace with Egypt, which has been important since Moses. Until Begin visits here, and the President hears him, then he (President Sadat) can’t give his idea about the whole thing. He knows that Begin doesn’t want to act in the West Bank as he did in Sinai, for ideological reasons. He (President Sadat) sent Begin a letter,⁷ saying that if Begin stayed in the middle of the road, then the person after him would take the whole credit: for both the comprehensive peace and the treaty with Egypt. He (President Sadat) will not make up his mind until Begin meets here with the President.

The President said that the hardest for Begin of all was dismantling the settlements in the Sinai. He (the President) does not believe Begin will give East Jerusalem to the Arabs, so it will need to stay unified. Except for Jerusalem, Sinai was the worst problem; it was torture for Begin on the settlements.

Dr. Brzezinski said that at Camp David he had referred to the settlements as colonial. Begin had asked him to go for a private walk, and had upbraided him for using that word. Begin said that his right eye would fall out, and his right arm would fall off, before he would agree to give up the Sinai settlements. But 10 days later he did.

President Sadat said Begin told him the Sinai settlements would go with him (Begin) to the grave.

The President said that Begin had had a good reception at those settlements.

Assistant Secretary Saunders said that the problem of the West Bank settlements was worse.

President Sadat said that if he could solve the Jerusalem problem, he insists. . . . There should be public opinion here and in the whole world; why should Israel put the U.S. in such a position with 800 million Moslems? He tells Israelis, how many of you are there, 16 million? Why not take U.S. interests into account in the Muslim world? When Begin agrees on Jerusalem, then he (President Sadat) will give water.

The President said that they negotiated a paragraph at Camp David on Jerusalem. It is the most likely basis for agreement. No one will like it; but people will live with it. The next difficulty is getting Begin to carry out Camp David (not new proposals). There are many difficulties. The day Begin gives the order to the military authorities to withdraw will be tough for him (Begin).

President Sadat said he knows. January 25, the last withdrawal, was a funeral in Israel. 90% of the people are for peace, as he saw in Haifa. But Israel says: “what did we receive.” Compare what Israel gives up: it is tangible, a lot. But if Camp David fails, Israel loses, and its future would be in danger. If it carries it out in good faith, then Israel can turn to the world for approval, with the West Europeans, the Canadians, the Japanese, the Australians, and get a lot of approval. Maybe in 100 years the Palestinians will still be demanding a separate state. But most Arab leaders would accept what is being done, de facto, while still insisting.

Secretary Vance asked, if there were agreement on the West Bank and Gaza, what will Assad do?

President Sadat said that Assad continues to raise dust. We are waiting for civil war. Assad is in grave danger. Assad is of no significance, now, following his Lebanon fiasco and the civil war. See him and Iraq. Assad provides arms. Therefore, he is of no significance.

The President said that, except for South Yemen, Syria is most subservient to the Soviet Union.

President Sadat said that it is also most despised in the Arab world. We have the upper hand despite Soviet actions, in Libya, Afghanistan, etc., because of the Soviet agents—South Yemen is despised in the Arab world; Assad will have a civil war by next summer, with the fall of Assad and the Alawites or a quagmire in Syria; and Qadhafi the Soviet Union knows is moody. We have the upper hand, therefore should not lose the moment. With any Soviet move, we must check it. We (Egyptians) must do it, or help the U.S.

The President concluded by saying it is good to have President Sadat as a partner.

(The meeting concluded at 4:18 p.m.)

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—(2/1/80–4/15/80). Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Carter’s handwritten notes related to this meeting are in the Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 3, Mid East, 4/79–12/80.
2. On the morning of April 8, Carter met privately with Sadat in the Rose Garden and the Oval Office from 11:01 a.m. to 12:10 p.m. No memorandum of conversation for this meeting has been found. At the same time, the U.S. and Egyptian delegations met in the Cabinet Room, where they discussed the proposed powers and responsibilities to be transferred to the SGA, as well as the future competencies of the Continuing and Security Committees in the autonomy talks. Carter and Sadat joined the delegations at 12:10 and conversation turned to the two leaders’ hopes for their discussions and touched upon Egyptian-Saudi relations, the Horn of Africa, and the agenda for the afternoon meeting. The memorandum of conversation for these meetings is in the Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 37, Serial Xs—(2/1/80–4/15/80).
3. The list of points is attached but not printed.
4. For documentation on the First Egyptian-Israeli Disengagement Agreement, signed on January 18, 1974, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Documents 1–18.
5. See Document 132.
6. See footnote 6, Document 312.
7. Although Sadat had sent a letter to Begin regarding the state of negotiations on March 17 (see Document 351), the Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram announced March 30 that Sadat would send a “new message” to Begin in the next two days. (Telegram 7052 from Cairo, March 30; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800160–1041) The text of this second letter, likely the one Sadat referenced here, was not found.