Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

330. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 17, 1980, 1:08–1:39 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Summary of the President’s Meeting with Egyptian Vice President Hosni Mubarak

PARTICIPANTS

• President Jimmy Carter
• Cyrus Vance, Secretary of State
• Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Gary Sick
• Egyptian Vice President Hosni Mubarak

Secretary Vance opened the discussion with a quick review of his discussion with Vice President Mubarak the previous day² where they had discussed the progress of the autonomy talks and the need for some pressure to make it move forward. We are fully in agreement on this. Secretary Brown had met with Vice President Mubarak today.³

The President said there must be more progress between now and May. The end of this month marks a major turning point and it must not be upset. Before we get to the next stage, we must compare plans on how to speed up the process on Jerusalem, the West Bank, Gaza and Palestinian rights. The President had just talked with Prime Minister Suarez of Spain⁴ and he thought that European countries will be willing to play a stronger role in the coming months in support of efforts to get resolution of the Palestinian and related issues. Since the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan⁵ there has been a growing realization of the need to cooperate more closely among the moderate Arab nations and also Israel. There is now an opportunity to make real progress.

The U.S. needs a closer relationship with Egypt even than in the past few months. Ambassador Linowitz is the best negotiator in our nation. He is a strong, capable, intelligent man. He will be able to take positions which are unpopular in our country if he is convinced they are in the interest of peace. Once normalization has occurred, it would be useful for Egypt to present its case against settlements and for Palestinians to participate more strongly. We will do the same. In the President’s view, the majority of the people in Israel support that, including many of the people in leadership positions.

We are grateful for Egyptian friendship, especially the help which has been offered in the Iranian situation. The air support given to our planes strengthens our determination to persevere. We also appreciate your encouraging other Moslem nations to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Even if the leaders of those nations do not profess friendship, they listen carefully to Egypt as the dominant economic, political and military power.

We appreciate Vice President Mubarak’s coming here to try to persuade the North and South Koreans to settle their conflict. We are always ready for a three-country meeting if the North is willing to accept the political leaders of the South. It is necessary for each of us to keep the other fully informed on this.

Vice President Mubarak said that he had met with Secretary Vance yesterday and with Secretary Brown today. He had informed Secretary Vance fully about the recent negotiations⁶ with Prime Minister Begin—perhaps in greater detail than Ambassador Atherton had reported. He said that he had a hand-written report⁷ on the talks written by President Sadat following the meeting and wondered if the President would like to read it.

The President took the document and read it while the conversation among the others continued.

Secretary Vance said we had gone back to the Sudanese after the message from the Egyptians.⁸

Vice President Mubarak interjected that the Sudanese had now pulled out their Ambassador to the UN on the grounds that he had violated his instructions. He noted that he had not been satisfied by his talks with Secretary Brown.

Secretary Vance wondered if the problem was related to the kinds of equipment, delivery dates . . .

Vice President Mubarak said both. He said there was tremendous pressure in his country for arms. Secretary Brown had said the F–16s would not be delivered until 1984. What were they going to do all this time? He noted that Qadhafi had recently met with an Egyptian general who had been taking a course in London and who went secretly to Libya. Qadhafi tried to persuade him to “do something” in Egypt. The generals came and told them about the meeting, which took place three weeks ago. Qadhafi promised many things. Secretary Brown said he could not offer the F–15.

The President said that he had had a call from Prime Minister Begin⁹ which was a much more positive report than the one he had just read. Prime Minister Begin always emphasizes the things on which there was agreement or perhaps ignores or minimizes the areas of disagreement. However, there is no way to avoid the questions of autonomy and Jerusalem.

Vice President Mubarak said that solution of these issues would solve all the problems of the Middle East. President Sadat cannot understand why Prime Minister Begin spends all of his time talking about normalization. He talks for hours about normalization and leaves out the other problems.

The President said that some people know how to filibuster. We must recognize that Prime Minister Begin has a serious political problem in Israel and he does not want to talk about Jerusalem, autonomy and the Palestinian question. In the President’s own judgment, the paragraph in the Camp David accords will have to be the basis for agreement. Ambassador Linowitz wants to explore some reference to sovereignty and religion. On the Palestinian question, it needs PLO recognition of Israel’s right to exist and a statement of acceptance of Resolution 242. The Moslem nations must see evidence of some progress otherwise the U.S. position in the area will be damaged.

The United States will try to expedite the delivery of F–4s and F–16s. It is not desirable to propose F–15s at this time. The Congress would react adversely. The President was aware of Egypt’s desire to have the F–15, but he asked President Sadat to trust his judgment on this question. The President said he would consult with Congress about allocating additional grain for Egypt, although it might be corn rather than wheat. He noted that in the South where he grew up, people ate almost as much corn as wheat.

Vice President Mubarak said he had discussed the negotiations yesterday. When full autonomy is reached, it will be a good solution to the whole problem. Egypt and the U.S. must work together. He said he had recently gone to Tunisia for a meeting with an Islamic group. He had also traveled to Malaysia and to Oman. In Oman he had met with people coming secretly from Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the UAE. There was only one question: what did you do in Jerusalem? This is the vital question. Prince Fahd and the King know only Jerusalem. The President was right when he said some months ago that none of the Arab leaders really wants an independent Palestinian state. They are terrified of the Palestinians. They are afraid the Soviets will go there. Arafat has sent a private message. Every time he is going to make a public statement which is critical, he sends a message and says he must say this for Assad or for Qadhafi, and he asks for understanding. Egypt always gets the same message. He is trying to get some money from them, but still he is a leader who, when he finds the train is starting to leave, he will get aboard. For that reason, he has left his representative in Cairo. They have been trying to get him to take his representative out, but he leaves him there. Qadhafi has kicked out the PLO representative in Libya. In Oman, Vice President Mubarak met with the Chief of Cabinet of Shaikh Zayid of the UAE who had come from Pakistan to Oman to meet him. He said please convey to President Sadat our appreciation for all the steps he has taken, but ask his understanding that we cannot say it publicly. This is also what we hear from the Saudis. Not from the King. He knows nothing of politics, only Jerusalem. They need a way to save face. The object is not to kick the Israelis out of Jerusalem.

The President wondered if Vice President Mubarak had recently read the Jerusalem language in the Camp David accords? Was that language satisfactory to Sadat?

Vice President Mubarak said yes it is. Egypt wants something finished. Sadat told Begin nearly the same language as the Camp David language. Both he and President Sadat had said the same thing to Weizman: let us live all in peace. Jerusalem is a religious thing. We need only a small Council (Consulate?) with a flag. Weizman said Begin would not be able to accept the flag. But it is only something symbolic, he would see in time.

The President recalled that he had once spent two days with Begin talking about flags.¹⁰

Vice President Mubarak said they (Israelis) would have access and be able to move freely. Time would make everything disappear.

The President asked Secretary Vance if Ambassador Linowitz was ready with his language.

Secretary Vance said yes, he would take it out with him. It is based on Camp David plus mention of religious sovereignty.

Vice President Mubarak said this is very important. It is something that is felt by all Moslems. He had spent a whole day in Tunisia on nothing but Jerusalem. They never mentioned the West Bank or Gaza. It is as if God stays in Jerusalem.

Secretary Vance noted that the next withdrawal occurs on the 26th of January. That is the last step until the final withdrawal.

The President said that after the 26th all of us will need to show each other our plans and try to put them into effect in order to get maximum influence. Ambassador Linowitz is good here at home and with Begin. He communicates with Begin better than Ambassador Strauss.

Vice President Mubarak replied that Begin is hard to get along with. He noted that Begin recently talked about Golan and how it would always remain Israeli territory.

Dr. Brzezinski recalled that Begin had told him at one time that he would give up an eye, part of his arm, before he would part with the Sinai. He says one thing, but later he changes.

Vice President Mubarak noted that Israel had said it was ready to negotiate with the Syrians. If some agreement could be reached, it would be very good to stop the Russians. The Soviets are doing their best with the Syrians. President Assad knows that it would be a disaster for his regime if Sadat succeeds in getting something. He knows he would have to follow.

The President remarked that lately Assad had been worse than Qadhafi. He was more subservient to the Soviets.

Vice President Mubarak said the situation was boiling internally in Syria.

Secretary Vance said that once we are past the 26th, it will require pressure by both Egypt and the U.S. If we are not together, Begin will try to drive a wedge between us.

Vice President Mubarak said that the recent meeting between Sadat and Begin was just to pave the way for pressure later. President Sadat feels 100% the same way about U.S. and Egyptian pressure. He wanted to pave the way with Begin psychologically and make it easier for the United States. Without the efforts of President Carter later on and with tremendous effort, we will get nothing.

The President smiled and said he would prefer to remain in the background but that he was available if it was essential.

Vice President Mubarak said the Egyptians were all praying for the President’s success in the coming elections. They say to each other what would happen if President Carter were not there.

The President said to tell President Sadat that we understand his economic and military needs. In the President’s judgment this was not the time to propose the F–15. He realized how much the Egyptians wanted it. He will direct Secretary Brown to expedite delivery of the F–4s and F–16s and will consult with Congress immediately about the delivery of additional grain under PL–480.

Vice President Mubarak said that the F–15 would give satisfaction to the Egyptian armed forces. If it can be given to Israel and Saudi Arabia, why not to them? It is being raised so strongly by the Egyptian military.

The President said he understood.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 11, Egypt: 1980. Secret. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room. Sick forwarded the memorandum to Brzezinski under a January 18 covering memorandum. A stamped notation on Sick’s memorandum, dated January 18, reads: “ZB has seen.” (Ibid.)
2. Vance discussed several topics with Mubarak in their January 16 private meeting including the current situations in Afghanistan and Iran, U.S. aid to Oman, the improving outlook for the Egyptian economy, the Aswan Summit, and Libya. On Egypt’s military aid request, Vance informed Mubarak that the administration was seeking $350 million in FMS credits for FY 1981 and had a planning figure of $800 million for the following year. In response to Mubarak’s request for F–15 aircraft, Vance stated “he did not think this was in the cards,” but that F–16 fighters would be approved. (Telegram 13813 to Cairo, January 18; Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Jan/Feb/Mar, 1980, MemCons)
3. Brown’s January 17 meeting with Mubarak is summarized in telegram 20199 to Cairo, January 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800041–0008)
4. Carter met with Suarez and a delegation of Spanish officials at the White House on January 15. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President’s Daily Diary)
5. See footnote 2, Document 325.
6. See Document 327.
7. Not found.
8. Not further identified.
9. See Document 327.
10. Not further identified.