Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

225. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State¹

Cairo, March 20, 1979, 1426Z

5638. Dept Pass USDel Secretary. Subject: Egyptian-Israeli Military Talks. Ref: State 68313 (Tosec 30006).²

1. (S-entire text).

2. Summary. Khalil insists that, with Sadat’s agreement, there can be no further Egyptian compromise on sub-phasing agreed to at the Blair House talks and on oil arrangements.³ Israel, having gotten virtually everything it demanded as a result of Sadat’s acquiesence in President Carter’s proposals, should now be pressed to honor its word. He is sending, through Ghorbal, a message to the Secretary on the subject.⁴ We are now translating Arabic text and will send English translation by septel. End summary.

3. Met with PriMin Khalil early this afternoon to urge greater Egyptian flexibility in sub-phasing.⁵ I found Khalil primed for bear and in a more emotional state than I have yet seen him. He had obviously had a report from Kamal Hassan Ali on talks with Weizman and with Atherton and was visibly upset. He had trouble controlling his sense of outrage as he spoke. He said flatly that “we cannot go back on what has been agreed upon” and that he had earlier in the day sent the Secretary a message through Ghorbal on the subject.⁶ (I have obtained a copy from Boutros Ghali and will send English translation by septel.)

4. Specifically, Khalil said:

— (A) GOE will under no circumstances agree to a company-to-company oil arrangement with Israel as the Israelis are demanding.⁷ The treaty annex which provides that Israel may bid on the international market for Egyptian oil will not be implemented before Egypt and Israel enter into negotiations on normalization. Furthermore, Egypt will under no circumstances specifically agree to sell Alma oil to Israel.⁸ It will only be in terms of surplus Egyptian oil.

— (B) In the meantime, Israel has USG guarantee to provide Israel with its oil requirements. If USG wishes purchase oil from Amoco for this purpose, this is USG business.

— (C) Moreover, he could not accept what he called the new Israeli proposal not to withdraw from the Alma fields until seven months after signing of the treaty.⁹ This is totally inconsistent with letter and spirit of earlier sub-phasing agreement developed during Blair House talks¹⁰ and, Khalil insisted, with what he had been told by President Carter and the Secretary during President Carter’s visit.¹¹ The same applies to the Al Arish withdrawal. When I pointed out our view that three months Al Arish and seven months oil fields strikes us as a reasonable compromise, Khalil hit the ceiling. He reiterated that this is not consistent with what was said here during President Carter’s talks.¹² I noted that Atherton had told Kamal that he was confident that nothing specific about a two month or four month date had been said in those talks and I also knew of no such statement. Khalil responded that Atherton was only part right. He claimed to have specifically asked President Carter about the sub-phasing dates and that the President had replied he could not remember the dates, but that they would be those reached during the Blair House talks. This statement, Khalil insisted, represents a USG obligation to support what had earlier been agreed upon, especially since Sadat had, against Khalil’s advice, agreed that ambassadors would be exchanged one month after completion of the interim withdrawal.

— (D) Khalil also insisted that he had told the Secretary in Cairo that GOE will not rpt not be involved in the oil for Israel question before the end of the interim withdrawal period and that this will come only in the context of normalization.¹³ I noted that neither the treaty nor Annex III, including the agreed new minute, preclude normal trade relations before the negotiation of an Egyptian/Israeli trade and commerce agreement. I urged that GOE consider the matter on practical rather than legal basis. Khalil was clearly expecting this one. He simply said no, he could not agree with our point of view. USG has committed itself to provide Israeli oil requirements, he reiterated, and this should be source of Israeli oil in the interim period.

5. In response to my warning about disastrous effect on Israeli Knesset debate which Egyptians again raising question of exchange of ambassadors would have, Khalil said that is simply too bad. There would be no problem if Israelis would for once honor their word instead of constantly reneging.¹⁴ Sadat had reinstituted his earlier agreement that ambassadors will be exchanged one month after termination of interim withdrawal. He had done so, Khalil insisted, on clear understanding Israelis would reinstitute sub-phasing arrangement worked out at Blair House—not something totally new and different. Once Israelis get what they want, Khalil charged, they constantly seek whittle down their obligations.

6. By this time, he had worked himself into quite a stew and stated emphatically that GOE has had enough of this. USG, including President Carter, must be aware of what Sadat has done to facilitate the peace process.¹⁵ He expressed distress that American negotiators now seem to be looking for further compromises instead of pressing Israelis to honor their word. I assured Khalil that we are all aware of what Sadat has done on the peace treaty issue, but emphasized that it is in all of our interests find suitable compromise on the remaining issues. Khalil’s response was that Egypt has compromised all that it can.

7. To make the matter more personal, he recalled that he had spoken on TV about sub-phasing based on the Blair House arrangements. That TV interview is to be repeated tonight. Was he to be expected to stand up and say that he was a liar? Or that Egypt has given way to more Israeli demands? And all of this in the face of Begin’s totally unhelpful statements yesterday about Jerusalem;¹⁶ re Jerusalem, no independent Palestine state or anything else that might help Egypt in its present difficult period with the Arabs.

8. Khalil asked me to make it clear that there can be no further flexibility in the Egyptian position on sub-phasing or oil. This, he claimed, has been made clear in the letter he has sent to Secretary Vance.¹⁷ He emphasized that everything that he had said in that letter had been included with the full approval of President Sadat. Sadat, he said, is as disgusted as he about the Israeli position put forth during the Weizman/Ali talks.

9. Comment: As predicted, the new Israeli position on subphasing has aroused Egyptian hackles. They are disappointed that we do not seem willing to press the Israelis to abide by the Blair House sub-phasing agreement. They feel that once again they have been taken—Sadat, in response to President Carter’s urgings, accepted the compromise brought by the President only to find that we are now asking for more compromises. I do not believe that the Egyptians will allow the treaty to founder on these issues, but they are going to insist on the Blair House arrangements being honored and that the USG has guaranteed Israel oil supplies, hence no Egyptian/Israeli arrangements, even through private companies, will be permitted during the interim period.

Eilts

1. Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 13, Middle East—(10/78–7/79). Secret; Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Tel Aviv, the White House, and Bonn. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. At the top of the telegram, Carter wrote: “Zbig—Let Cy handle for time being. J.” The telegram was found attached to a March 20 handwritten covering note from Brzezinski to Carter which reads: “Mr. President—The sub-phasing issue is becoming very hot. Vance ought to put a cable through to Dayan, because Sadat has a point. Zbig.” (Ibid.)
2. In telegram Tosec 30006/68313 to Cairo and Tel Aviv, March 19, Newsom conveyed a summary of Atherton’s March 19 meetings with Weizman and Ali on the sub-phasing of Israel’s interim withdrawal. On these meetings, Newsom wrote, the “positions of both parties have hardened further.” At the end of the telegram, Newsom provided instructions to Eilts and Lewis “for approaches to Khalil and/or Sadat and to Begin in effort to get some flexibility into both sides’ approach to sub-phasing negotiations.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–1906)
3. Carter underlined this sentence. During a meeting between Atherton and Ali in Washington on the afternoon of March 19, the Egyptians indicated that they could not “sell oil to Israel or authorize Amoco to do so during any interim period following Israeli withdrawal from oil fields and prior to completion of interim withdrawal” since this would be a “violation” of the Arab boycott against trade with Israel, to which Egypt was a party. The legal adviser accompanying Ali’s delegation stated to Atherton that under the peace treaty the boycott “will be terminated only upon completion of interim withdrawal” of Israeli forces. If there was no agreement on sub-phasing for the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai oil fields, Ali stated, Annex III “could simply note that interim withdrawal would be completed in nine months with withdrawal from El-Arish in three months and details of interim withdrawal to be worked out in joint commission.” (Telegram Tosec 30009/68893 to Cairo and Tel Aviv, March 20; Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 3/17–21/79)
4. The Embassy conveyed Khalil’s message to Vance in telegram 5662 from Cairo, March 20; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number].
5. Carter underlined this sentence.
6. Carter underlined this sentence.
7. Carter underlined this sentence.
8. Carter underlined this sentence.
9. Carter underlined this sentence.
10. Carter underlined, “totally inconsistent with letter and spirit of earlier sub-phasing agreement developed during Blair House talks.” See Documents 84, 86–87, 90, and 94.
11. See Documents 202 and 203.
12. Carter underlined this and the preceding two sentences.
13. Carter underlined this sentence.
14. Carter underlined this and the previous sentence.
15. Carter underlined this and the previous sentence.
16. Reference is presumably to Begin’s March 20 statement to the Knesset in which he said: “Dear and distinguished Dr. Khalil, please take note: United Jerusalem—the one—is Israel’s eternal capital and will never again be redivided. It will remain one for generation unto generation.” (Israel’s Foreign Relations, Selected Documents, vols. 4–5, 1977–1979, Document 247)
17. Carter underlined this and the previous sentence.