Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

159. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to President Carter¹

Washington, December 16, 1978

SUBJECT

• Relocating Israeli Airbases from the Sinai to the Negev

At Camp David you indicated that, subject to Congressional approval of the necessary funds, that the United States would help in the relocation to the Negev of Israel’s two Sinai airbases at Eitam and Etzion. In pursuance of this agreement, on September 28, 1978, I sent a letter to Israel’s defense minister² proposing that our two governments consult on the scope and costs of the two new airbases. In November 1978, I sent a survey team to Israel to begin these consultations. A summary of the team’s report is attached.³

Eitam and Etzion presently accommodate up to four aircraft squadrons (120 planes). Israeli plans had called for expansion to five squadrons in 1979 with subsequent further expansion to an eventual 8 squadrons. Israel is asking for U.S. assistance in building airbases to accommodate 5 squadrons within three years. This would require constructing three bases, given the available land in the Negev. The cost would be about $1.5 billion.

I recommend we confine any assistance on our part to no more than the basing of the 4 squadrons now at Eitam and Etzion, and leave to Israel the full expense of any expansion. This would entail construction at two sites in the Negev (Ovda and Matred) rather than three. The cost for construction of the two bases, accommodating two squadrons each, would be $988 million for operational facilities and $57 million for necessary (family housing and recreational facilities for example) but non-mission essential facilities, for a total of $1.045 billion. This does not include costs for off-base infrastructure and related expenses such as road construction and maintenance, utilities, port and terminal expenses, and the like, which we have assumed Israel would bear. One way we could reduce the U.S. contribution (alternative forms of which are discussed later in this memo) below $1 billion would be by agreeing to fund only the operationally essential facilities ($988 million). These costs include inflation based on the assumption of construction over the three year period CY 1979–81.

If the two new airbases are to be operationally ready in three years it will be necessary for DoD to undertake overall management responsibility and to use accelerated construction techniques; Israel lacks the management experience to complete the task in three years. Also, a non-Israeli construction firm will be required to do the work because Israeli firms lack both experience and capacity. Almost all the essential ingredients—management, equipment, manpower, materials—will have to be imported. If a U.S. contractor is awarded the contract, the bulk of the money will be spent in the United States.

The requirement to have operationally-ready bases in three years is a substantial task having important budget and legislative implications. If a treaty were signed in December 1978, funds would be required as follows: $5 million immediately for site investigation and planning; 49.5% of total U.S. costs (roughly $500 million) by March 1979; 39.5% in FY 1980; and the remaining 10.5% in FY 1981. Thus, money for the first year must be from FY 1979 funds and available in March 1979, if the peace treaty is signed this month. A delay in signing obviously would allow a corresponding delay in funding.

There are, of course, various ways of reducing the cost to the United States either by cutting back on the scope of the assistance or by the method of financing. The former is connected with broad political questions. As to the latter, there are at least three ways the costs could be funded:

1. Direct grant for the full amount. This is the simplest and most convenient way to assure the construction is funded adequately and on time, and therefore holds open the best prospect that the work would be completed on schedule.

2. FMS Credits (50% “forgiven”). Israel now gets $1 billion annually. This could be increased (or perhaps in part reprogrammed) for FY 1979–1981 to cover the U.S. share of the airbase costs, i.e., of the total U.S. share of about $1 billion, Israel would receive $500 million as grant and the remainder as a long term loan on current FMS terms (no payment on principal for 10 years, payback over the next 20 years, prevailing interest rates).

3. Long term loan for the full amount. The terms might correspond with the FMS loan arrangements, or be separately negotiated.

The extent and method of assistance are matters that will require your decision, and you may want to reexamine them in the light of recent events. I am undertaking on a close-hold basis the necessary preparatory work so that we are ready when you decide, and when a peace treaty is in hand, to complete negotiations with Israel and to prepare and support legislation before the Congress. DoD personnel have been instructed to make no commitments to the Israelis on amount, or nature of assistance, and I believe they have observed those instructions.

Harold Brown

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 35, Israel: 7–12/78. Secret.
2. See Document 57.
3. A notation in the right-hand margin next to this sentence reads: “(Available upon request.)” A summary of the team’s report was not found attached, but a draft executive summary is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 35, Israel: 7–12/78.