137. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
24816. Subject: Sadat’s Reaction to President Carter’s Letter. Ref: A) State 287747,2 B) State 288539.3
Summary. Gave Sadat President Carter’s letter and supplemented this with approved talking points. Sadat’s reaction was one of disappointment. His first reaction was that we are “speaking different languages.” He would not sign a treaty with Israel and put himself at the Israelis’ “mercy” with respect to West Bank/Gaza, regardless of what the extent of USG involvement may be. Israelis will simply stall. Minimum GOE will accept, Sadat stated, is arrangement whereby self-government in Gaza will be established during first phase of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai, even if completion of first phase has to be delayed for several months. GOE will also not agree to priority of obligations language in present treaty draft.4 Sadat plans meet later today with VP Mubarak and PriMin Khalil to study Carter letter and draft West Bank/Gaza letter.5 He will then instruct Mubarak, who leaves for Washington tomorrow, to carry an answer6 to President Carter. Mubarak authorized spend as much time in Washington as he deems necessary to work with President Carter “to search for a way out of this situation.” Sadat professed to believe that a USG confrontation with Begin is needed. Mubarak will have considerable discretionary authority, but will have Sadat’s instructions very much in mind. End summary.
1. I met with Sadat and VP Mubarak early this afternoon in Ismailia. I presented President Carter’s letter to Sadat with addition authorized paragraph 1, ref B. I then read him, slowly, the text of President Carter’s letter. Several times during my reading of the letter, Sadat shook his head in obvious disagreement. I also read him revised text of [Page 476] letter re West Bank/Gaza minus clause re December 17, 1978 date (State 287408 and State 287766).7
2. I then went through the talking points provided ref B in some detail, noting West Bank/Gaza letter which I had read to him does contain timetable for moving to self-government and redeployment of Israeli forces. We recognize that period envisaged in draft letter is longer than Sadat or we desired, but emphasized that it does not preclude elections before end of interim withdrawal. Much as we appreciate Sadat’s desire for precise timetable, I pointed out that this is objectively not possible. Camp David frameworks underscore relationship between Egyptian/Israeli Treaty and West Bank/Gaza negotiations, but as I was sure he would agree, they establish no requirement re timing of specific steps. To delay interim withdrawal, as Sadat proposed, would simply mean Israel will insist that West Bank/Gaza elections be delayed beyond end of 1979. I reminded him of how much has in fact been achieved in establishing a practical relationship between the two sets of negotiations, pointing out that this is more than we had thought possible. While many Israelis may want to go slow on West Bank/Gaza, treaty package creates built-in process which will require early negotiations. As he knew, USG from President Carter on down have interest in moving expeditiously and Sadat has our commitment to remain involved as full party. USG intends to make major effort, as it did after Camp David, to support treaty package and Egypt throughout Arab world. I pointed out that actual progress which will follow ratification of Egyptian/Israeli peace treaty will have more impact on Camp David critics than any treaty language.
3. Re Sadat’s proposal on Gaza, we understand it and appreciate his desire for Egyptian presence. As he knew, however, Camp David Framework has no specific provision for Gaza and we do not want to appear to be attempting to split the Palestinians by handling Gaza separately from West Bank. Possibility that Sadat can achieve what he wants re Gaza once negotiating process starts, I noted, cannot be ruled out. Re timing of phases of withdrawal, I pointed out that early beginning of normalization, including exchange of ambassadors, will be an incentive to Israel to accelerate withdrawal. I also gave him view of Department’s legal advisor that proposed letter from President Carter re West Bank/Gaza has same binding effect as an exchange of letters between Sadat and Begin. All things considered, therefore, I hoped that Sadat could accede to President Carter’s request to accept the treaty package as it stands.
4. Sadat heard me out, but was clearly unhappy with the substance of President Carter’s letter and my supplementary comments on it. (He [Page 477] had just come from speaking to a labor group, was tired and was still suffering from a bad cold.) Rather wearily, he said his first reaction is that we are “speaking different languages.” It is out of the question, Sadat said with some show of emotion, that he would sign a treaty with Israel and put himself at the Israelis “mercy” with respect to the West Bank/Gaza, regardless of what the extent of USG involvement may be. He asked rhetorically how Egyptians and Arabs will receive his exchanging ambassadors with Israel one month after the Israeli interim withdrawal is completed when part of the Sinai remains occupied and no meaningful negotiations have yet been begun re West Bank/Gaza. I reminded him that the parties are commited under the West Bank/Gaza letter to begin negotiations within one month of ratification of an Egyptian/Israeli treaty. Sadat responded that this does not mean much, especially since the Israelis have made it very clear that they are in no hurry to specify when elections will be held, troop redeployment dates, etc., in West Bank/Gaza. They will simply spin out talks. The Israelis are up to their old tricks and he was not prepared to mortgage his position to Begin’s good intentions. Such a development would hurt not only him, but President Carter in the area. As a “friend and a partner,” he wanted President Carter to know his view that “we must play it fair.” I said that this is precisely what we want and are trying to do. Sadat would have none of it. He did not question President Carter’s desire to be fair, but insisted that the present treaty package amounts to a separate Egyptian/Israeli agreement. He could not take the Israelis on faith re their West Bank/Gaza intentions.
5. The minimum that GOE will accept, Sadat stated, is a Gaza arrangement. There should be self-government in Gaza during the first phase of Israeli withdrawal from Sinai even if completion of that phase has to be delayed for several months—perhaps to November of next year. VP Mubarak interjected to note Egypt also still objects to item 5 of article 6 re priority of obligations. Sadat firmly endorsed Mubarak’s comment and said Egypt will not, under any circumstances, agree to giving priority to the Egyptian/Israeli treaty obligations.
6. Sadat reiterated that his preliminary reaction is negative. He said that he will meet with VP Mubarak and PriMin Khalil later today to study President Carter’s letter and the proposed draft West Bank/Gaza letter (which he insisted that I give him). He would then instruct VP Mubarak, who leaves for Washington tomorrow, to carry an answer to President Carter. In my presence, he instructed Mubarak to give all the time necessary to President Carter in order, as Sadat put it, “to search for a way out of this situation.” Mubarak would explain the whole thing to President Carter and could decide to remain in Washington as long as the Vice President desired. Mubarak’s future movements should be agreed upon by President Carter and Mubarak. Mubarak could also decide what other actions might be necessary.
[Page 478]7. Sadat closed by recalling that he had told Secretary Vance that a confrontation with Begin is needed. He had asked the Secretary whether the USG is prepared for “brinkmanship” and the Secretary had replied in the affirmative. What is now needed, Sadat said, is a confrontation between President Carter and Begin, if the latter remains adamant, in order to obtain the necessary Israeli concessions. I told Sadat that in a sense there is already a confrontation between President Carter and Begin. This is evident by the negative Israeli reaction to some elements of the treaty package. Begin is under no illusions as to President Carter’s view. I pointed out, however, that it is necessary to take one thing at a time. To escalate the confrontation with Begin to public dimensions would only rally public support for the Israeli Prime Minister. It would not achieve what both Sadat and President Carter want. What is needed is to conclude the Egyptian/Israeli peace treaty and then proceed with equal vigor on moving ahead with West Bank/Gaza matters. Sadat said he disagreed. A confrontation with Begin is needed, as he saw it, if the outstanding issues are to be satisfactorily resolved. VP Mubarak, he reiterated, would amplify on his views.
8. As I was leaving, I noted that the treaty package is being deliberated in the Israeli Cabinet and Knesset. Many things will be said publicly which may seem outrageous. We urge that Sadat continue to avoid being drawn into public debate until the process is completed in Israel otherwise he will only weaken supporters of the treaty and give ammunition to critics. I said we would urge Israel to act in the same way. Sadat said he has no desire to engage in a rhetorical battle with the Israelis, but much would depend upon what comes out of Israel during the treaty debate. He recalled that GOE had made no public statement when Israel announced settlements expansion. Subsequently, Begin had pointed to Egyptian silence, claiming that this showed GOE has no objection to such expansion. This is clearly not correct and GOE will have to make a judgment on whether the protection of its interests requires answering the Israelis lest silence again be taken by Begin as acquiescence.
9. Comment: Sadat’s tough line continues. He was clearly disappointed in the President’s letter and unusually emotional in his comments. Sadat is a consummate actor and his performance was doubtless partly show. However, despite our efforts, he does feel that the treaty package, as presently constituted, is inequitable to him. He professes to believe that it will hurt him and, as he likes to point out, also President Carter in the Arab world. He is himself engaging in a game of brinkmanship, but I believe he will as a minimum insist on some change in the draft package if he is to sign it. I sense some unhappiness that Boutros Ghali may not have been tough enough in the negotiations. Hence, the dispatch of Mubarak at the very time Ghali is being recalled [Page 479] on consultations. Mubarak will have considerable discretionary authority, but he will be difficult to deal with since he will come as the voice of Sadat.
- Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 55, Middle East: Peace Talks Between Egypt and Israel, 11–12/78. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. At the top of the telegram, Brzezinski wrote: “Sadat’s response. ZB.” Carter initialed “C” in the upper right-hand corner of the first page of the telegram to indicate that he saw the document.↩
- See Document 136.↩
- See footnote 4, Document 136.↩
- See Document 131.↩
- Ibid.↩
- See Document 139.↩
- See Document 131.↩