Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980, Volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, August 1978–December 1980, Second, Revised Edition

127. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Washington, November 9, 1978

SUBJECT

• Middle East Strategy

The Issue

As discussed in our meeting² Wednesday, we need to decide whether and, if so, how we relate our policies and actions in the Egypt-Israel negotiations and in U.S.-Israeli bilateral relations so as to improve chances of getting serious negotiations started on the West Bank/Gaza promptly.

In the current negotiations an impasse may be shaping up, with Sadat having sent his negotiators back with instructions to insist on more explicit and far-reaching assurances from Israel concerning the West Bank and Gaza. In the light of this we need to decide:

—whether we should press Sadat and Begin to conclude the treaty as soon as possible, and to that end ask Sadat to drop his insistence on most of the “linkage” points he has now raised, while asking Begin to give a bit more in this respect; or³

—whether we should support Egypt in attempting to achieve more of the “linkage” Sadat wants, recognizing that if this succeeded it could assist our own objective of getting West Bank/Gaza negotiations off to a good start, but also that it could delay conclusion of the peace treaty.

—We also need to decide how we manage our response to Israel’s request for additional economic assistance so as to achieve our objectives.

Egypt’s Objectives

The letter⁴ that has just come in from Sadat concentrates entirely on the need for an “unequivocal commitment on what is to take place in the West Bank and Gaza in implementation of the Camp David Framework;” it does not mention any of the other issues over which the two sides are bargaining. From my meeting Thursday with the Egyptians,⁵ the West Bank/Gaza issue will clearly be the focus of the Egyptian delegation’s negotiating efforts now that Boutros Ghali has returned. How far they are prepared to push this remains a difficult question to answer, but they are starting off with a long list—e.g., setting dates not only for beginning West Bank/Gaza negotiations but also for the establishment of the self-governing authority and the end of the military government, plus a half dozen or so unilateral steps they want Israel to agree to now. Undoubtedly the delegation itself would be prepared to hold up progress on the treaty in order to achieve these commitments. But you will recall that at Camp David we dropped the paragraph on linkage when Sadat himself did not press very hard for it. The same pattern could repeat itself in the present circumstances. Sadat may be giving his advisors a license to achieve what they can for a period of time figuring that he will settle for whatever he can get rather than delay conclusion of the Treaty beyond a certain point.⁶

On the other hand, Arab pressures may be registering more keenly on Sadat in the wake of the Baghdad Summit⁷ than they were at Camp David. Secret resolutions⁸ were apparently passed at Baghdad calling for sanctions against Egypt if it proceeds to sign a peace treaty. We cannot rule out the possibility that this time Sadat is more determined to get what he is asking for, even at risk of delaying the Treaty. Israeli backtracking on a commitment now to an accelerated schedule for withdrawal to the interim line could further stiffen the Egyptian position. If Sadat is more determined on this occasion, the issue for us will be whether we wish to support him, or to bring pressure to dissuade him because we decide it is not in our interest to see the Treaty delayed.

Israel’s Objectives

The mood in Israel is one of growing querulousness and suspicion about the course the negotiations are taking. Weizman reports the Cabinet gave him a rough time, but summing up he told us Wednesday⁹ that if we can wrap up the Treaty package as it presently stands, Begin will be able to sell it to the Cabinet and Knesset. Even allowing for Weizman’s propensity to optimism, we share that assessment. But Weizman warns that if Egypt now attempts to achieve additional linkage it will bring the whole Treaty seriously into question because of the present mood in Israel. We do not have to accept this literally: the question clearly is how much additional baggage can be placed on the Treaty package before a serious risk of rejection of the whole package is entailed.¹⁰

The Israelis are unquestionably in a very tender mood about having their hand forced any further on the West Bank/Gaza negotiations. Begin is coming in for heavy criticism that he gave away too much at Camp David. He clearly sees as a highly important objective maintaining freedom to approach West Bank/Gaza negotiations, if at all, in a manner and at a pace that will not cause political problems for him. The Israelis have been brought to accept a great deal in the last twelve months, and in terms of Israeli public opinion, it is possible that not too much more can be forced on Israel too fast.

The Options for the U.S.

In these circumstances the options for the U.S. in our judgment boil down to two:

—We can determine that we are best off getting the Treaty done with as soon as possible—that the momentum created by this event, together with the realization on the part of the other Arabs that they are being left out in the cold, is the process best suited to get negotiations going on the West Bank/Gaza. If we choose this course we will need to devise a blend of pressure tactics and assurances which we would direct at Sadat to get him to back off most of his present demands as reflected in his latest letter and in the instructions given his delegation. We would at the same time need to insist on at least a bit more give from the Israelis—e.g., to set a target date now for West Bank/Gaza elections.

—Alternatively, we can determine that it is in our interest to face up to and resolve at least some of the problems inherent in the West Bank/Gaza negotiations in the context of the Egypt-Israel talks, even if it means delaying the conclusion of a peace Treaty. If we do this it would be on the grounds that to postpone tackling these problems would make it even more difficult for us to get negotiations started and going somewhere once the Egypt-Israel Treaty is signed.

The merits of these two strategies are finely balanced and we will need to consider the pros and cons of each course very carefully in making our decision.

The Pros and Cons

A case can be made that in getting Sadat to accept the ambiguities in the Camp David Framework about the West Bank/Gaza process we already issued a rather sizeable promissory note on the future in order to pay for the present, and that we should not compound this by attempting to postpone the tough issues any further. Our credibility in Arab eyes is already at stake in having announced publicly that we differed with Begin’s understanding of what was agreed to at Camp David about settlements and our inability thereafter to get him to stop or even exercise restraint in continued settlement activity. In his public statements Begin has taken the line that what he agreed to in the Camp David Framework was really nothing more than the Begin self-rule plan.¹¹ This has fed the worst fears of the Arabs that the negotiations on the West Bank/Gaza will not be able to produce any real relinquishment of Israeli control over these areas. If we press Sadat now to abandon his insistence on further “linkage,” he might, in order to explain to other Arabs, let it be known that it was we who pressed him to drop his insistence on this matter. This will only deepen Arab suspicions of our commitment to a comprehensive settlement, and could make it very difficult if not virtually impossible to get either Jordan or Palestinians to step forward to join the process envisioned at Camp David, or to enlist Saudi support for that process.

The actual signing of an Egypt-Israel Treaty will produce shock waves throughout the Arab world. So far Sadat’s course of action has been seen as a potential threat to the other Arabs, but it will come as a further disillusioning shock when he proceeds to an actual signing. The Arabs will see the withdrawal of the most powerful Arab state from the arena as destroying their leverage to get decent terms on the West Bank/Gaza/ Palestinian aspect. They will not be inclined to see U.S. assurances that we intend to deliver the goods in West Bank/Gaza negotiations as an adequate substitute for Egypt’s retirement. While it is possible that Egypt’s action might galvanize Jordan and West Bank/Gaza Palestinians into coming into the negotiations so as to get at least some kind of deal, we think it more likely that the Arabs in their present mood will retreat into a condition of sullen negativism and begin to turn their attention toward actions they can take against Sadat, even though King Hussein and the Saudis will not feel comfortable about being drawn into such a posture.

The problem is that we cannot be sure that the opposite course—that of engaging in a struggle with Israel in the context of the present negotiations to get better terms on the West Bank/Gaza aspect—will be the decisive factor in bringing in Jordan or representative Palestinians. And if we cannot be certain of this it can be argued that we may be better off playing it in a way that minimizes our problems with Israel. If we choose this option we would accept the fact that in the immediate post-Treaty situation we might not be in a good position to push Israel farther and for more than it chose to give on the West Bank/Gaza, but that in the long term we will get more out of Israel by managing the process in a way that is more acceptable to Israel.

On the Israeli side of the equation we need to assess whether we will be in a better position to move Israel now or in a post-Treaty situation. One thesis is that by trying to drive a bargain now we make it particularly difficult for Israel because it comes in a context of conditionality on the Egypt-Israel Treaty, something the Israelis were assured would not happen at Camp David. The opposing thesis is that once Israel achieves its strategic objective of removing Egypt from the conflict, it will see even less reason to give ground on its eastern front. Both theses have an element of truth in them.

Finally, it needs to be noted that the option to delay if necessary the present negotiations to achieve something more precise on the West Bank and Gaza obviously presents us with public relations and Congressional problems. The Israelis will argue that it is the U.S. rather than Sadat that is holding up the Treaty. They will also mount a campaign which will find receptivity in some quarters that it is unwarranted for the U.S. to be using the additional assistance Israel has requested to try to gain political concessions.

Conducting West Bank/Gaza Negotiations

In designing our strategy for extending the Camp David negotiations to the West Bank/Gaza, we need to keep in mind that it may prove impossible, whatever we do, to induce Jordan and representative Palestinians to join the negotiations at the outset. That does not necessarily mean, however, that these negotiations need be stymied. We need to think in terms of a strategy of beginning the negotiations between Egypt and Israel while developing in support of those negotiations a network of our own private consultations with Jordan, with West Bank and Gaza Palestinians, and perhaps with some Americans of Palestinian origin in order to build confidence in the seriousness of the negotiations so that we might think of Palestinians either joining the negotiations at a later stage or at least standing for elections when they are called. Our ability to engage the Palestinians in this kind of dialogue concurrent with the formal Egypt-Israel negotiations, which could eventually become a kind of once-removed negotiating process in itself, will depend on the terms of reference we are able to develop on West Bank/Gaza negotiations between now and when they start.

A Possible Course of Action

In my judgment there is a sufficient amount at stake for U.S. interests to warrant using Sadat’s present posture to attempt to get more from the Israelis than they are presently offering on West Bank/Gaza linkage, though by no means all Sadat is asking. We need to calibrate what we try for under this strategy carefully in order to ensure that the risks are reasonable. We must obviously stop short of the point that we believe entails a serious risk of placing the Treaty as a whole in jeopardy. We will also want to keep sensitive antenna out to assess Sadat’s position, since we cannot be in the position of pressing Israel for things that the Egyptians themselves are not prepared to insist on.

With these considerations in mind we suggest a course of action that will achieve something more for Sadat, but far less than he now seeks, on West Bank/Gaza “linkage,” and will also ask a bit more of Begin than he has indicated he is willing to give. If this course works, we will have avoided a protracted delay and probable suspension of the negotiations. If it does not work, we suggest a fallback we could go to in an effort to get things moving again when we judge the time is right. The fallback (see below) could also be viewed as an alternative to pursue now if we wanted to try for more for Sadat.

The course of action I propose would be composed of the following components:

1. We would press both sides to try to wrap up all work on the Treaty so that the West Bank/Gaza issue could be isolated as the sole remaining obstacle before the Treaty can be signed.

2. We would tell the Israelis our understanding of what Sadat is asking for and then describe what we believe the minimum will be that we need to achieve if the Treaty process is not to be unreasonably delayed. If Israel will agree to this, we will endeavor to persuade Sadat to agree.

—We would seek inclusion in the joint letter of a specific target date for West Bank/Gaza elections. This could be either six months from signing or we might suggest a specific date such as September 17, 1979 (the first anniversary of Camp David), which will probably be about nine months after the Treaty comes into force.

—We would raise with the Israelis once again Egypt’s requirement (which Sadat’s letter mentions) that Israel carry out at least some of the unilateral gestures to improve the atmosphere for West Bank/Gaza negotiations that Sadat asks for in his letter, and which earlier Dayan told us were not out of the question. Sadat mentions lifting officially the ban on political activities, granting amnesty to political prisoners, and admitting some displaced persons back to the West Bank and Gaza on the basis of family reunification. We would not, however, make any of these a sine qua non for proceeding with the Treaty.

After an initial round with the Israelis and Egyptians here, I would recommend you phone and send written messages to both Sadat and Begin, telling them what you believe is needed from each of them to resolve this issue, along the foregoing lines. Additionally, with Sadat we will have to talk him out of his fixation about putting Gaza on a separate track from the West Bank. This makes little sense even from the standpoint of his own interests, and the Israelis in any case will not agree to it.

A Possible Fallback

If the foregoing proves more than the Israelis can accept, or too little for Sadat, or both, we may face a period during which negotiations are suspended while both sides reflect on the consequences of a stalemate. We would then need to reach a judgment on when and in what way we should try to break the stalemate. We could try a different kind of approach, which in effect constitutes a fallback to the one outlined above, as follows:

—We would take the position that the U.S. needs to have an understanding with Egypt and Israel on the agenda for the West Bank/Gaza negotiations in order to complete the exchange of notes on this subject. This need not be embodied in the joint note or be given formal standing as a Treaty document but should be something that we can convey to Sadat as an understanding we have reached with Israel on how to proceed. In proposing a side understanding on the agenda, we would be seeking enough that would be concrete so that Sadat could be persuaded to step back from his most extreme demands, but that at the same time would not commit Israel to substantive positions on the agenda items. The purpose would be to make clear what issues will be negotiated. These will include questions of title to land, control over land transfer, the responsibilities of the Palestinian police force, control over water resources, control of the bridges, etc. Laying out these issues would by itself demonstrate that a serious negotiation is ahead.

—In addition to the discussion on agenda, we would have a discussion with the Israelis particularly on how to handle the question of the settlements during and in the negotiations. The purpose would be to explore possible understandings. If the Israelis question why we are doing this, the answer would be that President Carter made a promise to President Sadat on this subject at Camp David, and it was on that basis that Sadat agreed. Therefore, something must be done to clear up this misunderstanding. However, we would go beyond simply trying to sort out the Camp David misunderstanding and put the issue in the context of how settlements might be handled in the upcoming negotiations, but looking to the future, we might assure Israel that we are prepared to work for the right of Israelis to live in the West Bank, provided their living there is not part of a program of continuing land annexation.

Aid Strategy and Public Posture

On the question of aid, we would continue our consultations with the Israelis on the two airfields but would not respond otherwise to Israeli requests for additional aid for Sinai redeployment costs while our efforts go forward to get the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty completed and an agreed basis for West Bank/Gaza negotiations. Our position would be that the Administration will be delivering to Congress in January a message proposing authorization for a fund to support the peace effort. This would include everything from possible U.S. help with the costs of Israeli redeployment to assistance with a refugee solution, assistance for development in the West Bank and Gaza, and support for regional projects. We would tell the Israelis that we are not prepared to discuss the cost of evacuation from Sinai now. We would have the option of saying explicitly that we will not discuss this until it is clear how the West Bank/Gaza negotiations will be organized, or we could leave this implicit. When we are satisfied that Israel is working in good faith for implementation of the Camp David general framework, we could begin listening to the Israeli presentation on this subject, but we would hold off a response until sometime next year when we are satisfied with the progress in those negotiations.¹²

Publicly, we would try to seize the high ground, starting immediately making the following points:

—The Treaty negotiations are virtually completed. It is a good Treaty, meeting the legitimate interests of both parties. It has demonstrated that a negotiation can produce peace between Israel and its neighbors.

—During these negotiations, each party has committed itself to begin promptly the next round of negotiations envisioned at Camp David, those on the West Bank/Gaza.

—The Administration is developing for submission to Congress early next year a plan for a U.S. financial contribution to the several elements of the peace process. In that context, we will have to consider special programs and needs generated by implementation of the peace agreements and to seize opportunities offered by the new environment in the Middle East.¹³

—We will, of course, continue our ongoing programs to support the economic and military security of Israel and the efforts of President Sadat to improve the lives of the people of Egypt.

—We do not see our financial support as in any way payment to one side or the other for concluding this Treaty. They have done that in their own interest. The United States, however, will want to play a constructive role in building on the foundation which they have laid.

1. Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 71, Brzezinski, Chron: 11/1–10/78. Secret. At the top of the document, Carter wrote: “Cy. J.” The memorandum was found attached to a November 10 covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance indicating that Vance’s memorandum was being returned to him with Carter’s annotations.
2. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Carter met with Vance, Mondale, Atherton, and Brzezinski in the Oval Office from 10:30 a.m. to 11:10 a.m., November 8. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials) No memorandum of conversation of this meeting has been found.
3. In the left-hand margin next to this point, Carter wrote: “hold to present language.”
4. See Document 126.
5. No record of this meeting has been found.
6. In the left-hand margin next to this paragraph, Carter wrote: “Excessive.”
7. The Arab League convened in Baghdad November 2–5 in response to the agreements signed between Egypt and Israel at Camp David. The conference resolved that the Accords harmed the rights of the Palestinian people, and urged the Egyptian Government not to ratify the agreements and to align itself with the Arab League. The League also froze its relations with the Government of Egypt. (“Arab League Appeals to Egyptians to Renounce Accord with Israelis” The New York Times, November 6, 1978. p. 1) On November 4, Sadat refused to receive a delegation of Foreign Ministers from Arab countries that had been sent from the Baghdad Conference to Cairo. (Boutros Ghali, Egypt’s Road to Jerusalem, p. 173)
8. During a November 7 briefing on the conclusions of the Baghdad Conference, Saudi Deputy Foreign Minster Abd al-Rahman Mansuri told officials of the Embassy at Jidda that the Saudi delegation had blocked an attempt by the “rejectionists” to propose an Arab break in diplomatic, political, and economic relations with Egypt by making the counterproposal that these items should be discussed at a “later” conference of Arab Foreign Ministers and Economic Ministers. (Telegram 7992 from Jidda, November 7; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780460–0171) Of the Saudi decision to “join” the “rejectionists” in their condemnation of Egypt, Carter wrote in his memoirs that, despite the Saudi explanation of their “moderating influence, he “was disturbed that the Saudis had not fulfilled their earlier commitment to me.” (Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 410)
9. November 8.
10. In the left-hand margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote: “hold to present language.”
11. See footnote 2, Document 5.
12. Carter underlined this sentence and wrote in the left-hand margin: “mandatory.”
13. Carter wrote a question mark in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.