126. Telegram From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State1
24571. Subject: Letter From President Sadat to President Carter.
1. PriMin Khalil telephoned this afternoon to say he was sending over immediately a letter from President Sadat to President Carter on the Washington negotiations. Khalil asked that I forward it to President Carter as quickly as possible and before Boutros’ arrival in Washington later this afternoon.
2. Text follows: Quote:
Dear President Carter:
I would like to express to you, once again, my profound appreciation of the role you have been playing relentlessly for the cause of peace, which I have fully acknowledged in my recent speech in the opening session of the Egyptian Peoples Assembly. As you know I am following the Washington talks. It is obvious that certain problems remain to be solved. I am confident that you and your able assistants will spare no effort to make the ends meet and promote agreement.
One of these problems which is of utmost importance and is crucial to the ultimate success of our efforts is the Palestinian problem. I firmly believe that we have to reach an unequivocal agreement on what is to take place in the West Bank and Gaza in implementation of the Camp David Framework. Thus, we should lay down the format for establishing the self-governing authority and the abolition of the Israeli military government and its administration as provided for in the “Framework.” This would be accompanied by withdrawal of Israeli forces and redeployment of the remaining force in the specific security locations. A target date should be set for all that if we expect all parties to take the concept of transfer of authority seriously. This would require agreeing on the substantive aspects of the elections rather than the procedural ones. Also, the transfer of authority requires a clear definition of the powers and authority of the self-governing authority. All this requires a binding commitment from Israel to take these measures in a specified time. The logical date for that is the completion of the interim withdrawal in Sinai.
The implementation of these measures could proceed in the Gaza Strip first, for a variety of reasons. First, we have a certain responsibility [Page 430] there as you know. Thus, an Egyptian presence is certain to facilitate the process. Second, the political climate there is much more conducive to prove to all Palestinians that the change we agreed upon in Camp David, to bring about in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, is both genuine and feasible. This formula is apt to whip up support in Jordan and the West Bank for joining in with us before it becomes too late. It is also certain to generate more enthusiasm among the Palestinians at large for the Camp David Accord.
If I sign a peace treaty without having the agreement of the Israelis on what to take place in Gaza and West Bank, I would be concluding a separate agreement indeed.
This could be in contradiction not only with the basic line of our policy, but also with what we agreed upon in Camp David. You will undoubtedly recall that I told Prime Minister Begin in the clearest terms during our tripartite meeting on September the 7th and the 8th that I refuse to conclude a third disengagement agreement, a partial peace settlement or a separate agreement.
Needless to say that what I am proposing is the only course of action which serves the cause of peace. Postponement would lead to a veritable crisis in the near future and may abort all our previous efforts, and is apt to discourage and demoralize Palestinians who are willing to cooperate, leading to a situation over which we will have no control.
Israel would also be expected to take certain measures in the coming few weeks to improve the political climate in Gaza and West Bank, and stimulate the interest of their inhabitants. Such measures include permitting political activities, granting amnesty to political prisoners and permitting the reuniting of families by the return of their displaced members.
Dear President Carter,
In order to overcome the other problems, which have arisen in the course of negotiations due to the insistence of Israel to have a privileged position, the normalization of relations with Israel can only be realized on treating her on equal footing with other nations within the context of our laws, the international law and the United Nations Charter. Friendship and cooperation would only grow if there is a sense of fairness. For the treaty we are going to sign with Israel will be an example and model for the others. I am sure that you agree with me that such a model needs to be a solid and well founded one to stand any test.
In conclusion, please accept my best wishes and warm regards.
Mohammed Anwar El Sadat. Unquote.
- Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850067–2773. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. A signed copy of this letter is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 5, Egypt: President Anwar al-Sadat, 1–12/78.↩